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1 • 0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instr_/ctiQns and ground rules defined in N_TS 22206, Inst_uctioDs
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, I00Gtober 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward
Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and electrical power
distribution and control (EPD&C), generating draft failure modes
and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results
were then compared to the proposed post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL
baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison
for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD&C systems.
The IOA product for the RCS analysis consisted of two hundred
eight (208) hardware and two thousand sixty-four (2064) EPD&C
failure mode worksheets that resulted in one hundred forty-one
(141) hardware and four hundred forty-nine (449) EPD&C potential
critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of
the IOA_product to the°_A_A_MEA/CIL baseline as of 23 December"
1987 which consisted of ninety-nine (99) hardware and five hundred
twenty-four (524) EPD&C FMEAs, and sixty-two (62) hardware and one
hundred forty-four (144) EPD&C CIL items. In order to facilitate
comparison, additional IOA analysis worksheets were generated as
required. IOA mapped one hundred sixty-six (166) hardware and
five hundred ninety-seven (597) EPD&C FMEAs, and one hundred
thlrty-three (133) hardware and one hundred sixteen (116) EPD&C
CILs and PCIs into the NASA FMEAs and CILs. After comparison of
the IOA baseline to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline and discussions
with the NASA subsystem manager, ninety-six (96) hardware issues,
eighty-three (83) of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and two
hundred eighty (280) EPD&C issues, one hundred fifty-elght (158)
of which concern CIL items or PCIs, remain unresolved. These
three hundred seventy-six (376) issues can be grouped into three
categories: NSTS 22206 interpretation differences, IOA failure
modes not currently addressed on the NASA FMEA/CIL, and RCS
subsystem analysis differences.
One hundred seven (107) of the unresolved EPD&C issues result
because of differences in interpretation of NSTS 22206. The
NASA/RI definition of redundancy allowed the selection of
specific unrelated failures which were required to cause known
problems, e.g., failures required to cause continuous power to a
valve. The IQA redundancy string included only items that were
also capable of performing the specific function of the item
being analyzed. IOA considers many NASA/RI redundancy strings to
include multiple unrelated failures, thus making criticalities
too severe or masking other critical failures found by IOA.
One hundred twenty-eight (128) of the unresolved hardware and
EPD&C issues involve failure modes identified by IOA which are
not currently addressed on the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. IOA
considers each of these failure modes to be credible, and
recommends that they be added.
The remaining unresolved RCS issues result because of differences
between the IOA and NASA/RI analyses of the RCS subsystem. Many
of these issues are linked to a few general differences in the
analyses performed by IOA and NASA/RI. For example, seventeen(17) of the FRCS hardware issues are linked to the fact that IOA
considered the inability to deplete (dump) FRCS propellant to be
critical for entry. NASA/RI considered it critical only for ET
separation. Six (6) of the ARCS hardware issues result because
IOA considered any failure which resulted in the loss of primary
thrusters to be a crit 1 during RTLS and TAL aborts due to the
resulting reduced OMSand RCS propellant dump rates. Several of
the RCS hardware issues are related to failures which result in
propellant leakage. Per NSTS 22206, IOA considered a___yleakage
of propellant to be critical, regardless of where it occurred.
NASA/RI did not apply this philosophy to all propellant leakage
failues. Fifty (50) of the unresolved EPD&C issues result
because IOA considered the inability to determine the actual
position of a valve to be a 3/2R. Loss of all redundancy could
lead to falsely failing the valve closed, thus affecting mission
operations. NASA/RI classified such failures as 3/3's. The
remainder of the unresolved analysis-difference issues exist
independently and cannot, for the most part, be linked to any
general differences.
IOA recommends that the unresolved issues presented in this report
be considered for incorporation into the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline.
Figures 1 and 2 present comparisons of the proposed post 51-L NASA
hardware and EPD&Cbaselines with the IOA recommended hardware and
EPD&Cbaselines, respectively, and associated issues.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, EPD&C, functions, internal and external
interfaces, and operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis utiliz- _ _
ing as-built drawings to divide the respective subsystem into
components and low-level hardware items. Hardware and
EPD&C items are evaluated for failure mode, effects, and
criticality. These data are documented in the respective
subsystem analysis report, and are used to assess the NASA and
Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL reevaluation results. The IOA analysis
approach is summarized in the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0.
Step 4.0 summarizes the assessment of the NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEAs/CILs which is documented in this report .....
Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
i. 2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 RCS Ground Rules and Assumptions
The RCS specific ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA
analysis are presented in Appendix B.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Functional and Hardware Description
The Shuttle Orbiter includes three RCS packages, one forward and
two aft, one in each of the left and right OMS/RCS pods (Figure
3). Each RCS package consists of the following subsystems:
o Helium Pressurization
o Propellant Storage and Distribution
o Thruster
o Electrical Power Distribution and Control
Figures 4 through 7 present an overview of the RCS breakdown
hierarchy utilized in this analysis and assessment.
During a typical Shuttle mission, the RCS jets are used during
External Tank (ET) separation, orbit insertion, orbital
operations, deorbit maneuver, and entry. The Aft RCS (ARCS) is
active from prelaunch through the transition to aerosurface
control during entry. The Forward RCS (FRCS) is active from pre-
launch through the post-deorbit propellant dump and is disabled
for entry. Figures 8 and 9 are hardware schematics of the FRCS
and ARCS, respectively.
The RCS jets are first used in the mission after Main Engine
Cutoff (MECO) to maintain vehicle attitude until ET separation.
The RCS provides a translation maneuver during ET separation to
ensure Orbiter separation from the ET. The RCS is also used to
control roll in the event of the failure of two main engines
during ascent.
After OMS-I burn cutoff, the vehicle goes into attitude hold.
The crew uses the Translational Hand Controller (THC) to command
RCS translational maneuvers to null any residual velocity.
Attitude hold is maintained until the maneuver to OMS-2 burn
attitude which is performed manually by the crew using the
Rotational Hand Controller (RHC). The RCS +X jets can be used to
complete either the OMS-I or OMS-2 burns or to perform the OMS-2
burn entirely in the case of OMS engine failures. In this case,
the OMS-to-RCS interconnect capability will be used to feed OMS
propellant to the four +X RCS thrusters.
Once in orbit, after the OMS-2 burn is completed, RCS maneuvers
are performed to control the vehicle attitude according to the
flight plan. For onorbit attitude control the crew may select
either primary or vernier jets.
During deorbit, the RCS is used to maneuver to the OMS deorbit
burn attitude, null any residual velocity, dump excess propellant
for center-of,gravity control, and maneuver to the Entry
Interface (EI) attitude. In case both OMS engines malfunction,
the RCS can be used to perform or complete the deorbit burn. In
this case, the OMS-to-RCS interconnect will be selected to feed
OMS propellant to the four +X RCS thrusters.
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Once the deorbit burn is completed, the vehicle is maneuvered to
the EI attitude.
From EI (400,000 ft) to approximately 262,000 ft, the vehicle is
controlled in roll, pitch, and yaw with the ARCS jets. The GPCs
disable the roll thrusters below this altitude, since the vehicle
is captured and stable in the roll axis. Shortly after entering
blackout, the pitch thrusters are disabled. From this time on,
the elevons are used to control pitch and banking. The yaw
thrusters are still used to assist the rudder. This mode of
control will be used until the vehicle slows to Mach 1 where the
yaw thrusters are disabled. Total vehicle control is then
accomplished by the aerodynamic control surfaces through landing.
3.1.1 Helium Pressurization Subsystem
The pressurization subsystem regulates and distributes
helium to the propellant tanks. This subsystem consists of
two helium storage tanks, isolation valves, pressure
regulators, check valves, and the lines necessary for
filling, draining, and distributing the helium.
3.1.l.a Helium Storage Tanks
The high pressure helium supply is contained in two
1.761 cubic ft spherical storage tanks in each module.
The tanks are made of a titanium liner overwrapped with
fiberglass. One tank supplies helium pressure to the
fuel propellant tank while the other helium tank
supplies pressure to the oxidizer propellant tank. The
helium tank's maximum operating pressure is 4000 psig
and is proof-pressure tested to 4480 psig.
3.1.l.b Helium Isolation Valve
For each propellant there are two helium isolation
valves in parallel between the helium tanks and the
pressure regulators which are used to isolate the high-
pressure gaseous helium from the remainder of the
pressurization subsystem (Figure I0).
The helium isolation valves are operated by two
solenoids, one of which is momentarily energized to
magnetically latch the valve open. The second solenoid
magneticaliy unlatches the valve, allowing spring
and helium pressure to force the valve closed.
The switching logic for the helium isolation valves is
contained in the Forward and Aft Load Control
Assemblies (FLCA and ALCA). Solenoid and power logic
is provided by the Power Control Assemblies (PCA),
which are located within the LCAs. The LCAs and PCAs
must be powered up in order to operate the helium
isolation valves.
B
i
m
mmm
l
m
I
m
14
iw
u
i
i
=
w
m
F_
rmi
MAIN SEAL & SEAT
INLET
m
L . Figure i0 - HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE
15
The helium isolation valves are controlled by the FWD
RCS, AFT LEFT RCS, and AFT RIGHT RCS HE PRESS A/B
switches on panels 07 and 08. These are permanent
position switches (OPEN, GPC, CLOSE), but only apply
momentary power to the solenoid due to the logic in
the LCA. Each switch controls two isolation valves,
one in the helium oxidizer line and one in the helium
fuel line.
These valves contain microswitches which are activated
when the valves are fully open or closed. When
commanded, the switch logic allows a one-second delay
for the valves to reach the command position before
sending a position indication signal to the GPCs,
telemetry, and a position indicator (talkback) above
each switch. Power is then removed from the solenoids.
The talkback logic displays barberpole when the valves
are in motion or when there is a position mismatch
between the fuel and oxidizer helium valves.
Otherwise, the talkback shows OP for open valves and CL
for closed valves.
The GPC can command the isolation valve to open and
close to maintain the system pressurization and to
prevent overpressurization when the isolation valve
switch is in the GPC position. In the event of a
switch failure in the GPC position, the crew can open
or close the valves using the GPC memory read/write
procedures.
The valve's nominal operating pressure is 200 to 4000
psig and limits the flow to 81 scfm.
3.1.i.c Pressure Regulator Assembly
Helium pressure regulation is accomplished by two
regulator assemblies connected in parallel and located
downstream of each helium isolation valve (Figure ii).
Each assembly contains two regulators, primary and
secondary, connected in series so that if the primary
regulator fails open, the secondary regulator can
regulate the pressure within acceptable limits. The
regulators cannot be controlled manually or by the GPC.
The primary and secondary regulators regulate the tank
pressure to 245 psig and 256 psig, respectively. The
flow rate is limited to 81 scfm for 500 to 1400 psig
inlet pressure, and 150 scfm for 1400 to 4000 psig
inlet pressure.
3.1.l.d Check Valve Assembly
A check valve assembly, located between the pressure
regulator assemblies and each relief valve, is used to
preclude backflow of helium or propellant vapors or
B
m
i
g
i
m
I
m
mm
l
m
m
16
=m
m
u
M
i
u
=
I
r_
M
liquids (Figure 12). Each assembly contains four
independent check valves connected in series-parallel.
The check valves cannot be controlled manually or by
the GPC.
The valve's normal operating pressure is 355 psig, with
a maximum of 370 psig.
3.1.2 Propellant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
The propellant subsystem distributes the fuel and oxidizer
to the thrusters. This subsystem consists of propellant
tanks, pressure relief valves, tank isolation valves,
crossfeed valves, manifold isolation valves, and the lines
and couplings necessary for filling, draining, and
distributing the propellant.
3.1.2.a Propellant Tanks
Each RCS module contains two titanium 39.2-inch
spherical propellant tanks, one for fuel and one for
oxidizer (Figure 13). Each tank contains an
internally-mounted surface-tension screen Propellant
Acquisition Device (PAD) which acquires and delivers the
propellant to the RCS thrusters on demand. The surface-
tension device also prevents the helium pressurant gas
from entering the propellant or the propellant
distribution lines prior to propellant depletion. The
forward propellant tanks have PADs which are designed
to operate primarily in a low-g environment. The aft"
propellant tanks are designed to operate in both high
and low-g regimes.
3.1.2.b Pressure Relief Valve Assembly
The helium pressure relief valve assembly is located
between each check valve assembly and the propellant
tank, and will vent excess pressure overboard before it
can over pressurize the propellant tanks (Figure 14).
The assembly consists of a burst diaphragm, filter, and
relief valve. The burst diaphragm is of the non-
fragmentation type, but the filter is further insurance
that fragmentation or particles will not reach the
relief valve seat. The relief valve cannot be
controlled manually or by the GPC.
The burst disk ruptures at 332 psig. The relief valve
reseats at 310 psig.
3.1.2.c Tank Isolation, Crossfeed, and Manifold 1/2/3/4
Isolation Valves
The RCS propellant tank isolation, crossfeed, and
manifold 1/2/3/4 isolation valves are all AC motor
valves. Once a valve reaches the open or closed
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position, an open or close microswitch is
automatically activated to remove AC power from the
valve motor. A signal is also sent to the GPC, to the
ground, and to the valve position indicator (talkback),
located above each switch. The talkback logic displays
barberpole when the valves are in motion or when there
is a position mismatch between the fuel and the
oxidizer valves. Otherwise, the talkback shows "OP"
for open valves and "CL" for closed valves.
The tank isolation valves are located between the
propellant tanks and the manifold isolation valves, and
are used to isolate the propellant tanks from the
remainder of the subsystem (Figure 15).
The tank isolation valves are AC motor-operated and
contain a lift-off ball-flow control device. For each
module, one valve isolates each propellant tank from
the 1/2 manifold. Two valves in parallel isolate each
propellant tank from the 3/4/5 manifold line in the aft
modules, and one valve isolates each propellant tank
from the 3/4/5 manifold line in the forward module.
The tank isolation valves are controlled by the FWD
RCS, AFT LEFT RCS, and AFT RIGHT RCS TANK ISOLATION 1/2
and 3/4/5 switches on panels 07 and 08. These are
permanent position switches (OPEN, GPC, CLOSE). Switch
logic, relay logic, and motor logic for the isolation
valves are contained in the Fo_ard and Aft Motor
Control Assmmblies (FMCA and AMCA). Therefore, it is
necessary to have the MCAs powered up to operate the
tank isolation valves.
The FRCS tank isolation valves are normally maintained
open throughout the mission with the switch in the open
position. The ARCS tank isolation valves are in the
GPC position. With the switch in the GPC position, the
logic in the MCA is designed to receive computer
commands to control the valves. The GPC reconfigures
the aft tank isolation valves and the RCS and OMS
crossfeed valves in case of OMS-to-RCS interconnect, or
for RCS/RCS crossfeed operations. Manual configuration
is required in the case of manual RCS/RCS crossfeed and
on orbit/deorbit OMS-to-RCS interconnect. In the event
of a switch failure in the GPC position, the crew can
open or close the valves using GPC memory read/write
procedures.
The RCS crossfeed valves are contained only in the ARCS
pods, and are used to isolate the RCS propellant cross-
feed lines from the OMS interconnect lines (Figure 15).
They are located between the tank isolation valves and
the manifold isolation valves.
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The RCS crossfeed valves are AC motor-operated and
contain a lift-off ball-flow control device. One pair
of valves, one fuel and one oxidizer valve, isolate the
RCS crossfeed lines from the 1/2 propellant lines. One
pair of valves isolate the RCS crossfeed lines from the
3/4/5 propellant lines. The RCS crossfeed valves are
controlled by the LEFT, RIGHT RCS CROSSFEED 1/2 and
3/4/5 switches on panel 09. These are permanent
position switches (OPEN, GPC, CLOSE). switch logic,
relay logic, and motor logic for the isolation valves
are contained in the AMCA. Therefore, it is necessary
to have the MCAs powered up to operate the RCS
crossfeed valves.
The RCS crossfeed valves are normally maintained closed
throughout the mission, with the switch in the GPC
position. With the switch in the GPC position, the
logic in the MCA is designed to receive computer
commands to control the valves. The GPC reconfigures
these valves, the OMS crossfeed valves, and the tank
isolation valves in case of OMS-to-RCS interconnect
during aborts, or for RCS/RCS crossfeed operations.
Manual configuration is required in the case of manual
RCS/RCS crossfeed and on orbit/deorbit OMS-to-RCS
interconnect. In the event of a switch failure in the
GPC position, the crew can open or close the valves
using GPC memory read/write procedures.
The primary manifold isolation valves are located
between the tank isolation va_ives, downstream of the
RCS crossfeed valves, and the primary thrusters (Figure
15). They are used to isolate the primary thrusters
from the propellant subsystem.
The primary manifold isolation valves are AC motor-
operated and contain a lift-off ball flow control
device. For each module, one valve isolates each
manifold from each propellant. The primary manifold
isolation valves are controlled by the FWD RCS, AFT
LEFT RCS, and AFT RIGHT RCS MANIFOLD ISOLATION I, 2, 3,
and 4 switches on panels 07 and 08. These are
permanent position switches (OPEN, GPC, CLOSE). Switch
logic, relay logic, and motor logic for the isolation
valves are contained in the FMCA and AMCA. Therefore,
it is necessary to have the MCAs powered up to operate
the manifold isolation valves.
Redundancy Management (RM) is used to monitor the
microswitches in these valves, and can cause the valves
to be declared closed, and the jets on that manifold to
be removed from the Jet Available Table. The crew can
override the RM by CRT keyboard entries and reselect
the manifold and its jets.
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The primary manifold isolation valves are normally
maintained open throughout ascent and entry, with the
switch in the GPC position. With the switch in the GPC
position, the logic in the MCA is designed to receive
computer commands to control the valves. These valves
are controlled by the GPC during aborts and are
controlled by RM at all times. In the event of a
switch failure in the GPC position, the crew can open
or close the valves using GPC memory read/write
procedures.
3.1.2.d Vernier Manifold Isolation Valves
The vernier manifold isolation valves are located
between the tank isolation valves, downstream of the
RCS crossfeed valves, and the vernier thrusters (Figure
16). They are used to isolate the thrusters from the
propellant subsystem.
The vernier manifold isolation valves are DC solenoid
operated. One valve isolates each vernier manifold
from each propellant. The manifold isolation valves
are controlled by the ?WD RCS, AFT LEFT RCS, and AFT
RIGHT RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION switches on panels 07
and 08. These are momentary position switches (OPEN,
GPC, CLOSE). Switch logic for the vernier manifold
valves is contained in the FLCA and ALCA. Solenoid
logic and power logic is provided by the Power Control
Assemblies (PCAs). Therefore, it is necessary to have
the LCAs powered up to operate the manifold isolation
valves.
The circuitry to control the valve has been changed
since 51-L (Figure 17). The switches have been changed
from permanent position switches to momentary switches.
To prevent effects of an internal short in the switch,
diodes have been added to direct the current to ground
(thus blowing the associated fuse). A circuit breaker
and a Type IV hybrid driver have been added for
additional circuit control. The driver can receive
commands from either the switch panel or the GPC. These
changes have been implemented to prevent continuous
power from being applied to the solenoids. Continuous
power to these solenoids have been found to cause valve
overheating thus fuel decomposition leading to valve
rupture and propellant release.
Once a valve reaches the open or closed position, a
microswltch is automatically closed to remove DC
power from the valve solenoid. A signal is also sent
to the GPC, to the ground, and to the valve position
indicator (talkback) located above each switch. The
talkback logic displays barberpole when the valves are
in motion or when there is a position mismatch between
the fuel and the oxidizer valves. Otherwise, the talk-
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back shows "OP" for open valves and "CL" for closed
valves. Redundancy Management (RM) is used to monitor
the microswitches in these valves, and can cause the
valves to be declared closed, and the vernier jets to
be deselected. The crew can override the RM by CRT
keyboard entries and reselect the vernier jets.
The vernier manifold isolation valves are normally
maintained open throughout orbit and closed during
ascent and entry, with the switch in the GPC position.
With the switch in the GPC position, the logic in the
LCAs and PCAs is set up to receive computer commands to
control the valves. The GPC controls these valves by
RM at all times. In the event of a switch failure in
the GPC position, the crew can open or close the valves
using the GPC memory read/write procedures.
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3.1.3 Thruster Subsystem
The RCS jet thrusters are pressure-fed, bipropellant,
hypergolic engines. There are two types of thrusters in the
Shuttle: the primary thrusters, and the vernier thrusters
(Figure 18). Both types of thrusters contain a fuel and
oxidizer bipropellant solenoid valve, injector head
assembly, combustion chamber, expansion nozzle, and an
electrical junction box and can be operated in either pulse
mode or steady-state mode.
3.1.3.a Bipropellant Valves
The bipropellant control valves control the flow of
propellants to the thrusters by opening and closing in
response to electrical fire commands (Figure 19). Each
primary jet engine assembly contains two injector
solenoid pilot poppet valves, one for fuel and one for
oxidizer. They are operated by coaxially-wound coils
which are energized open by a fire command, and are
spring-loaded closed. When the pilot valves open, the
propellant's hydraulic pressure opens the main poppet
valves to allow the propellants into the injector. The
vernier jets use single-stage, solenoid-operated poppet
valves.
The fuel and oxidizer valves on the primary jet
thrusters are mechanically linked. The pilot valve is
activated by a 80 msec pulse sent from the Reaction Jet
Driver. Commands are issued every 80 msec, so the
minimum on or off time is 80 msec. The vernier
bipropellant valves are operated similarly by a
mechanically linked torque motor.
During normal operations, if the isolation and manifold
valves are properly configured, a fire command to a jet
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will cause that jet's bipropellant valves to open.
Removal of the fire command will cause the bipropellant
valves to close.
3.1.3.b Injector Head Assembly
Each RCS jet contains an injector head assembly which
directs the propellant flow from the bipropellant
control valves to the combustion chamber (Figure 20).
The injector is welded to the combustion chamber.
For the primary jets, injector holes are arranged in
two concentric rings (outer fuel, inner oxidizer) which
are canted to cause impingement of the hypergolic
propellants within the combustion chamber. Separate
fuel holes near the outer edge of the injector plate
provide cooling for the combustion chamber wall. Spaced
between these fuel inlet holes are acoustic cavities
which are of varied depth to prevent acoustic resonance
when the jet is fired.
For the vernier jets, fuel and oxidizer enter the
combustion chamber through a single pair of injector
holes which are also canted to provide impingement of
the fuel and oxidizer streams for combustion. The
combustion chamber wall is cooled by making the fuel
stream more divergent than the oxidizer stream.
Unlike stream impingement is used to improve propellant
mixing in the combustion chamber with a mixture ratio of
1.6 ibs oxidizer to 1.0 ibs fuel for both the primary
and vernier jets.
The primary jets operate at 152 psia, produce 870 ibs
(vacuum) thrust, and have a specific impulse of 280
seconds. The vernier jets operate at 106 psia, produce
25 ibs (vacuum) thrust, and have a specific impulse of
265 seconds.
3.1.3.c Combustion Chamber and Nozzle
The combustion chamber and nozzle are made of columbium
C-I03 with a RSI2A Disilicide coating 0.O03-inches
thick. Behind the columbium is Dynaflex molded
insulation covered with 0.02-inch thick titanium on the
outside.
3.1.4 Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem
3.1.4.a Electrical Junction Box
The electrical junction box on each RCS thruster
contains an electric heater and thermostat, a chamber
pressure transducer, a propellant leak detection
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device, and the electrical connections to the
bipropellant valves. The electrical heater contains
one heating element and is thermostatically controlled.
The thermostat is set to a predetermined range, and
will regulate the on and off cycles of the heater as
long as voltage is present. The heaters are controlled
by the RCS/OMS HEATERS switches on panel AI4. These
are two-position switches, OFF and AUTO, and the heater
is controlled by the thermostat when this switch is in
the AUTO position.
3.2 Redundancy Management
The RCS Redundancy Management (RM) monitors the RCS jets' chamber
pressures, temperatures, reaction jet driver output discretes and
jet fire commands, and manifold valves status. It also provides
a limited amount of automatic jet deselection and alerts the crew
when a fault is detected.
The Data Processing System (DPS) software provides status
information on I/O errors to the RCS RM software, referred to as
commfaults (communications faults). Commfault indicators are set
as the result of bus masking, Bus Control Element (BCE) bypasses,
and Bus Terminal Unit (BTU) bypasses. When an I/O error is
detected on a BCE chain by any GPC, the data on the entire chain
is flagged as invalid (commfaulted) for the applications
software. On subsequent transactions, if the problem is
isolated, only the faulty element is flagged as invalid. In a
similar way, if a bus mask is set all BCEs and data associated
with that bus is indicated via commfault as being in error. In
any case, the commfau!t will be set or latched when it is present
for two consecutive passes.
Commfaults are included in the RCS RM requirements to help
prevent the redundant GPCs from moding to dissimilar software, to
optimize the number of jets available for use, and to prevent the
RCS RM from generating additional alerts to the Flight Control
Operational Software (FCOS) generated alerts associated with
commfaults. The RCS RM uses the MDM and Line Replaceable Unit
(LRU) commfaults (where LRU is defined to be either one RCS jet
or one RCS manifold), and will reconfiqure for commfaults,
regardless of whether the commfault is permanent, permanent and
subsequently removed, or transient. The MDM and LRU commfaults
are set in the FCOS software when a commfault is present for two
cycles. There are 44 jet LRU commfaults and 15 manifold LRU
commfaults.
All input signals associated with any one LRU (where LRU is
defined as either one RCS jet or one RCS manifold) will be within
the same BCE, and the FCOS will set a BCE flag for a BCE if it
determines an I/O problem at the BCE level. This flag will be
used by the manifold status monitor in determining the commfault
state of the RCS LRU, and/or input signals for the LRU. A jet
33
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with an LRU commfault will not have any of its status flags or
counters modified as long as the fault exists, except by
subsequent crew action. An MDM commfault will set all LRU
commfaults for each BCE associated with the MDM commfault, thus
suspending the operation of the RCS RM failure monitors. An I/O
reset on a CRT keyboard will reset any latched commfaults. LRU
commfaults or transducer failures will cause the quantity monitor
to use substitute measurements or constants, and the CRTs will
shown on "M" to indicate missing data. If a substitute is not
available or a constant is used, the calculations are suspended,
a down arrow appears on the CRT, and a class 3 alarm is output.
All input signals associated with an LRU are required to be
within the same BCE. The input signals associated with each RCS
jet are a chamber pressure discrete, fuel and oxidizer injector
temperatures, and reaction jet driver output discrete. The input
signals associated with each manifold are the open and close
discretes for the fuel and oxidizer manifold isolation valves.
3.2.1 Jet Failed-On Monitor
The Jet Failed Monitor uses the Reaction Jet Driver (RJD)
output discretes and the jet fire command discretes provided
by the RCS CMD SOP to detect jets failed on.
The Jet Failed-On Monitor uses the jet fire command A
discretes, the reaction jet driver output discretes, the jet
inhibit discretes, and the jet LRU commfault discretes as
inputs, and outputs the jet failed-on indicator discretes
and the jet failedon counter discretes. There are 44 of
each of these discretes.
The Jet Failed-On Monitor's logic ANDs the reaction jet
driver output discrete with the complement of the jet fire
command A discrete, and declares the jet failed-on if this
calculation is true for three consecutive cycles.
Consecutive passes are not affected by commfaults or by
cycles in which there are fire commands for the affected
jets. The three consecutive cycle logic will be reset;
however, if the noncommanded jet has its reaction jet driver
output discrete reset to indicate the jet is not firing. A
jet failed-on declaration will not cause automatic
deselection of the jet by RM, nor will the Digital Autopilot
(DAP) reconfigure the Jet Priority Table.
A jet failed-on determination will set the jet failed-on
indicator discrete and the jet failed-on counter discrete.
These discretes will be reset when the associated jet's RM
inhibit discrete is reset. The Jet Failed-On Monitor
outputs the jet failed-on indicators to displays and
controls and to the Jet Fault Limit Module.
The Jet Failed-On Monitor's design is valid for a minimum
jet fire command pulse of 80 msec on and 80 msec off. The
crew will be alerted by a class 2 alarm, the backup C&W
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lights and RCS jet light on the C&W matrix on panel F7, a
fault message on the CRT fault message line, and jet-on
indications on the RCS SPEC display and the GNC SYS SUM 1
and 2 displays.
The Jet Failed-On Monitor is active in OPS i, 2, 3, 6, and 8
in the PASS, and i, 3, and 6 for the BFS, but only if BFS is
engaged.
3.2.2 Jet Failed-Off Monitor
The Jet Failed-Off Monitor uses the jet fire command
discretes provided by the RCS Command SOP, and the jet
chamber pressure feedback discretes provided by the RJDs to
detect jets failed off.
The Jet Failed-Off Monitor uses the jet fire command A
discretes, the jet chamber pressure discretes, the jet RM
inhibit discretes, and the jet LRU commfault discretes as
inputs, and outputs the jet failed-off indicator discretes
and the jet failed-off counter discretes. There are 44 of
each of these discretes.
The Jet Failed-Off Monitor's logic ANDs the jet fire command
A discrete with the complement of the jet chamber pressure
discrete, and declares the jet failed off if this calcula-
tion is true for three consecutive cycles. Consecutive
passes are not affected by commfaults or by cycles in which
there are no fire commands for the affected jets. However,
consecutive passes leading to a failed-off ;indication must
begin anew if, prior to reaching the third consecutive
cycle, the fire command and its associatedpressure discrete
indicates that the jet has fired. The RCS RM will automati-
cally deselect a jet which has failed off, and the DAP will
reconfigure jet selection accordingly. (See section 3.6.1
for the DAP Jet Select Logic description.)
A failed-off jet determination will set the associated jet
failed-off indicator and the jet failed-off counter
discretes. These discretes will be reset when the
associated jet's RM inhibit discrete is reset. The Jet
Failed-Off Monitor outputs these jet failed-off indicator
discretes to the Jet Fault Limit Module and to displays and
controls. The Jet Failed-Off Monitor will be inhibited for
the jet which has failed off until the crew resets the RM
inhibit discrete.
The Jet Failed-Off Monitor design is valid for a minimum jet
fire command pulse mode of 80 msec on and 80 msec off. The
crew is alerted to a failure by a class 2 alarm, the backup
C&W light and RCS jet light on the C&W matrix on panel F7, a
fault message on the CRT fault message line, and a jet-off
indication on the RCS SPEC display and the GNC SYS SUM 1 and
2 displays. The Jet Failed Off Monitor is active in OPS 2,
3, 6, and 8 in the PASS, and I, 3, and 6 for the BFS, but
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only if BFS is engaged.
3.2.3 Jet Leak Monitor
The Jet Leak Monitor uses the jet fuel and oxidizer injector
temperature transducer outputs of each jet to detect a
leaking jet.
The Jet Leak Monitor uses the jet fuel and oxidizer injector
temperatures, the jet RM inhibit discretes, and the jet LRU
commfault discretes as inputs, and outputs the jet failed
leak indicator discretes and the jet failed leak counter
discretes. There are 44 of each of these discretes.
The Jet Leak Monitor's Logic compares the jet fuel and
oxidizer injector temperatures with the specified
temperature limit of 30 degrees F, and declares the Jet
Failed Leak if either of the temperatures are less than 30
degrees F for three consecutive cycles. Consecutive passes
leading to a Jet Failed Leak indication will begin anew if
the fuel and oxidizer temperatures are both greater than 30
degrees F before the jet leak counter reaches three. The
RCS RM will automatically deselect a jet which is declared
leaking and the DAP will reconfigure jet selection
accordingly.
A Jet Failed Leak determination will set the associated jet
failed leak indicator and jet failed leak counter discretes.
These discretes will be reset when the associated jets RM
inhibit discrete is reset. The Jet Leak Monitor outputs the
Jet Failed Leak indicator discretes to the Jet Fault Limit
Module and to crew displays.
The crew is alerted to a failure by a class 2 alarm, the
backup C&W light and the RCS jet light on the C&W matrix on
panel F7, a fault message on the CRT fault message line, and
a Jet Failed Leak indication on the RCS SPEC display and the
GNC SYS SUM 1 and 2 displays.
The Jet Leak Monitor is active in OPS 2, 3, and 8 for the
PASS, and i, 3, and 6 for the BFS, but only if BFS is
engaged.
3.2.4 Jet Fault Limit Module
The Jet Fault Limit module limits the number of jets which
can be automatically deselected in response to failures
detected by RCS RM. The limits are modifiable by crew input
on the RCS SPEC display (RCS F, L, R Jet Fail Limit integers
- one integer per pod) _ This module also reconfigures a
' deselect outputjet s availability status (jet - - discretes
(44)) in response to crew inputs on the RCS SPEC display
(jet RM inhibit discretes (44) and jet deselect input
discretes (44)).
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An automatic deselection of a jet occurs if all of the
following are satisfied:
o Jet Failed-Off or Jet Failed Leak (Jet Failed-On
failures do not result in automatic deselection)
o Jet select/deselect status is "SELECT"
o Jet's manifold status is "OPEN"
o RM is not inhibited for this jet
o Jet failure has not been overridden
o The number of automatic deselections of primary
jets on this pod is less than the associated
Jet Fail Limit (no limit on vernier jets)
All jet failures detected will be announced to the crew even
if they do not cause automatic jet deselection. If multiple
failures occur on a jet, only the last failure will be
annunciated. Failure indicators are the same as in the Jet
Failed Off and Jet Failed Leak Monitors.
The jet fail limit counter is incremented by the number of
jets which have been automatically deselected for that pod
by the RCS RM and is decremented by one for each
automatically deselected jet that is reselected. The vernier
jets do not increment or decrement the jet fail limit
counter. The Jet Fail Limit valves are individually
changeable in major modes 2 and 3 on the RCS SPEC display.
An increase in the Jet Fail Limit allows previously failed
jets to be deselected, providing the above requirements are
met. A decrease in the Jet Fail Limit will not cause a
change in the status of any jet. Note that setting the Jet
Fail Limit equal to or less than the number of jets which
have been automatically deselected will effectively inhibit
the RCS RM for that pod.
A jet's status can be changed from deselect to select only by
item entry on the RCS SPEC page. Failure resets or
reductions in the Jet Fail Limit will not cause the status to
be reset to select. The select item entries cause the
override to be invoked if there is a declared failure for
that jet, and wili make those failures inoperative in the Jet
Fault Limit module. An overridden failure will remain
overridden until the applicable failure is reset.
Automatic deselection of a jet can be prevented by the use
of the Inhibit item entries on the RCS SPEC page. Changing
the Inhibit to Not Inhibited will reset a jet's failures,
but will not cause the Jet Fail Limit to be incremented or
decremented. Reset by use of the RM Inhibit of a failure
which has been overridden will reset the override. Jet
failures are unordered; that is, if there are more
candidates for automatic deselection than is permitted by
the Jet Fail Limit, there is no preference as to which of
the candidates will be deselected.
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3.2.5 Manifold Status Monitor
The Manifold Status Monitor uses the open and close
discretes of the oxidizer and fuel manifold isolation valves
(provided by the monitor control assemblies) to determine
the open/close status for each jet manifold.
The Manifold Status Monitor uses the fuel and oxidizer
manifold valve open discretes (15 of each discrete), the
fuel and oxidizer close discretes (15 of each), the manifold
status discrete (15 discretes), the manifold LRU commfault
discretes (15 discretes), the MDMcommfault discretes (8
discretes), and the manifold status override discrete (one
discrete) as inputs, and outputs the manifold open/close
status discretes (15 discretes), the RCS manifold RM dilemma
discretes (15 discretes), and the RM power fail discrete
(one discrete).
The Manifold Status Monitor monitors the open and close
discretes for each manifold for any changes of state. A
change of state in any one or more of these discretes will
cause a redetermination of that manifold's open/close
status, independent of status changes made by the crew.
This redetermination also contains logic which will deter-
mine if a power failure has occurred and will determine
whether a dilemma exists on a manifold (tables 3-I and 3-
If). A power failure condition exists when all of the open
and close discretes on a manifold are false for three
consecutive cycles, and will cause the RM Power Fail Flag to
be set. The manifold sets identified in Table 3-If are the
only manifolds which require power failure determination.
This flag will remain set until the GNCFDA module honors
it, when it will then be reset. There is only one RM Power
Fail Flag and all manifolds are capable of setting it, but
each can set the flag only once. Whenever a dilemma exists
for three consecutive passes, the RCS manifold RM Dilemma
Flag for that manifold will be set. MDMor LRU commfaults
will not modify the dilemma pass counter or the RM Dilemma
Flag. The flag will be reset, however, if any of the four
manifold open/close discretes change state.
The transition of an MDM commfault discrete from false to
true will cause the status of all affected manifolds to be
set to close in all major modes. In major mode I, the same
is true of an LRU commfault. In major modes 2 and 3, the
transition of an LRU commfault will cause no change in
manifold statuses.
The crew is able to override the status of all manifolds on
an individual basis by item entries on the RCS SPEC display
via the Manifold Status Override. The setting of this
discrete for a manifold will change the manifold's status to
its complementary state and will then reset the discrete.
The use of the Manifold Status Override feature will not
inhibit or modify any of the other functions of the manifold
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status monitor. The module will continue to honor
subsequent changeS_in the affectedmanifold's input signals
(open/close discretes, commfaults, override discrete) as
specified in this section.
The Manifold Close Status Override is used in Major Modes 1
and 3 open all manifolds whose status is closed and whose
open/close discretes are in dilemma. This discrete can be
set by item entry on the Override page, and will be reset to
false after the reconfiguration is complete. The use of the
Manifold Close Status Override feature will not inhibit or
modify any of the other functions of the Manifold Status
Monitor.
3.2.6 Available Jet Status Table
The Available Jet Status table module provides a list of
jets available for use to the Jet Select Logic Module in the
Flight Control System software.
The Available Jet Status Table uses the manifold open/close
discretes (15 discretes) from the Manifold Status Monitor,
and the jet deselect output discretes (44 discretes) from
the Jet Fault Limit Module as inputs, and outputs the jet
available discretes (44 discretes) and the jet status change
discrete (one discrete).
The Available Jet Status Table's logic "AND"s the jet de-
select output discrete with the manifold open/close status
discrete and statuses a jet as available to the Flight
Control System if the discretes indicate select and open,
respectively. The Available Jet Status Table will be com-
puted each time that the jet status change discrete is true.
In the BFS, Jet failures are detected only when BFS is
engaged. The Jet Failed Leaking and Jets Failed-Off
detection in the BFS is the same as in the PASS, but the jet
chamber pressure feedback discrete is used for Jet Fail-On
detection in the BFS rather than the RJD output discrete
which is used in the PASS.
3.3 Interfaces and Locations
The RCS interfaces with the following systems: Data Processing
System, Displays and Controls, Caution and Warning, Orbital
Maneuvering System, Electrical Power Distribution and Control,
and the Pulse Code Modulator. In addition, the RCS interfaces
with the crew.
3.3.1 Data Processing Syste m ......
The RCS sends data consisting of pressures, temperatures, and
valve positions to the Data Processing System (DPS) through
the flight-critical Multiplexer Demultiplexers (MDMs) to
have the data processed by the GPCs. The GPCs use this data
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to monitor and display the configuration and status of the
RCS. The GPCs also provide valve configuration commands to
the RCS and jet on/off commands to the RCS via the Reaction
Jet Drivers Aft and Forward (RJDA and RJDF).
The Flight Control software uses the RCS Digital Automatic
Pilot (DAP) to hold attitude or to accomplish an attitude
maneuver by virtue of an error correction method. The State
Estimator takes IMU data from the Attitude Processor
software (ATT PROC), filters it, and sends it to a module
called RCS Errors Phase Plane. In the RCS Errors module,
attitude commands coming from the hand controller or from
the Universal Pointing software (which runs the display by
the same name) are compared with the actual attitude as
computed by the State Estimator. The result is an attitude
error and rate error which are passed on to the Phase Plane
module. The Phase Plane Module generates positive or
negative rate commands for each axis. These commands are
sent to the RCS Activity Lights and to the Jet Select
module.
The Jet Select Module uses a look-up table to determine how
many jets are needed from each directional cluster. (A
"directional cluster" is a group of jets located within the
same pod, forward, left, or right, which provide thrust
in the same axis and direction.) There are several such
tables which take into account jet failures, propellant feed
constraints, and usage of OMSpropellant. A Jet Priority
Table is used to determine the particular jets to be fired.
Each jet in a directional cluster is assigned a priority
permission. If RCS RM removes a jet from the Available Jet
Status Table, the jet will be removed from the Jet Priority
Table. Thus, the Jet Select Module logic will automatically
select the next highest priority jet in that directional
cluster. The crew has the capability to change a jet's
priority on the Jet Priority Table or to override RM
deselection of a jet from the Available Jet Status Table.
3.3.2 Displays and Controls
RCS data is sent to the Displays and Controls (D&C) to be
displayed on dedicated displays. Switches and circuit
breakers in the D&C panels are used for manual valve
configuration and power routing to the RCS. z
3.3.3 Caution and Warning
A selected portion of the RCS parameters are sent to the
Caution and Warning (C&W) unit, where they are limit sensed
to determine if RCS anomalies exist. If system anomalies
are found, the C&W issues signals that illuminate the proper
light on the C&W panel, the master alarm pushbutton
indicators (pbis), and turn on the C&W tone.
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3.3.4 Orbital Maneuvering System
The ARCS modules are connected with each other and with the
OMS by propellant interconnect lines so that either or both
OMS module's propellants can be fed to either or both of the
ARCS modules.
3.3.5 Electrical Power Distribution and Control System
The Electrical Power Distribution and Control System (EPD&C)
provides both AC and DC power to the RCS.
3.3.6 Pulse Code Modulator
Data from the RCS is routed through the Input/Output (I/O)
MDMs to the Pulse Code Modulator (PCM) for incorporation in
the telemetry downlink to be sent to the ground and to the
onboard recorders.
3.3.7 Crew
The crew monitors and controls the RCS performance through
CRT displays, fault messages, keyboard item entries, C&W
indications, and associated switches and indicators.
3.4 Hierarchy
Figures 4 through 7 illustrate the hierarchy of the RCS hardware
components. Figures 8 through 20 depict the functional details of
the RCS subsystem components.
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the RCS hardware initially generated two
hundred eight (208) failure mode worksheets and identified one
hundred forty-one (141) potential critical items (PCIs) before
starting the assessment process. The EPD&C subsystem analysis
initially generated two thousand sixty-four (2064) worksheets with
four hundred forty-nine (449) PCIs. These analysis results along
with additional analysis results generated during the assessment
(Appendix E) were compared to the proposed NASA baseline of
ninety-nine (99) hardware and five hundred twenty-four (524) EPD&C
FMEAs, and sixty-two (62) hardware and one hundred forty-four
(144) EPD&C CIL items. IOA mapped one hundred sixty-six (166)
hardware and five hundred ninety-seven (597) EPD&C FMEAs, and one
hundred thirty-three (133) hardware and one hundred sixteen (116)
EPD&C CILs and PCIs into the NASA FMEAS and CILs. Upon completion
of the assessment, and after discussions with the NASA subsystem
manager, ninety-six (96) hardware issues, eighty-three (83) of
which concern CIL items or PCIs, and two hundred eighty (280)
EPD&C issues, one hundred fifty-eight (158) of which concern CIL
items or PCIs, remain unresolved. Each of these unresolved issues
are presented in subsequent section 4 paragraphs as well as in the
detailed assessment worksheets (Appendix C). Any IOA issues which
were resolved with the NASA subsystem manager are documented as
such on the detailed assessment worksheets, but are not discussed
in section 4.
Appendix C presents detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. These worksheets detail the
assessments of each failure mode and document unresolved issues,
resolved issues, plus any additional non-issue recommendations and
comments. Appendix D highlights the IOA recommended critical
items list and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix E
contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous analysis
results reported in Space Transportation System Engineering and
Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper No. 1.0-WP-VA86001-27,
Analysis of the Reaction Control System, January 19, 1987.
Appendix F provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEAs and
corresponding IOA worksheet(s) along with IOA recommendations and
an issues "flag" to denote the FMEAs with which IOA has unresolved
issues. Appendix G identifies IOA analysis worksheets that have
been superseded by the re-analysis shown in Appendix E.
Following the hierarchy breakdown shown in Figures 4-7, the RCS
assessment results are summarized in the tables below.
Tables I-A.I, I-B.I, I-A.2, and I-B.2 present summaries of the IOA
FMEA assessments for the forward RCS hardware, forward RCS EPD&C,
aft RCS hardware, and aft RCS EPD&C, respectively. The IOA INTL
column is the initial number of IOA failure modes for each RCS
component. The recommended IOA FMEA baseline (IOA MAP) versus the
NASA FMEA baseline, and resulting unresolved issues are presented
in the subsequent columns. The unresolved failure mode issues for
each RCS component are discussed in the associated section 4
paragraph referenced in the final column.
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Tables II-A.I, II-B.I, II-A.2, and II-B.2 present summaries of the
IOA CIL assessments for the forward RCS hardware, forward RCS
EPD&C, aft RCS hardware, and aft RCS EPD&C, respectively. The IOA
INTL column is the initial number of IOA PCIs for each RCS
component. The recommended IOA CIL baseline (IOA MAP) versus the
NASA CIL baseline, and resulting unresolved issues are presented
in the subsequent columns. Again, the unresolved failure mode
issues for each RCS component are discussed in the associated
section 4 paragraph referenced in the final column.
Tables III-A.1, III-B.I, III-A.2, and III-B.2 present summaries of
the recommended IOA FMEA baselines for the forward RCS hardware,
forward RCS EPD&C, aft RCS hardware, and aft RCS EPD&C,
respectively.
Tables IV-A.I, IV-B.I, IV-A.2, and IV-B.2 present summaries of the
recommended IOA CIL baselines for the forward RCS hardware,
forward RCS EPD&C, aft RCS hardware, and aft RCS EPD&C,
respectively.
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TABLE I-A. 1 Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment - FRCS Hardware
Components IOA IOA INASA ISSUES PARAGRAPHS
INTL MAP FMEAS FOR ISSUES
4.1.2.1°AHE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK
TANK ISOLATION VALVES
REGULATOR ASSEMBLIES
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANKS
PROPELLANT CHANNEL SCREENS
PROPELLANT FEEDOUT TUBES
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLIES
GROUND MANUAL ISOL VALVES
GIMBAL BELLOWS
TANK ISOL VALVES
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, PRIMARY
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, VERNIER
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
INJECTOR HEAD
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
VERNIER JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
1
2
6
2
6
2
4
1
1
1
2
3
2
6
I0
2
2
2
24
2
2
9
0
1
1
5
5
4
5
4
1
1
1
0
8
2
1
6
5
5
1
0
4
4
1
6
2
2
1
2
2
3
4
2
1
1
1
0
5
1
1
4
4
3
1
0
2
0
5
4
4
1
2
0
0
1
0
3
1
0
5
4
4
1
0
2
2
0
5
1
3
1
2
1
6
2
0
TOTAL 99 78 49 49
4.1.2.1.A.I
4.1.2.1.A.2
4.1.2.1.A.3
4.1.2.1.A.4
4.1.2.1.A.4
4.1.2.2.A
4.1.2.2.A.I
4.1.2.2.A.2
4.1.2.2.A.3
4.1.2.2.A.4
4.1.2.2.A.5
4.1.2.2.A.6
4.1.2.2.A.7
4.1.2.2.A.8
4.1.2.2.A.8
4.1.2.3.A
4.1.2.3.A.I
4.1.2.3.A.2
4.1.2.3.A.3
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TABLE I-B. 1 Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment - FRCS EPD&C
Components IOA IOA NASA ISSUES PARAGRAPHS
INTL MAP FMEAS FOR ISSUES
4.1.2.1.BH_ PRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
MICROSWITCH
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
P_OP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
MICROSWITCH
CIRCUIT BREAKER
METERS/ROTARY SWITCH
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
8
16
12
2
16
5
1
1
8
4
4
197
38
I0
40
i00
35
8
2
5
4 4
9 7
8 8
1 1
3 3
2 2
1 0
4
71
2O
4
12
16
8
8
2
4
1
1
1
4
67
2O
4
12
16
8
0
2
4
6
2
1
0
5
2
0
2
1
1
1
0
0
4
27
2O
1
9
i0
3
8
1
2
4.1.2.1.B.I
4.1.2.1.B.2
4.1.2.1.B.3
4.1.2.1.B.4
4.1.2.1.B.5
4.1.2.1.B.6
4.1.2.2.B
4.1.2.2.B.I
4.1.2.2.B.2
4.1.2.2.B.3
4.1.2.2.B.4
4.1.2.2.B.5
4.1.2.2.B.6
4.1.2.2.B.7
4.1.2.2.B.8
4.1.2.2.B.9
4.1.2.2.B.I0
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
INSTRUMENTATION
SENSOR, CONTINUITY
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
12
24
14
24
46
12
13
6
8O
42
3
i0
17
4
4
2
ii
6
3
i
1
I
i0
12
4
4
2
i0
6
2
6
0
0
5
7
3
3
2
1
5
1
4.1.2.2.B.11
4.1.2.3.B
4
I0
i0
4
4
4
0
2
2
4.1.2.3.B.I
4.1.2.3.B.2
4.1.2.3.B.3
4.1.2.3.B.4
4.1.2.3.B.5
4.1.2.3.B.6
4.1.2.3.B.7
4.1.2.3.B.8
4.1.2.3.B.9
4.1.2.3.B.I0
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TABLE I-B.I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment - FRCS EPD&C (cont'd)
Components IOA IOA NASA ISSUES PARAGRAPHS
INTL MAP FMEAS FOR ISSUES
4.1.2.4.BTHERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS
FUSE
HEATER
RESISTOR
SWITCH, THERMAL
SWITCH, TOGGLE
POD
DRIVER
FUSE
HEATER
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
5
8
i0
12
25
24
12
12
4
16
5
3
4
1
4
4
2
2
1
2
3
2
2
2
1
2
3
2
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
4.1.2.4.B.I
4.1.2.4.B.2
TOTAL 945 287 254 137
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TABLE I-A. 2 Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment - ARCS Hardware
Components IOA IOA NASA ISSUES PARAGRAPHS
INTL MAP FMEAS FOR ISSUES
4.2.2.1.AHE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK 1 1
TANK ISOLATION VALVES
REGULATOR ASSEMBLIES
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
PRO_ STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANKS
PROPELLANT CHANNEL SCREENS
PROPELLANT FEEDOUT TUBES
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLIES
GROUND MANUAL ISOL VALVES
GIMBAL BELLOWS
TANK ISOL VALVES
CROSSFEED VALVES
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, PRIMARY
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, VERNIER
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
INJECTOR HEAD
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
VERNIER JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
2
6
2
4
4
4
1
1
1
2
3
2
6
6
i0
2
2
2
20
8
4
5
4
4
7
4
1
1
1
0
8
2
1
8
6
6
5
0
4
4
1
2
2
3
4
2
1
1
1
0
5
1
1
4
4
4
3
1
0
2
2
1
3
0
2
2
1
4
3
2
3
2
0
0
1
0
3
1
0
5
3
4
2
0
0
2
2
0
6
2
0
2
0
TOTAL 109 88 53 47
4.2.2.1.A.I
4.2.2.1.A.2
4.2.2.1.A.3
4.2.2.1.A.4
4.2.2.1.A.4
4.2.2.2.A
4.2.2.2.A.I
4.2.2.2.A.2
4.2.2.2.A.3
4.2.2.2.A.4
4.2.2.2.A.5
4.2.2.2.A.6
4.2.2.2.A.7
4.2.2.2.A.8
4.2.2.2.A.8
4.2.2.3.A
4.2.2.3.A.I
4.2.2.3.A.2
4.2.2.3.A.3
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WTABLE I-B.2 Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment - ARCS EPD&C
Components ISSUES
HE pRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
MICROSWITCH
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
PROp $TO_ & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
MICROSWITCH
CIRCUIT BREAKER
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
THRUSTE_R SUBSYSTEM
IOA
INTL
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
INSTRUMENTATION
SENSOR, CONTINUITY
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
16
25
24
4
32
5
1
1
8
4
4
177
54
17
48
139
50
9
2
36
90
24
19
6
122
40
4
5
20
12
IOA NASA
MAP FMEAS
4 4
9 7
7 7
1 1
3 3
2 2
1 0
1 1
1 1
1 1
4 4
87 83
25 25
6 6
16 16
25 19
12 12
9 0
2 2
8 8
1 1
1 1
6 6
12 12
6 6
3 3
2 2
I0 i0
4 4
2 2
5 0
6 3
5 3
0
4
2
0
2
0
1
1
0
0
3
35
21
0
ii
19
4
9
2
8
0
0
2
0
3
0
1
0
2
0
0
3
2
PARAGRAPHS
FOR ISSUES
4.2.2.1.B
4.2.2.1.B.I
4.2.2.1.B.2
4.2.2.1.B.3
4.2.2.1.B.4
4.2.2.1.B.5
4.2.2.2.B
4.2.2.2.B.I
4.2.2.2.B.2
4.2.2.2.B.3
4.2.2.2.B.4
4.2o2°2.B.5
4.2.2.2.B.6
4.2.2.2.B.7
4.2.2.2.B.8
4.2.2.2.B.9
4.2.2.3.B
4.2.2.3.B.I
4.2.2.3.B.2
4.2.2.3.B.3
4.2.2.3.B.4
4.2.2.3.B.5
4.2.2.3.B.6
J
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TABLE I-B.2 Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment - ARCS EPD&C (cont'd)
Components IOA IOA NASA ISSUES PARAGRAPHS
INTL MAP FMEAS FOR ISSUES
4.2.2.4.BTHERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS
FUSE
HEATER
RESISTOR
SWITCH, THERMAL
SWITCH, TOGGLE
DRIVER
5
8
i0
8
25
I0
2
4
1
8
4
4
TOTAL 1083 310
2
4
1
0
4
4
270
0
0
0
8
0
0
143
4.2.2.4.B.I
)
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TABLE II-A. 1 Summary of IOA CIL Assessment - FRCS Hardware
Components IOA IOA iNASA ISSUES PARAGRAPHS
INTL MAP CILS FOR ISSUES
4.1.2.1.AHE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK
TANK ISOLATION VALVES
REGULATOR ASSEMBLIES
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
PROp STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANKS
PROPELLANT CHANNEL SCREENS
PROPELLANT FEEDOUT TUBES
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLIES
GROUND MANUAL ISOL VALVES
GIMBAL BELLOWS
TANK ISOL VALVES
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, PRIMARY
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, VERNIER
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
THRUST_R SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
INJECTOR HEAD
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
VERNIER JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
1
1
5
2
3
0
4
1
1
1
2
2
2
4
6
1
2
2
12
0
2
7
0
1
1
5
5
4
2
2
1
1
1
0
7
1
1
3
4
4
1
0
2
i
0
i
2
2
I
I
1
1
0
4
0
1
1
1
2
1
0
1
1
1
2
0
2
0
5
4
4
0
1
0
0
1
0
3
1
0
3
4
3
1
0
1
1
0
6
2
0
5
1
2
1
2
0
TOTAL 68 62 30 42
4.1.2.1.A.i
4.1.2.1.A.2
4.1.2.1.A.3
4.1.2.1.A.4
4.1.2.2.A
4.1.2.2.A.I
4.1.2.2.A.2
4.1°2.2.A.3
4.1.2.2.A.4
4.1.2.2.A.5
4.1.2.2.A.6
4.1.2.2oA.7
4.1.2o2.A.8
4.1.2.2.A.8
4.1.2.3.A
4.1.2.3.A.I
4.1.2.3.A.2
4.1.2.3.A.3
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TABLE II-B.1 Summary of IOA CIL Assessment - FRCS EPD&C
Components
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
MICROSWITCH
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
PROP ST0_ & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
MICROSWITCH
CIRCUIT BREAKER
METERS/ROTARY SWITCH
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
IOA
INTL
0
3
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
1
i0
8
0
20
0
i0
2
0
0
0
0
0
IOA
MAP
0
2
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
4
5
0
7
0
2
2
0
0
NASA
CILS
2
9
8
0
6
4
1
0
1
0
2
0
0
ISSUES
0
3
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
3
ii
12
0
9
4
2
2
1
0
2
0
0
PIuRAGRAPHS
FOR ISSUES
4.1.2.1.B
4.1.2.1.B.I
4.1.2.1.B.4
4.1.2.2.B
4.1.2.2.B.I
4.1.2.2.B.2
4.1.2.2.B.3
4.1.2.2.B.5
4.1.2.2.B.6
4.1.2.2.B.7
4.1.2.2.B.8
4.1.2.2.B.9
4.1.2.2.B.II
4.1.2.3.B
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
INSTRUMENTATION
SENSOR, CONTINUITY
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
9
23
4
12
3
6
17
2
0
2
2
3
Ii
2
5
1
2
3
2
3
7
3
1
0
2
1
1
0
0
0
4
8
3
3
1
0
2
1
0
2
2
4.1.2.3.B.I
4.1.2.3.B.2
4.1.2.3.B.3
4.1.2.3.B.4
4.1.2.3.B.5
4.1.2.3.B.7
4.1.2.3.B.8 _
4.1.2.3.B.9
4.1.2.3.B. I0
L
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TABLE II-B.I Summary of IOA CIL Assessment - FRCS EPD&C (cont'd)
Components IOA IOA NASA ISSUES PARAGRAPHS
INTL MAP CILS FOR ISSUES
4.1.2.4.BTHERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS
FUSE
HEATER
RESISTOR
SWITCH, THERMAL
SWITCH, TOGGLE
1
1
0
1
3
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
POD
DRIVER
FUSE
HEATER
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
TOTAL
0
0
0
0
0
3
145
0
0
1
62
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0
0 0
1 0
57 77
4.1.2.4.B.I
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TABLE II-A.2 Summary of IOA CIL Assessment - ARCS Hardware
Components IOA IOA NASA ISSUES PARAGRAPHS
INTL MAP CILS FOR ISSUES
4.2.2.1.AHE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK
TANK ISOLATION VALVES
REGULATOR ASSEMBLIES
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
P_OP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANKS
PROPELLANT CHANNEL SCREENS
PROPELLANT FEEDOUT TUBES
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLIES
GROUND MANUAL ISOL VALVES
GIMBAL BELLOWS
TANK ISOL VALVES
CROSSFEED VALVES
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, PRIMARY
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, VERNIER
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
INJECTOR HEAD
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
VERNIER JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
1
1
5
2
2
0
4
1
1
1
2
2
2
5
6
6
1
2
2
I0
0
4
6
0
1
1
5
4
4
3
2
1
1
1
0
7
1
1
7
4
5
4
1
0
2
2
1
6
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
0
4
0
1
2
2
1
2
1
0
1
1
l
2
0
2
0
4
3
2
1
1
0
0
1
0
3
1
0
5
2
4
2
0
0
1
6
2
0
2
0
5
1
3
1
2
1
TOTAL 73 71 35 41
4.2.2.1.A.I
4.2.2.1.A.2
4.2.2.1.A.3
4.2.2.1.A.4
4.2.2.1.A.4
4.2.2.2 .A
4.2.2.2.A.I
4.2.2.2.A.2
4.2.2.2.A.3
4.2.2.2.A.4
4.2.2.2.A.5
4.2.2.2.A.6
4.2.2.2.A.7
4.2.2.2.A.8
4.2.2.2.A.8
4.2.2.3.A
4.2.2.3.A.I
4.2.2.3.A.2
4.2.2.3.A.3
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TABLE II-B.2 Summary of IOA CIL Assessment - ARCS EPD&C
Components ISSUES
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
MICROSWITCH
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
PROP $TOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
MICROSWITCH
CIRCUIT BREAKER
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
SIGNAL CONDITIONER
INSTRUMENTATION
SENSOR, CONTINUITY
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
IOA
INTL
0
4
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
15
5
0
I0
0
I0
1
1
0
0
0
2
62
4
8
0
9
4
2
0
0
0
IOA
MAP
I .....
0
2
0
0
0
1
0
0
9
5
0
5
0
3
1
1
0
0
0
1
6
2
1
0
2
1
2
0
0
0
NASA
CILS
0
2
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
3
22
13
0
9
5
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
25
15
0
i0
5
4
1
2
3
0
0
2
0
3
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
I PARAGRAPHSFOR ISSUES
4.2.2.1.B
4.2.2.1.B.I
4.2.2.2.B
4.2.2.2.B.I
4.2o2.2.B.2
4.2.2.2.B.3
4o2.2.2.B.4
4.2.2.2°B.5
4.2.2.2.B.6
4.2.2.2.B.7
4.2.2.2.B.8
4.2.2.2.B.9
4.2.2.3.B
4.2.2.3.B.4
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TABLE II-B.2 Summalfy of IOA CIL Assessment ARCS EPD&C (cont'd)
Components IOA IOA NASA ISSUES PARAGRAPHS
INTL MAP CILS FOR ISSUES
4.2.2.4.BTHERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS
FUSE
HEATER
RESISTOR
SWITCH, THERMAL
SWITCH, TOGGLE
DRIVER
5
1
0
4
15
5
2
1
0
4
2
2
2
1
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
4
0
0
TOTAL 171 54 87 81
4.2.2.4.B.I
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TABLE I I I-A. 1
Criticality:
IOA Recommended Criticalities
i/I 2/IR 2/2
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK
TANK ISOLATION VALVES
REGULATOR ASSEMBLIES
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANKS
PROPELLANT CHANNEL SCREENS
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLIES
GROUND MANUAL ISOL VALVES
GIMBAL BELLOWS
TANK ISOL VALVES
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, PRIMARY
MANIFOLD ISOLVLVS, VERNIER
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
T_H_USTER SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
INJECTOR HEAD
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
VERNIER JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
TOTAL
- FRCS Hardware
3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 2 0 2 0 0 5
1 2 0 1 1 0 5
2 2 0 0 0 0 4
0 2 0 0 0 3 5
0 0 0 2 0 2 4
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 3 0 3 0 0 8
1 0 0 0 0 1 2
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 2 0 3 0 0 6
2 2 0 1 0 0 5
2 1 1 1 0 0 5
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 2 0 0 0 2 4
0 0 0 2 0 2 4
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
4 2 0 0 0 0 6
2 0 0 0 0 0 2
2 0 0 0 0 0 2
2 0 1 0 0 0 3
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
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TABLE III-B.I IOA Recommended Criticalities - FRCS EPD&C
Criticality: i/i 2/1R 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER 0 0 0 3 0 1 4
DIODE 0 1 0 3 1 4 9
DRIVER 0 0 0 5 2 1 8
FUSE 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 2 1 3
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
MICROSWITCH 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 2 4
0 2 2 12 II 44 71
0 1 4 4 7 4 20
0 0 0 4 0 0 4
0 6 0 6 0 0 12
0 0 0 0 I0 6 16
0 1 0 7 0 0 8
0 2 0 0 6 0 8
0 0 0 1 0 1 2
0 0 0 0 2 2 4
0 0 0 0 6 0 6
0 0 0 0 2 0 2
0 0 0 0 1 0 1
PROp STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
MICROSWITCH
CIRCUIT BREAKER
METERS/ROTARY SWITCH
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER 0 2 1 2 0 5 i0
DIODE 0 5 1 5 0 6 17
DRIVER 0 1 1 0 0 2 4
FUSE 0 3 1 0 0 0 4
RELAY 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
RESISTOR 0 0 0 1 2 8 ii
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 2 1 0 0 3 6
SIGNAL CONDITIONER 0 0 1 1 1 0 3
INSTRUMENTATION
SENSOR, CONTINUITY 0 0 0 0 0 4 4
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 0 0 0 4 0 4
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 0 0 4 0 4
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TABLE III-B.I
Criticality:
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS
FUSE
HEATER
RESISTOR
SWITCH, THERMAL
SWITCH, TOGGLE
POD
DRIVER
FUSE
HEATER
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
TOTAL
IOA Recommended Criticalities - FRCS EPD&C (cont'd)
I/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
0 0 1 0 2 0 3
0 0 1 0 1 2 4
0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 3 0 4
0 0 1 0 1 2 4
0 0 0 0 2 0 2
0 0 0 0 2 0 2
0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 2
0 0 0 0 1 3 4
0 0 1 0 0 1 2
0 28 18 56 79 106 287
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TABLE III-A.2 IOA Recommended Criticalities - ARCS Hardware
Criticality: i/I 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK 1 0
TANK ISOLATION VALVES 1 2
REGULATOR ASSEMBLIES 1 1
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY 2 2
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL) 0 3
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL) 0 0
LINES AND FITTINGS 1 0
i .......
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANKS 1 0
PROPELLANT CHANNEL SCREENS 1 0
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLIES 2 3
GROUND MANUAL ISOL VALVES 1 0
GIMBAL BELLOWS 1 0
TANK ISOL VALVES 2 1
CROSSFEED VALVES 2 0
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, PRIMARY 2 1
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, VERNIER 3 0
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY 1 0
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL) 0 2
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL) 0 0
LINES AND FITTINGS 1 0
TOTAL
0 0 0 0 1
0 2 0 0 5
0 1 1 0 4
0 0 0 0 4
0 0 0 4 7
0 2 0 2 4
0 0 0 0 1
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES 4 0
INJECTOR HEAD 2 0
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE 2 0
VERNIER JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES 2 0
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE 1 0
TOTAL 34 15
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 3 0 0 8
0 0 0 1 2
0 0 0 0 1
1 4 0 0 8
2 2 0 0 6
0 3 0 0 6
1 1 0 0 5
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 2 4
0 2 0 2 4
0 0 0 0 1
0 2 0 0 6
0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 2
1 0 0 0 3
0 0 0 0 1
.... !
5 22 1 ii 88
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TABLE III-B.2 IOA Recommended Criticalities - ARCS EPD&C
Criticality: i/I 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER 0 0 0 3 0 1 4
DIODE 0 1 0 3 1 4 9
DRIVER 0 0 0 5 2 0 7
FUSE 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 2 1 3
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
MICROSWITCH 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
PROP STOR & Q_ST SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER 0 0 1 1 0 2 4
DIODE 0 0 4 22 12 49 87
DRIVER 0 0 4 4 i0 7 25
FUSE 0 0 0 5 0 1 6
RELAY 0 1 2 i0 1 2 16
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 13 12 25
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 0 3 7 0 2 12
MICROSWITCH 0 0 1 3 5 0 9
CIRCUIT BREAKER 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION 0 0 0 0 8 0 8
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER 0 0 1 2 0 3 6
DIODE 0 0 1 5 0 6 12
DRIVER 0 0 2 1 0 3 6
FUSE 0 0 0 3 0 0 3
RELAY 0 0 0 1 0 1 2
RESISTOR 0 0 0 2 0 8 I0
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 0 1 1 0 2 4
SIGNAL CONDITIONER 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
INSTRUMENTATION
SENSOR, CONTINUITY 0 0 0 0 0 5 5
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 0 0 2 4 0 6
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 0 2 1 2 5
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nTABLE III-B.2 IOA R_commended Criticalities - ARCS EPD&C (cont'd)
Criticality: i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS
FUSE 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
HEATER 0 0 1 0 1 2 4
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
SWITCH, THERMAL 0 0 1 0 3 4 8
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 0 2 0 0 2 4
DRIVER 0 0 2 0 0 2 4
TOTAL 0 5 29 84 68 124 310
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TABLE IV-A.I IOA Recommended Critical Items - FRCS Hardware
Criticality: I/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R TOTAL
HE pRESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK
TANK ISOLATION VALVES
REGULATOR ASSEMBLIES
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
PROP STO_ & DIST SQBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANKS
PROPELLANT CHANNEL SCREENS
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLIES
GROUND MANUAL ISOL VALVES
GIMBAL BELLOWS
TANK ISOL VALVES
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, PRIMARY
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, VERNIER
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
1 0 0 0 0 1
1 2 0 2 0 5
1 2 0 1 1 5
2 2 0 0 0 4
0 2 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 2 0 2
1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1
2 3 0 2 0 7
1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1
1 2 0 0 0 3
2 2 0 0 0 4
2 1 1 0 0 4
1 0 0 0 0 1
0 2 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 2 0 2
1 0 0 0 0 1
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
INJECTOR HEAD
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
VERNIER JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
4 2 0 0 0 6
2 0 0 0 0 2
2 0 0 0 0 2
2 0 1 0 0 3
1 0 0 0 0 1
TOTAL 30 20 2 9 1 62
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TABLE IV-B.I IOA Recommended Critical Items - FRCS EPD&C
Criticality: i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R TOTAL
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER 0 0 0 0 0 0
DIODE 0 1 0 1 0 2
DRIVER 0 0 0 0 0 0
FUSE 0 0 0 0 0 0
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 0 0
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 1 0 0 0 1
MICROSWITCH 0 0 0 0 0 0
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 0 0 0 0
PROp $TOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER
DIODE
DRIVER
FUSE
RELAY
RESISTOR
SWITCH, TOGGLE
MICROSWITCH
CIRCUIT BREAKER
METERS/ROTARY SWITCH
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION
SENSOR, PRESSURE
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 2 2 0 0 4
0 1 4 0 0 5
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 6 0 1 0 7
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 2
0 2 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER 0 2 1 0 0 3
DIODE 0 5 1 5 0 ii
DRIVER 0 1 1 0 0 2
FUSE 0 3 2 0 0 5
RELAY 0 1 0 0 0 1
RESISTOR 0 0 0 1 1 2
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 2 1 0 0 3
SIGNAL CONDITIONER 0 0 1 0 1 2
INSTRUMENTATION
SENSOR, CONTINUITY 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 0 0 0 2 2
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 0 0 2 2
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TABLE !V-B.I IOA Recommended CIL Items - FRCS EPD&C (cont'd)
Criticality: i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R TOTAL
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS
FUSE 0 0 1 0 0 1
HEATER 0 0 1 0 0 1
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 0 0
SWITCH, THERMAL 0 0 1 0 0 1
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 0 1 0 0 1
POD
DRIVER 0 0 0 0 0 0
FUSE 0 0 0 0 0 0
HEATER 0 0 0 0 0 0
RELAY 0 0 0 0 0 0
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 0 0
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 0 1 0 0 1
TOTAL 0 28 19 9 6 62
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TABLE IV-A.2 IOA ReCommended Critical Items - ARCS Hardware
Criticality: i/I 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R TOTAL
H_ _RESS SUBSYSTEM
STORAGE TANK
TANK ISOLATION VALVES
REGULATOR ASSEMBLIES
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
1 0 0 0 0 1
1 2 0 2 0 5
1 1 0 1 1 4
2 2 0 0 0 4
0 3 0 0 0 3
0 0 0 2 0 2
1 0 0 0 0 1
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT TANKS
PROPELLANT CHANNEL SCREENS
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLIES
GROUND MANUAL ISOL VALVES
GIMBAL BELLOWS
TANK ISOL VALVES
CROSSFEED VALVES
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, PRIMARY
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS, VERNIER
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY
COUPLINGS (SINGLE SEAL)
COUPLINGS (DOUBLE SEAL)
LINES AND FITTINGS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
INJECTOR HEAD
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
VERNIER JETS
BIPROP SOLENOID VALVES
COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE
TOTAL
1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1
2 3 0 2 0 7
1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 i
2 1 1 3 0 7
2 0 2 0 0 4
2 1 0 2 0 5
3 0 1 0 0 4
1 0 0 0 0 1
0 2 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 2 0 2
1 0 0 0 0 1
4 0 0 2 0 6
2 0 0 0 0 2
2 0 0 0 0 2
2 0 1 0 0 3
1 0 0 0 0 1
34 15 5 16 1 71
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TABLE IV-B. 2
Criticality:
IOA Recommended Critical Items - ARCS EPD&C
i/I 2/IR 2/2 13/IR 3/2R TOTAL
l
HE pRESS SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER 0 0 0 0 0 0
DIODE 0 1 0 1 0 2
DRIVER 0 0 0 0 0 0
FUSE 0 0 0 0 0 0
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 0 0
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 1 0 0 0 1
MICROSWITCH 0 0 0 0 0 0
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 0 0 0 0
PROP STO_ & DIST SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER 0 0 1 0 0 1
DIODE 0 0 4 4 1 9
DRIVER 0 0 4 1 0 5
FUSE 0 0 0 0 0 0
RELAY 0 1 2 2 0 5
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 0 0
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 0 3 0 0 3
MICROSWITCH 0 0 1 0 0 1
CIRCUIT BREAKER 0 0 1 0 0 1
INSTRUMENTATION
INDICATOR, POSITION 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 0 0 0 0
T_RUSTER SUBSYSTEM
CONTROLS
VALVES
CONTROLLER 0 0 1 0 0 1
DIODE 0 0 1 5 0 6
DRIVER 0 0 2 0 0 2
FUSE 0 0 0 1 0 1
RELAY 0 0 0 0 0 0
RESISTOR 0 0 0 2 0 2
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 0 1 0 0 1
SIGNAL CONDITIONER 0 2 0 0 0 2
INSTRUMENTATION
SENSOR, CONTINUITY 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, PRESSURE 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENSOR, TEMPERATURE 0 0 0 0 0 0
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TABLE IV-B.2 IOA Recommended CIL Items - ARCS EPD&C (cont'd)
Criticality: i/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R TOTAL
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS
FUSE 0 0 2 0 0 2
HEATER 0 0 1 0 0 1
RESISTOR 0 0 0 0 0 0
SWITCH, THERMAL 0 0 1 0 3 4
SWITCH, TOGGLE 0 0 2 0 0 2
DRIVER 0 0 2 0 0 2
TOTAL 0 5 29 16 4 54
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4.1 Forward RCS Assessment Results
The unresolved forward RCS hardware and EPD&C issues are presented
in the following sections. Several general issues are first
presented (section 4.1.1), followed by the specific unresolved
issues (section 4.1.2). J
4.1.1 General Forward RCS Issues
Many of the unresolved issues which exist on individual FMEAs and
CILs are linked to several "general" issues identified by IOA
during the RCS FMEA/CIL assessment. These general issues concern
either the groundrules used by NASA/RI to perform the FMEA/CIL
analysis, or the NASA/RI analysis of the RCS subsystem. Each of
the general IOA issues results in numerous FMEA and CIL issues.
The general issues identified by IOA in the FRCS hardware and
EPD&C assessments are discussed in the following sections.
mm
U
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4.1.I.A Hardware
Four general areas of difference between the IOA and NASA/RI
forward RCS subsystem analyses are responsible for many of the
unresolved FRCS hardware issues.
U
4.1.1.A.I Inability to Deplete FRCS Propellant
IOA considers the inability to deplete FRCS prop to be
potentially life and vehicle threatening during entry. Many
flights include a nominal FRCS propellant dump after the OMS
deorbit burn to achieve an improved X axis center-of-gravity (cg)
condition for entry. On flights which would require a post-
deorbit FRCS prop dump to meet the forward cg limit (1076.7
inches), inability to complete the dump could result in possible
loss of entry control.
Failures which result in loss of propellant tank repressurization
capability (loss of helium flow paths, loss of helium due to
leakage) or loss of propellant flow paths are the types of
failures which result in the inability to deplete FRCS
propellant.
The current NASA/RI criticalities assigned to these types of
failures are based only on loss of ET sep capability and do not
consider possible entry effects. The criticalities assigned
based only on ET sep correctly include tank ullage in the redun-
dancy string' IOA agrees with the criticalities assigned by
NASA/RI based only on ET sep effects, and agrees that ullage is
sufficient to perform ET sep. However, IOA's more severe
criticalities on these types of failures are driven by the
possible entry effects discussed above. In this case, ullage may
not be sufficient to deplete FRCS prop and, therefore, is not
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included in the redundancy string.
IOA would concur with the current NASA/RI criticalities on
failures which result in the inability to use or deplete FRCS
propellant if it could be determined that no flights would be
launched which required a nominal post-deorbit FRCS dump to meet
the forward cg limit. However, IOA was unable to verify that
this is the case. IOA recommends a documented flight rule which
prohibits dependence on a nominal post-deorbit burn FRCS prop
dump to meet the forward X cg limit.
Seventeen (17) of the FRCS hardware issues are related to this
general issue.
4.1.1.A.2 Propellant Leakage
IOA considers any leakage of RCS propellant (MMH or NTO) to be
potentially life and vehicle threatening, regardless of where the
leakage occurs. NSTS 22206 states that "A single failure
resulting in leakage of LO2, LH2, N2H4, or MMH shall be classified
as a Criticality i" (p. 2-11, item h). Therefore, IOA classifies
any single failure which results in plop leakage as a I/i. If
redundant items must fail before leakage occurs, IOA classifies
the failure as a functional criticality IR. Propellant leakage
can result in contamination and corrosion of other components,
fire, explosion, or exposure of EVA and ground crews to propellant
or propellant vapors.
Thirteen (13) : of the FRCS hardware issues are related to this
general issue.
4.1.1.A.3 Isolation Valve Internal Relief Device Failure
The propellant tank isolation valves, primary manifold isolation
valves, and vernier manifold isolation valves each have an
internal pressure relief device which would relieve a downstream
overpressurization condition if the valve was closed. NASA/RI
assigns 3/3 criticalities to the FMEAs which address the failure
of this device to relieve downstream pressure. IOA contends that
it is possible that a failed closed relief device could allow a
downstream press_rebu_id_up sufficient to cause a prop line leak.
This is supported by the fact that the prop line structural
failure FMEA (03-2F-I02108-I) lists this failure as a cause.
Since this failure cou!d result in line failure and prop leakage,
IOA recommends £hat the current 3/_ FMEAs for the relief device
failures be upgraded accordingly.
Three (3) of the FRCS_hardware issues are related to this general
issue.
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4.1.1.A.4 Additional Items and Failure Modes
A number of RCS subsystem items and failure modes identified by
IOA during the analysis phase are not covered in the current NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA recommends that these items and failure modes be
incorporated into the FMEA/CIL. These issues are identified in
Appendix F by issue codes HDW 4 and HDW 5.
Thirty-one (31) of the FRCS hardware issues are related to this
general issue.
R
i
4.1.I.B EPD&C
IOA has several general EPD&C issues that tend to inflate the
number of issues shown in the assessment tables. The following
general issues remain unresolved.
4.1.1,B.i Loss of Talkback D_i _
IOA considers the loss of data to determine the actual position of
a valve to be a 3/2R PPP. Vaive position data iS provided by the
GPC/MDM discretes and the event indicators, which provide
redundancy for each other. Loss of all redundancy may lead to
falsely failing the valve closed which could effect mission
operations. NASA FMEAs have a 3/3 criticality for these
failures.
This type of failure mode accounts for 25 op@n issues shown in the
assessment tables for the forward RCS EPD&C (6 issues in the _:
helium pressurization subsystem and 19 in the propellant storage
and distribution subsystem). They are identified by issue code
EPD&C 1 in Appendix F.
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4.1.I.B.2 FMEA Downgrades to 3/3 or 3/2R PPP - NSTS 22206
interpretations
Numerous issues remain open due to different interpretations of
NSTS 22206. All these issues concern the definition of the
redundancy string. IOA did not consider multiple or unrelated
failures in determining the criticality. IOA considers these
FMEAs warrant a 3/2R PPP or 3/3 for the failure mode.
This type of failure mode accounts for 35 open issues shown in
the assessment tables for the forward RCS EPD&C (i issue in the .....
heliumlpressurizationsubsystem, 27 issues_in the.propeilant-
storage and distribution subsystem, and 7 Issues In the thruster
subsystem). They are identified by issue code EPD&C 2 in Appendix
F.
J_
m
a
mm
mm
7O
mm
4.1.I.B.3 FMEA Failure Scenario Upgrades - NSTS 22206
Interpretations
These issues also remain open due to the different interpretations
of NSTS 22206. All these issues concern the definition of the
redundancy string. IOA did not consider multiple or unrelated
failures in determining criticality, however, IOA did consider
the functional redundancy for the item in question. Based on
this, IOA failure scenarios create a IR or CIL item condition,
without using-multipie or unreiated failures. IOA recommends
these failure scenarios and criticality upgrades be included in
the NASA FMEA/CIL.
These failure modes account for 9 open issues in the propellant
storage and distribution subsystem as shown in the forward RCS
EPD&C assessment tables. They are identified by issue code EPD&C
3 in Appendix F.
4.1.I.B.4 EPD&C Issues Tied to Open IOA Hardware Issues
These issues are directly related to the open IOA hardware issues.
These failure modes account for 33 open issues as shown in the
assessment tables (i issue in the helium pressurization subsystem,
21 issues in the propellant storage and distribution subsystem,
and ii in the thruster subsystem). They are identified by issue
code EPD&C 4 in Appendix F.
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4.1.1.B.5 Additional EPD&C Failure Modes Recommended by IOA
These failure modes are not currently addressed by the NASA
FMEA/CIL. _ IOA_recommends these failure modes be incorporated
into the FMEA/CIL.
These failures account for 31 open issues shown in the assessment
tables for the forward RCS EPD&C (3 issues in the helium
pressurization subsystem, 12 issues in the propellant storage and
distribution subsystem, 15 issues in the thruster subsystem, and 1
issue in the thermal control subsystem). They are identified by
issue code EPD&C 5 in Appendix F.
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4.1.2 Specific Forward RCS Issues
The specific forward RCS hardware and EPD&C unresolved issues are
presented in the following sections and paragraphs which were
referenced in tables I and II. The organization of the sections
and paragraphs follow the RCS hierarchy shown in Figures 4-7, and
used in tables I and II.
Unresolved issues which are related to general issues discussed in
section 4.1.1 contain a reference to the applicable general issue.
Each issue is presented in a standard format which gives the
failure mode, applicable FMEA number and IOA assessment ID, the
NASA and IOA criticality and screen assignments, and the rationale
behind the IOA issue. Refer to the detailed assessment sheets in
Appendix C for further information on each issue.
4.1.2.1 Helium Pressurization Subsystem (28 issues)
4.1.2.1.A Hardware (16 issues)
4.1.2.1.A.I
1 ) FAILURE:
Helium Tank Isolation Valves
FAILS OPEN
(5 issues)
03-2F-I01020-3
RCS-103
3/IR PPP
3/IR PFP, CIL _
ISSUE: IOA recommends that this failure mode be upgraded to a
3/1R PFP. A failure of the redundant secondary regulator would ......
not be detectable in flight (fail B screen). No way to tell that
one level of redundancy has been lost.
2) FAILURE: FAILS CLOSED
03-2F-10102014 3/iR PPP _
RCS-104 2/IR PPP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA considers this failure to be a 2/IR. Failure of both
valves results in inability to repress prop tank and deplete FRCS
propellant. See 4.1.I.A.I.
3) FAILURE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-103A 3/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers internal leakage to be a credible
failure mode and recommends that it be addressed on the FMEA/CIL.
Effects same as "fails open". See issue on 03-2F-I01020-3, above.
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4) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW
NO FMEA
RCS-10002X 2/IR PFF, CIL
ISSUE." This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers restricted flow to be a credible failure
mode and recommends that a 2/IR PFF FMEA and CIL be added.
Effects same as "failed closed". See issue on 03-2F-I01020-4,
above, and 4.1,I.A.I. Failure not detectable during dual leg
operation (fail B screen). Contamination can affect both valves
simultaneously (fail C screen).
5) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-10003X i/I ---, CIL
_SSUE: This failure mode is not currently covered on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers external leakage of the He isol valve
due to a housing failure to be a credible failure (ref. NSTS
222_6, p. 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and recommends that it be
addressed on the FMEA/CIL. Failure results in loss of helium
pressure. See 4.1.I.A.I.
4.1.2.1.A.2 Regulator Assemblies (4 issues)
i) FAILURE: FAILS CLOSED
03-2F-i01030-2
RCS-II2
3/IR PPP
2/1R PFP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA considers this failure to be a 2/IR PFP. Failure of
parallel regulators results in inability to repress prop tank and
deplete FRCS propellant. See 4.1.1_A.I. Failure not detectable
during dual leg operation (fail B screen).
2) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW
NO FMEA
RCS-II3 2/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA recommends that restricted flow be addressed as a
failure mode for the He regulator. IOA contends that restricted
flow is a credible failure mode which should be addressed for
components with integral filters and/or orifices. Effects same as
"fails closed". See issue on 03-2F-I01030-2, above, and section
4.1.I.A. FMEA 03-2F-I01030-2 currently lists "partial blockage
of pilot screen/sense line" as a cause for a failed closed
regulator, however this does not address restricted flow through
the regulator.
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3) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-114 I/I ---, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers external leakage of the He regulator due
to a housing failure to be a credible failure mode (ref. NSTS
22206, p. 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and recommends that it be
addressed on the FMEA/CIL. Failure results in loss of helium
pressure. See 4.1.I.A.I.
4) FAILURE: SENSING PORT LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-II5 3/2R PFP, CIL
_SSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
RCS FMEA/CIL, but is addressed on the NASA OMS FMEA/CIL (03-3-
1004-3, sensing port leakage, 3/2R PFP). IOA recommends that
this failure mode also be addressed for the RCS regulators, with
the same rationale used in the OMS subsystem.
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4.1.2.1.A.3 Quad Check Valve Assemblies (4 issues)
i) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-2F-I01095-I 3/3 ---
RCS-II9 2/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that this FMEA be upgraded to a 2/IR PFP.
IOA contends that, with series check valve poppets failed open or
leaking, the contamination of upstream components by prop or prop
vapors during a mission could result in loss of prop tank
repressuriza£ion capabili£yand subsequent inabiiity touse or _-
deplete FRCS prop. See section 4oI.I.A.I. Contamination by prop
could cause parallel regulators to fail closed.
2) FAILURE: FAILS CLOSED
03-2F-I01095-2 3/IR PFP, CIL
RCS-120 2/IR PFP, CIL
_SSUE: IOA considers this failure to be a 2/IR PFP. Failed
closed parallel check valve poppets results in inability to
repress prop tank and deplete FRCS propellant. See 4.1.I.A.I.
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3) FAILURE: BLOCKAGE OF SINGLE INLET FILTER
03-2F-I01095-3
RCS-10005X
2/IR PPP, CIL
i/1 ---, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode was added to the FMEA/CIL as a result
of an IOA recommendation. However, IOA considers this failure to
be a I/I since it results in inability to repress prop tank and
deplete FRCS prop. See 4.1.I.A.I.
W
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4) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-10006X i/i ---, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers external leakage of the quad check valve
assembly due to a housing failure to be a credible failure mode
(ref. NSTS 22206, p. 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and recommends that it
be addressed on the FMEA/CIL. Failure results in loss of helium
pressurant (see 4.1.I.A.I), and leakage of prop and/or prop
vapors (see 4.1.I.A.2).
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4.1.2.1.A.4 Quick Disconnect Couplings (3 issues)
i) FAILURE : EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-2F-I01091-I
RCS-109, 117, 121, 142
3/IR FFP, CIL
3/IR FFP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "poppet fails open" be added as a
failure mode on this FMEA. This is a credible failure mode and
is addressed on other QD coupling FMEAs.
2,3) FAILURE: FAILS TO COUPLE
03-2F-I01091-2 3/3 ---
03-2F-I02150-2 3/3 ---
RCS-II0, 118, 122, 127, 133,
135, 137, 143, 154, 156 3/3
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "restricted flow" be added as a
failure mode on the FMEAs listed. This is a credible failure and
is addressed on other QD coupling FMEAs.
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4.1.2.1.B EPD&C (12 issues)
4.1.2.1.B.I Diodes (5 issues)
i) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
NO FMEA
FRCS-11202 2/1R PFP, CIL
_SSUE: The helium isolation valves have two diodes, one in
series with each of the open and close solenoid circuits. Diode
failing open prevents further valve movement associated with that
circuit (open or close). Redundancy provided by other isolation
valve. Loss of this, coupled with the loss of all hardware
redundancy causes loss of jets required to expel propellants in
efforts to meet C.G. limits. Note: Issue above is directly
related to the schematics. They may be drawn incorrectly.
Manifold isolation valve diodes are in+parallel.
2) FAILURE:
NO FMEA
FRCS-II203
FAILS SHORT
3/3
_SSUE: The helium isolation valves have two diodes, one in
series with each of the open and close solenoid circuits. Diode
failing high has no effect. IOA-RCS recommends this failure be
included in the FMEAs.
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3) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6KF-2252-2
FRCS-321,323
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers unrelated failures. IOA-RCS claims
this failed short diode alone has no effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
4) FAILURE:
05-6KF-2267-I
FRCS-324,326
FAILS OPEN
3/3
3/2R PPP
ISSUE:
closed.
- L5 ; ....
This failure may lead to falsely failing the valve
(see 4.1.1.B.1)
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5) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
05-6KF-2252-3
FRCS-II211,11212
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers unrelated failures. IOA-RCS claims
this failed short to ground diode causes inability to open the
valve manually. Redundancy provided by the GPC/MDM. Loss of all
redundancy causes inability to expel propellants to meet CG
limits. (see 4.1.I.B.3)
4.1.2.1.B.2 Hybrid Drivers (2 issues)
i) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KF-2201-I 3/3
FRCS-336 3/2R PPP
2) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KF-2201A-I 3/3
FRCS-334 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: Both of these issues concern falsely failing the vaive
closed. (see 4.1.1.B.1)
4.1.2.1.B.3 Resistor (2 issues)
i) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2077-I 3/3
FRCS-348,350,352,354 3/2R PPP
2) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2078-I 3/3
FRCS-356 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: Both of these issues concern falsely failing the valve
closed. (see 4.1.1.B.1)
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4.1.2.1.B.4 Toggle switches (1 issue)
I) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KF-2026-2 3/IR PPP
FRCS-II081,II082 2/IR PPP
11083 3/3
(fails short), CIL
(inadvertent operation)
_SSUE: IOA-RCS claims a short across contacts 5,6 causes _ _
inability to open one leg of the isolation valve. Redundancy
provided by the other leg. Loss of all redundancy causes
inability to expel propellants in efforts to meet C.G. limits.
Inadvertent operation (switch movement) has no effect.
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4.1.2.1.B.5
1 ) FAILURE :
NO FMEA
FRCS-11204
Microswitches (I issue)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The helium isolation valve A & B solenoid microswitch
provides power to the talkback circuitry. A microswitch failure
across the either contact will provide an inaccurate talkback.
This may lead to falsely failing the valve closed.
4.1o2.1.B.6 Event Indicators (I issue)
1) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT TO GROUND OR OPEN
05-6KF-2151-1,2 3/3
FRCS-387 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: This issue concerns falsely failing the valve closed.
(see 4.1.1.B.1)
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4.1.2.2 Propellant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
(I14 issues)
w
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4.1.2.2.A Hardware (23 issues)
4.1.2.2.A.I Propellant Tank Acquisition Assembly (1 issue)
i) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HELIUM PASSAGE, SCREEN DRY-OUT
03-2F-111110-3 1/1 ---, CIL
RCS-128 i/i ---, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that the propellant tank acquisition
device components be itemized in the item list or functional
description sections to show specifically what is covered by this
FMEA (e.g.: upper compartment channels/screens, lower compartment
channels/screens, feedout tubes, plenum, bulkhead, etc.). IOA
also recommends that the "high G" discussion be removed from the
functional description for this FRCS prop tank. The FRCS prop
tanks are not designed for high G propellant acquisition.
4.1.2.2.A.2 Pressure Relief Assemblies (3 issues)
I) FAILURE: BURST DISK LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-140 2/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: Internal leakage of the burst disk is a credible failure
mode and is not currently addressed on the NASA FMEA/CIL. IOA
recommends that this failure mode be added to 03-2F-I01060-5
(pressure relief valve assembly, burst disk ruptures prematurely,
2/IR PFP). The failure history of the burst disk includes
internal leakage.
L
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2) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW
NO FMEA
RCS-100OSX 3/IR FNP, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers restricted flow to be a credible failure
mode for components with integral filters and/or orifices, and
recommends that it be addressed for the pressure relief valve.
Failure mode can be added to 03-2F-I01060-3 (pressure relief
valve assembly, burst disk fails to rupture, 3/IR FNP).
r_
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3) FAILURE: STRUCTURALFAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNALLEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-10009X 1/l ---, CIL
This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. FMEA 03-2F-I01060-I addresses only a bellows failure.
IOA considers external leakage of the relief assembly due to a
housing failure to be a credible failure mode (ref. NSTS 22206,
p. 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and recommends that it be addressed on
the FMEA/CIL. Failure results in loss of helium pressurant (see
4.1.I.A.I), and leakage of prop or prop vapors (see 4.1.I.A.2).
4.1.2.2.A.3 Ground Manual Isolation Valve (i issue)
1) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-146 i/I ---, CIL
_SSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers external leakage of the ground manual
isolation valve due to a housing failure to be a credible failure
(ref. NSTS 22206, p. 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and recommends that it
be addressed on the FMEA/CIL. Failure results in loss of helium
pressurant (see 4.1.I.A.I), and leakage of prop and/or prop
vapors (see 4.1.I.A.2).
4.1°2°2.A.4 Propellant Tank Isolation Valves (5 issues)
I) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW
03-2F-I02120-I
RCS-148
3/IR PPP
2/IR PPF, CIL ......
ISSUE." IOA recommends that this failure mode be upgraded to a
2/IR PPF and placed on a new FMEA, separate from the "fails
closed" FMEA. Loss of prop flow through both tank isolation
valves would result in inability to perform ET sep and inability
to deplete FRCS prop. See 4.1.I.A.I. Contamination could affect
both valves simultaneously (fail C screen).
2) FAILURE: FAILS CLOSED
03-2F-I02120-I 3/IR PPP
RCS-150, 152 2/IR PPP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that this failure mode be upgraded to a
2/IR. Failure of both FRCS prop tank isol valves results in
inability to perform ET sep and inability to deplete FRCS
propellant. See 4.1.I.A.I.
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3) FAILURE: RELIEF DEVICE FAILS CLOSED
03-2F-I02120-3
RCS-10010X
3/3 ---
2/IR PNP, CIL
These valves are nominally open during all phases, and
will not be closed unless a downstream failure occurs which
requires isolation. Therefore, this failure mode is not
applicable until another failure occurs. IOA recommends that the
FMEA for this failure mode be upgraded to a 2/IR PNP (not a I/I,
since a previous failure is required for the valve to be closed).
See 4.1.I.A.3.
4) FAILURE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-149A, 151A 3/IR PNP
_SSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers "internal leakage" to be a credible
failure mode and recommends that it be added as a failure mode on
03-2F-I02120-2 (prop tank isol valves, fails open, 3/IR PNP).
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5) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-147 i/i ---, CIL
_SSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. FMEA 03-2F-I02112-I addresses only a bellows failure.
IOA considers external leakage of a prop tank isolation valve
housing to be a credible failure (ref. NSTS 22206, p. 2-14, item
2.3.7.a), and recommends that it be addressed on the FMEA/CIL.
This failure would result in leakage of propellant. See
4.1.I.A.2.
E 4.1.2.2.A.5 Primary Manifold Isolation Valves (4 issues)
I) FAILURE: FAILS CLOSED
03-2F-I02110-I 3/IR PPP
RCS-158, 162, 166, 170 2/IR PPP, CIL
_SSUE: IOA recommends that this failure mode be_upgraded to a
2/IR. Certain combinations of two manifold isolation valves
failed closed (#i & #3, or #2 & #4) would result in loss of yaw
jet (null jet) dumping capability and possible inability to
deplete FRCS prop. See 4.!.I.A.I.
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2) FAILURE: RELIEF DEVICE FAILS CLOSED
03-2F-I02110-3 3/3 ---
RCS-10012X i/i ---, CIL
ISSUE: These valves are nominally closed during entry. IOA
recommends that the FMEA for this failure mode be Upgraded to a
1/1. See 4.1.I.A.3
3) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-177 I/I ---, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. FMEA 03-2F-I02112-I addresses only a bellows failure.
IOA considers external leakage of a primary manifold isolation
valve housing to be a credible failure (ref. NSTS 22206, p. 2-14,
item 2.3.7.a), and recommends that it be addressed on the
FMEA/CIL. This failure would result in leakage of propellant.
See 4.1.I.A.2. _
4) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW
NO FMEA
RCS-178 2/IR PPP, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers restricted flow to be a credible failure
mode for components with integral filters, and recommends that
it be addressed for the primary manifold isolation valves,
Effects same as "fails closed", See issue on 03-2F-I02110-I,
above, and 4.1.I.A.I.
4.1.2.2.A.6 Vernier Manifold Isolation Valves (4 issues)
1) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-2F-102170-2 3/2R PPP
RCS-173 3/1R PNP
ISSUE: IOA recommends that these failure modes be upgraded to
3/1R PNP. Loss of all redundancy (tank isol valve and thruster
valve) results in leakage of propellant. See 4.1.1,A.2,
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2) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-177A i/i ---, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. FMEA 03-2F-I02170-3 addresses only a bellows failure.
IOA considers external leakage of a vernier manifold isolation
valve housing to be a credible failure (ref. NSTS 22206, p. 2-14,
item 2.3.7.a), and recommends that it be addressed on the
FMEA/CIL. This failure would result in leakage of propellant.
See 4.1.1.A.2.
3) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW
NO FMEA
RCS-178 2/2 ---, CIL
ISSUE.- This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers restricted flow to be a credible failure
mode for components with integral filters, and recommends that
it be addressed for the vernier manifold isolation valves.
Effects same as "fails closed". This failure mode can be added
to 03-2F-I02170-I (vernier manifold valve, fails closed, 2/2).
4) FAILURE:
NO FMEA
RCS-10014X
RELIEF DEVICE FAILS CLOSED
2/IR PNP, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed for the FRCS
vernier manifold isolation valves, however it is addressed for
the ARCS vernier manifold valves. This valve is nominally open
during all phases, and will not be closed unless a downstream
failure occurs which requires isolation. Therefore, this failure
mode is not applicable until another failure occurs. IOA
recommends that the FMEA for this failure mode be upgraded to a
2/IR PNP (not a I/i, since a previous failure is required for the
valve to be closed). See 4.1.I.A.3.
4.1.2.2.A.7 Jet Alignment Bellows (1 issue)
i) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-2F-121308-I i/i ---, CIL
RCS-179 i/i ---, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that the "effects" on this FMEA be
revised. The current effects state that this failure is "no
effect after ET separation". IOA considers leakage of prop to be
critical during all phases, see 4.1.I.A.2.
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4.1.2.2.A.8 Quick Disconnect Couplings (4 issues)
1) FAILURE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-2F-I01080-I 2/1R FFP, CIL
RCS-159, 163, 167, 171, 175 2/1R FFP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "poppet fails open" be added as a
failure mode on this FMEA. This is a credible failure mode and
is addressed on other QD coupling FMEAs.
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2) FAILURE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
03,2F-I01090-I
RCS-130
3/iR FFP, CIL
3/IR FFP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "poppet fails open" be added as a
failure mode on this FMEA. This is a credible failure mode and
is addressed on other QD coupling FMEAs.
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3,4) FAILURE: FAILS TO COUPLE
03-2F-I01080-2 3/3 ---
03-2F-I01090-2 3/3 ---
RCS-160, 164, 168, 172, 176, 131 3/3 ---
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "restricted flow" be added as a
failure mode on the FMEAs listed. This is a credible failure and
is addressed on other QD coupling FMEAs.
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4.1.2.2.B EPD&C (91 issues)
4.1.2.2.B.1 Remote Power Controllers (4 issues)
1) FAILURE:
05-6KF-2177-2
FRCS-11019
INADVERTENT OPERATION
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
_SSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (c!ose driver
failed on, ground driver failed on causing continuous power to
the solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this RPC inadvertently operating
alone has no effect. (see 4.1.1.B.2)
g
w_
84
W
wW
2) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KF-2178-2
FRCS-II021
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (open driver
failed on, ground driver failed on causing continuous power to
the solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this RPC inadvertently operating
alone has no effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
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3) FAILURE:
05-6KF-2177-I
FRCS-IIOI8
LOSS OF OUTPUT
3/2R P P P
3/IR P NAP
ISSUE: This RPC failed open (loss of output) causes inability
to close manifold 5 isolation valve. Loss of this, coupled with
the loss of all hardware redundancy prevents isolation of a
thruster leak. (see 4.1.I.B.4)
4) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KF-2178-I
FRCS-II020
3/2R PPP
2/2, CIL
_SSU_: IOA-RCS claims this RPC failed open (loss of output)
causes inability to open the valve. This causes loss of vernier
jets required for mission operations. (see 4.1.I.B.4)
rJ
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4.1.2.2.B.2 Diodes (27 issues)
i) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6KF-2255-2
FRCS-573,579,595,601
617,623,639,645
2) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2268-I
FRCS-580,582,602,604
624,626,646,648
3) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6KF-2257-2
FRCS-II037
3/3
3/2R PPP
3/3
3/2R PPP
3/3
3/2R PPP
W
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4) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6KF-2257A-2 3/3
FRCS-II039 3/2R PPP
5) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2269-1 3/3
FRCS-II056,11058 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The first five issues concern falsely failing the valve
closed. (see 4.1.I.B.I)
6) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2253-I 2/IR PFP, CIL
FRCS-388,406,410,420 3/3
_SSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failed
open diode alone (causing continuous power to the motor) has no
effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
7) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-22_3E-I 3/IR
FRCS'408,418 3/3
PFP, CIL
NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA_RCS claims th_s failed
open diode alone (causing continuous power to the motor) has no
effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
8) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2254-I
FRCS-424,442,446,456
2/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failed
open diode alone (causing continuous power to the motor) has no
effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
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9) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2255-I
FRCS-572,578,594,600
616,622,638,644
2/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failed
open diode alone (causing continuous power to the motor) has no
effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
I0) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2255E-I
FRCS-576,598,620,642
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
_SSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failed
open diode alone (causing continuous power to the motor) has no
effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
Ii) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2255F-I
FRCS-568,590,612,634
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
_SSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor a_d a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failed
open diode alone (causing continuous power to the motor) has no
effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
12) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2257-I 3/IR PFP, CIL
FRCS-II036 3/3
_SSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (switch internal
short, open driver failed on causing continuous power to the
solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this diode failed open alone has no
effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
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13) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2257A-I 3/IR PFP, CIL
FRCS-II038 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (switch internal
short, close driver failed on causing continuous power to the
solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this diode failed open alone has no
effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
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14) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6KF-2257F-2 3/2R PPP
FRCS-11065 3/3
_SSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (switch fails
short, circuit breaker failed on causing continuous power to the
solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this diode failed shor_ has no effect.
(see 4.1.I.B.2)
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15) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6KF-2255E-2
FRCS-577,599,621,643
J
3/IR PFP, CIL
2/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuouspOwer
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failed
short diode causes excessive motor operation (continuous power
that opens the valve slightly (3 degrees) then Cioses i_,
constantly repeating itself). Motor damage would likely cause
the valve to close, causing loss of jets on associated manifold.
Redundancy provided by jets on another manifold. Loss of all
redundancy causes the inability to expel propellants in efforts
to meet C.G. limits. (see 4.1.I.B.3, 4.1.1.B.4)
16) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6KF-2255F-2_
FRCS-569,591,613,635
3/IR PFP, CIL
2/1R PFP, CIL
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failed
short diode causes excessive motor operation (continuous power
that opens the valve slightly (3 degrees) then closes it,
constantly repeating itself). Motor damage would likely cause
the valve to close, causing loss of jets on associated manifold.
Redundancy provided by jets on another manifold. Loss of all
redundancy causes the inability to expel prope!lants in efforts
to meet C.G. limits. (see 4.1.I.B.3, 4.1.I.B.4)
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17) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2253B-I
FRCS-398,400
3/2R P P P
3/IR P NAP
ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this failed open diode causes inability
to open the valve with the GPC/MDM. Manual commanding provides
redundancy. Loss of this, coupled with the loss of all hardware
redundancy causes inability to expel propellants in efforts to
meet C.G. limits.
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18) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2254B-I
FRCS-434,436
3/2R P P P
3/IR P NAP
ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this failed open diode causes inability
to open the valve with the GPC/MDM. Manual commanding provides
redundancy. Loss of this, coupled with the loss of all hardware
redundancy causes inability to expel propellants in efforts to
meet C.G. limits.
c
w 19) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2255B-I
FRCS-574,596,618,640
3/2R P P P
3/IR P NAP
ISSUE." This diode failed open causes inability to open the
valve with the GPC/MDM. Redundancy provided by manual
commanding. Loss of this causes loss of jets on associated
manifold. Redundancy provided by jets on another manifold.
of all redundancy causes loss of jets required to expel
propellants in efforts to meet C.G. limits.
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20) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2257D-I
FRCS-II044_II060
3/2R P P P
3/IR P NA P
ISSUE: This d_ode failed open causes inability to close
isolation valve manually. GPC/MDM close command provides
redundancy. Loss of this, coupled with the loss of all hardware
redundancy prevents isolation of a thruster leak. (see 4.1.I.B.4)
21) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2257F-1
FRCS-11064
3/2R P P P
3/iR P NAP
ISSUE: This diode failed open causes inability to inhibit the
ground driver manually to close the valve. Redundancy provided
with the GPC/MDM commands. Loss of this, coupled with the loss
of all hardware redundancy prevents isolation of a thruster leak.
(see 4.1.I.B.4)
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22) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2258-I
FRCS-II070
3/2R PPP
2/2, CIL
ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this failed open diode causes inability
to open valve. This causes ioss of vernier jets required for
mission operations. (see 4.1.I.B.4)
23) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
05-6KF-2258-3
FRCS-II221
3/2R PPP
2/2, CIL
IOA-RCS claims this failed short to ground diode causes
inability to open valve. This causes loss of vernier jets
required for mission operations. (see 4.1.I.B.4)
24,25) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
NO FMEA
FRCS-II072,11074 3/IR P NAP _
z
ISSUE: The manifold isolation valve has two diodes in parallel
that completes the circuit to ground. One diode failing open has
no effect. Second diode failing open will causes inability to
close the >alve. Loss of this, coupled with the loss of all
hardware redundancy prevents isolation of a thruster leak. (see
4.1.I.B.5)
26,27) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
NO FMEA
FRCS-II073,11075 3/3
ISSUE: The manifold isolation valve has two diodes in parallel
that completes the circuit to ground. Either or both diode
failing short has no effect. (see 4.1.I.B.5)
4.1.2.2.,.3Hybr±dDriversC20i,suo, 
i) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KF-2206-I 3/3
FRCS-460,462 3/2R PPP
2) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KF-2206-2 3/3
FRCS-461,463 3/2R PPP
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3) FAILURE:
05-6KF-2207-I
FRCS-464,464
LOSS OF OUTPUT
3/3
3/2R PPP
4) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KF-2207-2 3/3
FRCS-465,467 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The first four issues concern falsely failing the valve
closed. (see 4.1.I.B.I)
5) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KF-2208-I
FRCS-668,670,672,674,676,678,680,682
2/IR PFP, CIL
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failed
open driver causes loss of accurate indication of the valve
status from the event indicator. GPC/MDM microswitch discretes
provide redundancy. Loss of all redundancy may lead to falsely
failing the valve closed. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
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6) FAILUIWE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KF-2113A-2 3/IR PFP, CIL
FRCS-II033 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (open driver failed
on, ground driver failed on causing continuous power to the
solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this driver inadvertently operating
has no effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
7) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KF-2210-I
FRCS-II024
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/2R PPP
_$SUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (switch short,
ground driver failed on causing continuous power to the
solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this driver failed open (loss of
output) causes loss of event indicator to determine valve status.
GPC/MDM discretes provide redundancy. Loss of all redundancy may
lead to falsely failing the valve close causing loss of mission
operations. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
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8) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KF-2210A-I
FRCS-II022
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/2R PPP
_SSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (switch short,
ground driver failed on causing continuous power to the
solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this driver failed open (loss of
output) causes loss of event indicator to determine valve status.
GPC/MDM discretes provide redundancy. Loss of all redundancy may
lead to falsely failing the valve close causing loss of mission
operations. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
9) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KF-2211-2
FRCS-II031
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (open driver
failed on, ground driver failed on causing continuous power to
the solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this driver inadvertently
operating alone has no effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
i0) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KF-2213-2 3/IR PFP, CIL
FRCS-II02_ 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (close driver
failed on, ground driver failed on causing continuous power to
the solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this driver inadvertently
operating alone has no effect. (see 4.1.1.B.2)
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Ii) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KF-2224-2
FRCS-II035
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (type I open
driver failed on, type III open driver failed on causing
continuous power to the solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this driver
inadvertently operating alone has no effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
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W12) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KF-2212-2
FRCS-II029
3/IR PFP, CIL
2/2, CIL
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (ground driver
failed on causing continuous power to the solenoid). This driver
failed high causes inability to open the isolation valve. This
causes loss of verniers thus mission objectives. (see 4.1.I.B.3)
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13) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KF-2208-2
FRCS-669,673,677,681
671,675,679,683
3/IR PPP
2/1R PPP (open driver), CIL
3/1R PPP (close driver)
ISSUE: This driver failed short causes inability to open the
valve. This causes loss of jets on associated manifold.
Redundancy provided by jets on another manifold. Loss of all
redundancy causes loss of jets required to expel propellants in
efforts to meet C.G. limits. Close driver failed short causes
inability to isolate a thruster leak. (see 4.1.I.B.4)
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14) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KF-2210-2 3/2R PPP
FRCS-II02_ 2/2, CIL
ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this failed short driver causes inability
to open the valve. This causes loss of vernier jets required for
mission operations. (see 4.1.I.B.4)
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15) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KF-2210A-2 3/2R PPP
FRCS-II023 3/IR PPP
ISSUE: This driver failed short causes inability to close
isolation valve. Loss of this, coupled with the loss of all
hardware redundancy prevents isolation of a thruster leak.
4.1.i.s.4)
(see
16) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KF-2211-I
FRCS-II030
3/2R PPP
2/2, CIL
ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this failed open driver (loss of output)
causes inability to open the valve. This causes loss of vernier
jets required for mission operation. (see 4.1.I.B.4)
w
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17) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KF-2212-I 3/2R P P P
FRCS-II028 3/IR P NAP
ISSUE: This driver failed open (loss of output) causes inability
to close the isolation valve. Loss of this, coupled with the
loss of all hardware redundancy prevents isolation of a thruster
leak. (see 4.1.I.B.4)
B
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18) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
J
05-6KF-2213-1 3/2R P P P
FRCS-11026 3/IR P NA P
ISSUE: This driver failed open (loss of output) causes
inability to close the isolation valve. Loss of this, coupled
with the loss of all hardware redundancy prevents isolation of a
thruster leak. (see 4.1.1.B.4)
19) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KF-2113A-I
FRCS-II032
3/2R PPP
2/2, CIL
_SSUE: IOA-RCS claims this failed open driver causes inability
to open the valve. This causes loss of vernier jets required for
mission operations. (see 4.1.1.B.4)
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20 ) FAI LURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KF-2224-I
FRCS-II034
3/2R PPP
2/2 , CIL
ISSUE: This driver failed open (loss of output) causes
inability to open the isolation valve. Inability to open this
valve causes loss of verniers thus loss of mission. (see
4.1.i.B.4)
4.1.2.2.B.4 Fuses (i issue)
FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2006-I 3/2R P P P
FRCS-II001,11002 3/IR P NA P
_SSUE: This fuse failed open causes inability to close the
valve manually. Redundancy provided with the GPC/MDM commands.
Loss of this, coupled with the loss of all hardware redundancy
prevents isolation of a thruster leak. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
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4.1.2.2.B.5 Relays (9 issues)
I) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KF-2126-2
FRCS-473,479
2/1R PFP, CIL
3/1R PFP, CIL
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failed
closed relay causes inability to close the valve. This, coupled
with the loss of all hardware redundancy prevents isolation of a
thruster leak. (see 4.1.I.B.3)
2) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KF-2126A-2 3/IR PFP, CIL
FRCS-475,481, 3/3
477,483 2/IR PFP, CIL
_SSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failed
closed relay causes inability to open the valve. This causes
loss of jets on manifolds 1 & 2. Redundancy provided by jets on
manifolds 3 & 4. Loss of all redundancy causes loss of jets
required to expel propellants in efforts to meet C.G. limits.
First in a series relay failing closed has no effect (475,481).
(see 4.1.I.B.3, 4.1.I.B.4)
3 ) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KF-2127-2 2/IR PFP, CIL
FRCS-487,493 3/3
489,495 2/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failed
closed relay causes inability to open the valve. This causes
loss of jets on manifolds 3,4 & 5. Redundancy provided by jets
on manifolds 1 & 2. Loss of all redundancy causes loss of jets
required to expel propellants in efforts to meet C.G. limits.
First series relay failing closed has no effect (487,493). No
redundancy for vernier jets on manifold 5 (2/2). (see 4.1.I.B.3,
4.1.I.B.4)
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4) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KF-2127A-2
FRCS-485,491
2/IR PFP, CIL
2/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures(continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failed
closed relay causes inability to open the valve. This causes
loss of jets on manifolds 3,4 & 5. Redundancy provided by jets
on manifolds I & 2. Loss of all redundancy causes loss of jets
required to expel propellants in efforts to meet C.G. limits. No
redundancy for vernier jets on manifold 5 (2/2). (see 4.1.I.B.3,
4.1.I.B.4)
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5) FAILURE: FAILS TO TRANSFER (LOSS OF OUTPUT)
05-6KF-2127A-I 3/IR PPP
FRCS-484,490 2/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: This relay failing to transfer inability to open the
3/4/5 valve. This causes loss of jets on manifolds 3,4, & 5.
Redundancy for jets on manifolds 3 & 4 provided on manifolds 1 &
2. Loss of all redundancy causes loss of jets required for to _
expel propellants in efforts to meet C.G. limits. No redundancy
provided for manifold 5 (verniers - 2/2). (see 4.1.I.B.3)
6) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KF-2128-2 2/IR PFP, CIL
FRCS-705,709,713,717 2/IR PPP, CIL
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this close
relay inadvertently operating causes inability to open the valve
causing loss of jets on associated manifold. Redundancy provided
by jets on another manif01d. Loss of all redundancy causes
inability to expel propellants in efforts to meet C.G. limits.
(see 4.1.1.B.3, 4.1.I.B.4)
7) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KF-2128A-2 2/IR PFP, CIL
FRCS-703,707,711,715 3/IR PFP, CIL
_SSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this open relay
failed closed causes inability to close the valve. This, coupled
with the loss of all hardware redundancy prevents isolation of a
thruster leak. (see 4.1.I.B.3)
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8) FAILURE: FAILS TO TRANSFER (LOSS OF OUTPUT)
05-6KF-2126-I
FRCS-472,478
3/IR PPP
2/IR PPP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this relay failing to transfer causes
inability to open the valve. This causes loss of jets on
manifolds 1 & 2. Redundancy provided by jets on manifolds 3 & 4.
Loss of all redundancy causes loss of jets required to expel
propellants in efforts to meet C.G. limits. (see 4.1.I.B.4)
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9) FAILURE: FAILS TO TRANSFER (LOSS O_OUTPUT)
05-6KF-2128A-I
FRCS-702,706,710,714
3/IR PPP
2/IR PPP, CIL
ISSUE: This relay failing to transfer causes inability to open
isolation valve. This causes loss of jets on associated
manifold. Redundancy provided by jets on another manifold. Loss
of all redundancy causes loss of jets required to expel
propellants in efforts to meet C.G. limits. (see 4.1.I.B.4)
4.1.2.2.B.6 Resistors (10 issues)
i) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-208_-I 3/3
FRCS-502,506,5_I0,512 3/2R PPP
m
z
2) FAILURE:
05-6KF-2082-I
FRCS-504,508
FAILS OPEN
3/3
3/2R PPP
3) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT TO GROUND OR OPEN
05-6KF-2153-I,2 3/3
FRCS-879 3/2R PPP
4) FAILURE:
05-6KF-2085-I
FRCS-522,526
FAILS OPEN
3/3
3/2R PPP
5) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2086-I
FRCS-520,524,528,530
3/3
3/2R PPP
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6) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2091-I 3/3
FRCS-II012,11013,11014,11015 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The first six issues concern falsely failing the valve
closed. (see 4.1.I.B.I)
m
7) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2083-I
FRCS-496,498,500
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/2R PPP
_SSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failed
open resistor causes loss of accurate indication of the valve
status from the event indicator or the GPC/MDM microswitch
discretes. This may lead to falsely failing the valve closed.
(see 4.1.I.B.2)
m
mm
B
mm
D
mm
8) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2084-I
FRCS-514,516,518
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failed
open resistor _auses loss of accurate indication of the valve
status from the event indicator or GPC/MDM microswitch discretes.
This may lead to falsely failing the valve closed. (see
4.1.I.B.2)
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9) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2089-I
FRCS-718,732,746,760
2/IR PFP, CIL
3/2R PPP
ISSUE." NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failed
open resistor causes loss of accurate indication of the valve
status from the event indicator or GPC/MDM microswitch discretes.
This may lead to falsely failing the valve closed. (see
4.1.I.B.2)
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I0) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2090-I
FRCS-11008
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (ground driver
failed on causing continuous power to the solenoid). IOA-RCS
claims this failed open resistor causes loss of accurate
talkback. This may lead to falsely failing the valve closed
causing loss of mission operations. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
w
4.1.2.2.B.7 Toggle Switches (3 issues)
i) FAILURE:INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KF-2032-2
FRCS-II005,11007
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE." NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (open driver failed
on, causing continuous power to the solenoid). The switch
inadvertently operating causes inability to close the valve.
This, coupled with the loss of all hardware redundancy prevents
isolation of a thruster leak. (see 4.1.I.B.3)
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2) FAILURE: FAILS TO CONDUCT ONE OR MORE CONTACT SET
05-6KF-203_2-I 3/2R P P P
FRCS-II003,110_4,11006 3/IR P NAP
ISSUE: This switch failed open causes inability to close the
valve manually. Redundancy provided with the GPC/MDMcommands.
Loss of this, coupled with the loss of all hardware redundancy
prevents isolation of a thruster leak. (see 4.1.I.B.3)
3) FAILURE: SWITCH FAILS SHORT
05-6KF-2030-2
FRCS-II096,11097,11101,III02
11106,11107,11111,11112
3/IR PPP
2/IR PFP, CIL
_SSUE: Switch short across close contacts causes inability to
open the valve. Inability to open the valve coupled with the
loss of all hardware redundancy may causes loss of jets required
to expel propellants to meet CG limits. (see 4.1.I.B.3)
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4.1.2.2.B.8 Microswitches (8 issues)
i) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
NO FMEA
FRCS-II205 3/IR PPP
ISSUE." The tank isolation valve 1/2 solenoid microswitch
provides power to the talkback circuitry and to the relay
inhibit. A microswitch failure across the close contacts while
the valve is open causes inability to close the valve. This,
coupled with the loss of all hardware redundancy prevents
isolation of a thruster leak. (see 4.1._.B.5)
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2) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
NO FMEA
FRCS'II206 3/IR PPP
ISSUE: The tank isolation valve 3/4/5 solenoid microswitch
provides power to the talkback circuitry and to the relay
inhibit, A microswitch failure across the close contacts while
the valve is open causes inability to close_£he valve. This,
coupled with the loss of all hardware redundancy prevents
isolation of a thruster leak. (see 4.1.I.B.5)
3-6) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
NO FMEA
FRCS-I1207,11208, 3/2R PPP
11209,11210
ISSUE: The manifold isolation valve solenoid microswitch
provides power to the talkback circuitry and to the relay
inhibit. A microswitch failure across the either contacts will
provide an inaccurate talkback. This may lead to falsely failing
the valve closed. (see 4.1.I.B.5)
7-8) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
NO FMEA
FRCS-II078,11079 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The manifold isolation valve solenoid microswitch
provides power to the talkback circuitry. A microswitch failure
across the either contact will provide an inaccurate talkback.
This may lead to falsely failing the valve closed. (see
4.1.I.B.5)
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4.1.2.2.B.9 Circuit Breaker (1 issue)
i) FAILURE: SHORT, FAILED CLOSED
05-6KF-2280-2 3/IR PFP, CIL
FRCS-11077 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (switch jam, open
driver failed on causing continuous power to the solenoid). IOA-
RCS claims this circuit breaker failed short alone has no effect.
(see 4.1.1.B.2)
4.1.2.2.B.I0 Meters / Rotary Switch (2 issues)
1) FAILURE: All Credible Modes
05-6KF-2158-I 3/3
FRCS-II193,11194 3/2R PPP
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2) FAILURE: All Credible Modes
05-6KF-2034-I 3/3
FRCS-III91 3/2R PPP
ISSUE:
closed due to inaccurate switch or meter data.
4.1.2.2.B.11 Event Indicators (6 issues)
• L
I) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT TO GROUND OR OPEN
Both of these issues concern falsely failing the valve
(see 4.1.I.B.I)
05-6KF-2154-1,2 3/3
FRCS-879 3/2R PPP
2) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT TO GROUND OR OPEN
05-6KF-2155-I,2 3/3
FRCS-879A 3/2R PPP
3) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2155-2
FRCS-880A,881A,882A,883A
3/3
3/2R PPP
i01
w
4) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2156-2 3/3
FRCS-II016 3/2R PPP
_SSUE: The first four issues concern falsely failing the valve
closed. (see 4.1.I.B.I)
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5) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT TO GROUND ....
05-6KF-2155-I
FRCS-880,881,882,883
2/IR PFP, CIL
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failed
short to ground event indicator causes loss of accurate
indication of the valve status from the display. GPC/MDM
microswitch discretes provide redundancy. Loss of all redundancy
may lead to falsely failing the valve closed. (see 4.1.i.B.2)
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6) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
05-6KF-2156-I
FRCS-II017
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (ground driver
failed on_causing continuous power to the solenoid). IOA-RCS
claims this event indicator failed short to ground causes loss of
accurate indication of valve status from event indicator.
Redundancy provided by GPC/MDM discretes. Loss of all redundancy
may lead to falsely failing the valve closed causing loss of
mission operations. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
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4.1.2.3 Thruster Subsystem (41 issues)
4.1.2.3.A Hardware (i0 issues)
4.1.2.3.A.I Primary Thruster Bipropellant Solenoid Valves
(6 issues)
i) FAILURE: PREMATURE OPERATION
(DURING GROUND C/O TRICKLE CURRENT TEST)
03-2F-121310-I 3/3 ---
RCS-10116X I/i ---, CIL
ISSUE: IOA considers a premature (unexpected) firing of an RCS
thruster during ground operations and testing to be a i/I
failure. Such a failure could result in loss of life due to
exposure to prop vapors and/or thruster plume. This failure is
the result of a reaction jet driver (RJD) failure. A "failed-on"
thruster caused by an RJD failure is covered in the GNC
subsystem.
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2) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-2F-121310-2 3/IR FPP, CIL
RCS-181 i/i ---, CIL (Fails open)
RCS-185, _87, 189 I/i ---, CIL (Internal leakage)
ISSUE: A thruster biprop valve failed open or leaking due to
piece-part structural failure or seal failure results in leakage
of propellant. See 4.1.I.A.2. Such a failure could also result
in zots upon subsequent thruster use.
3) FAILURE: FAILS CLOSED (ONE OR BOTH VALVES)
03-2F-121310-3
RCS-184
RCS-186
RCS-188
RCS-10015X
3/IR FPP, CIL (All FRCS thrusters)
3/2R FPP, CIL (-X axis)
2/IR FPP, CIL (+/-Y axis)
3/IR FPP, CIL (-Z axis)
3/2R FPP, CIL (+Z axis)
ISSUE: IOA recommends that the FRCS primary thrusters be
separated by axis since the failure of thrusters in each axis can
have different effects. IOA considered thrusters which fire in
the same direction to be redundant to each other. Loss of all
jets in the -X axis could result in loss of mission only. -X
thrusters are not required for ET sep or FRCS prop dumping. Loss
of both +Y or both -Y thrusters after the deorbit burn would
result in loss of yaw jet (null jet) dumping capability and
possible inability to deplete FRCS propellant. See 4.1.I.A.I.
Loss of all -Z thrusters on the same side could result in
inability to perform ET sep. Loss of all +Z thrusters could
103
result in loss of mission only. +Z thrusters are not required
for ET sep or FRCS prop dumping. IOA recommends either that this
FMEAbe separated into four new FMEAs, or that this FMEAbe
upgraded to a 2/IR FPP to cover the worst case.
4) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-182 i/I ---, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers external leakag_ of the primary thruster
biprop solenoid valves assembly due to a housing failure to be a
credible failure (ref. NSTS 22206, p. 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and
recommends that it be addressed on the FMEA/CIL. Failure results
in leakage of propellant. See 4.1.I.A.2.
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5) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW
NO FMEA
RCS-183 2/IR FPP, CIL
_SSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers restricted flow to be a credible failure
mode for components with integral filters, and recommends that
it be addressed for the thruster biprop valves. Effects same as
"failed closed". See issue on O3-2F'1213i0-3, above, and
4.1.I.A.I. _-
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6) FAILURE: DELAYED OPERATION, ONE VALVE OPENS SLOWLY OR LATE
NO FMEA
RCS-10042X i/i ---, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers the delayed opening of one biprop valve
relative to the other to be a credible failure which should be
addressed. Such a failure of the oxidizer valve could result in
fuel migration into the oxidizer injector tube and detonation
within the tube upon oxidizer flow (zots). Rupture of the valve
assembly due to jet zots would result in leakage of propellant.
See 4.1.I.A.2. IOA recommends that a i/i FMEA be generated for
this failure mode.
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4.1.2.3.A.2 Primary Thruster Injector Head Assembly (2 issues)
I) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW
NO FMEA
RCS-10018X i/I ---, CIL
ISSUE: This item is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. However, a note on 03-2F-121312-1 states that the
injector FMEA was deleted and added as a cause on 121312-1. IOA
considers the injector assembly to be at the same level of detail
as other primary thruster components on the FMEA/CIL, and
recommends that a separate 1/1 FMEA be z_generated for this item
and failure mode. This will ensure that this critical failure
gets the proper amount of attention. Restricted flow leading to
an improper mixture ratio or inadequate cooling would probably
result in loss of the thruster, and could result in combustion
chamber or nozzle extension burn-through.
2) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BURN-THROUGH
NO FMEA
RCS-10OI9X I/1 ---, CIL
ISSUE: This item is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. However, a note on 03-2F-121312-I states that the
injector FMEA was deleted and added as a cause on 121312-1. IOA
considers_the injector assembly to be at the same level of detail
as other prima/y thruster components on the FMEA/CIL, and
recommends that a separate i/i FMEA be regenerated for this item
and failure mode. This will ensure that this critical failure
gets the proper amount of attention. Such a failure of the
injector head assembly could result in a fire/explosion potential
leading to possible damage to the vehicle.
Vernier Thruster Assembly (2 issues)
FAILS OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-2F-131310-2 2/2
RCS-192 I/i
RCS-195 1/1
---, CIL
---, CIL (Fails open)
---, CIL (Internal leakage)
ISSUE: A thruster biprop valve failed open or leaking due to
piece-part structural failure or seal failure results in leakage
of propellant. See 4.1.I.A.2.
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2) FAILURE: STRUCTURALFAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNALLEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-194 i/i ---, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers external leakage of the vernier thruster
biprop valve assembly due to a housing failure to be a credible
failure (ref. NSTS 22206, p. 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and recommends
that it be addressed on the FMEA/CIL. Failure results in leakage
of propellant. See 4.1.I.A.2.
4.1.2.3.B EPD&C (31 issues)
D
D
mm
4.1.2.3.B.I Remote Power Controllers (5 issues)
i) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KF-2179-2
FRCS-886,890,894,901
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (RJD bus relays
fail on, RJD fails on, manifold isolation valve failed, tank
isolation valve failed, main bus off, causing inadvertent or
uncontr0ilable thruster firing)-. _ IOA-RCS-claims this_RPC
inadvertently operating alone has no effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
2) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KF-2183-2
FRCS-906,908
3/2R PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (RPC failed,
spurious RJD command, manifold isolation valve failed, tank
isolation valve failed, main bus fails on, causing inadvertent or
uncontrollable thruster firing). IOA-RCS claims this RPC
inadvertently operating alone has no effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
3) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
=
05-6KF-2179-I 3/IR PPP
FRCS-885,889,904 2/1R PPP, CIL
893 3/1R PPP (manifold 3)
_SSUE: IOA-RCS claims this failed open RPC causes loss of
driver power, thus jets, on associated manifold. Redundancy
provided by jets on another manifold. Loss of all redundancy
causes loss of jets required to expel propellants in efforts to
meet C.G. limits. Manifold 3 has electrical redundancy for
driver power (893). (see 4.1.1.B.4)
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4) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KF-2180-I 3/IR PPP
FRCS-887,891,902 2/IR PPP, CIL
895 3/IR PPP (manifold 3)
ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this failed open RPC causes loss of
logic power, thus jets, on associated manifold. Redundancy
provided by jets on another manifold. Loss of all redundancy
causes loss of jets required to expel propellants in efforts to
meet C.G. limits. Manifold 3 has electrical redundancy for logic
power (895). (see 4.1.1.B.4)
5) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KF-2182-2 3/IR PPP
FRCS-900 3/3
ISSUE." NASA FMEA considers multiple failures.
this failure alone has no effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
4.1.2.3.B.2 Diode (7 issues)
IOA-RCS claims
I) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2259-I
FRCS-913,9_19,941
925,931
3/IR PFP, CIL
2/IR PPP, CIL
3/IR PPP (manifold 3)
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ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this failed open diode causes loss of
driver power, thus jets, on associated manifold. Redundancy
provided by jets on another manifold. Loss of all hardware
redundancy causes loss of jets required to expel propellants in
efforts to meet c.G. limits. Manifold 3 has additional
electrical redundancy (925,931). (see 4.1.I.B.4)
2) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2260-I 3/IR PFP, CIL ...............
FRCS-909,915,943 2/IR PPP (I/i ABORT), CIL
921,927 3/IR PPP (manifold 3)
ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this failed open diode causes loss of
driver power, thus jets, on associated manifold. Redundancy
provided by jets on another manifold. Loss of all redundancy
causes loss of jets required to expel propellants in efforts to
meet C.G. limits. Loss of one yaw thruster during RTLS/TAL abort
could result in inability to complete a propellant dump.
Manifold 3 has electrical redundancy (921,927). (see 4.1.I.B.4)
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3-7) FAILURE: FAILS SHORTTO GROUND
NO FMEA
FRCS-I1213,11214,11217 2/IR PFP, CIL
11215,11216 .... 3/IR PFP (manifold 3), CIL
ISSUE: Diode failed short to ground causes loss of jets on
associated manifold. Redundancy provided by jets on another
manifold. Loss of all redundancy causes loss of jets required to
expel propellants in efforts to meet C.G. limits. Manifold 3 has
electrical redundancy for driver power (FMEA for fail open and
fail short on 05-6KF-2260-I, -2). (see 4.1.I.B.4)
4.1.2.3.B.3 Hybrid Drivers (3 issues)
I) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KF-2220-2 3/2R PFP, CIL
FRCS-958 3/3
NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (RPC failed,
spurious RJD command, manifdld isolation valve failed, tank
isolation valve failed, main bus fails on, causing inadvertent or
uncontrollable thruster firing). IOA-RCS claims this driver
inadvertently operating alone has no effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
2) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KF-2214-I 3/IR PFP, CIL
FRCS-947,949,956 2/1R PPP, CIL
951,953 3/1R PPP (manifold 3)
ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this failed open driver causes loss of
driver power, thus jets, on associated manifold. Redundancy
provided by jets on another manifold. Loss of all redundancy
causes loss of jets required to expel propellants in efforts to
meet C.G. limits. Electrical redundancy provided for manifold 3
(951,953). (see 4.1.I.B.4)
3) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KF-2214-2
FRCS-948,950,952,954,955
3/iR PFP, CIL
3/3
NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (RJD bus relays
fail on, RJD fails on, manifold isolation valve failed, tank
isolation valve failed, main bus off, causing inadvertent or
uncontrollable thruster firing). IOA-RCS claims this relay
inadvertently operating alone has no effect. (see 4.1 I.B.2)
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4.1.2.3.B.4 Fuses (3 issues)
I) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2009-I
FRCS-959,962,965
3/2R PPP
2/IR PPP, CIL
ISSUE." This fuse failed open causes loss of energy to supply
driver power to associated relay. Relay "A" provides energy to
manifolds 1 & 3. Relay "B" provides energy to manifold 2. Relay
"C" provides energy to manifolds 3 & 4. Loss of relay causes
loss of jets on associated manifold. Redundancy provided by jets
on another manifold. Loss of all hardwaTe redundancy causes loss
of jets required to expel propellants in efforts to meet C.G.
limits. (see 4.1.I.B.4)
2) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2007-I 3/IR PPP
FRCS-961,964,967, 2/IR PPP, CIL
969 3/IR PPP (manifold 4)
ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this failed open fuse causes loss of logic
power, thus jets, on associated manifold. Redundancy provided by
jets on another manifold. Loss of all redundancy causes loss of
jets required to expel propellants in efforts to meet C.G.
limits. Manifold 4 has electrical redundancy for logic power
after ascent (969). (see 4.1.I.B.4)
3) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KF-2008-I
FRCS-960,963,966,970
3/IR PPP
2/IR PPP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this failed open fuse causes loss driver
power, thus jets, on associated manifold. Redundancy provided by
jets on another manifold. Loss of all redundancy causes loss of
jets required to expel propellants in efforts to meet C.G.
limits. (see 4.1.I.B.4)
4.1.2.3.B.5 Relays (2 issues)
i) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KF-2130-2 • 3/IR PPP
FRCS-973,975,97 7.... 3/3 ............................ _.......
IssuE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (RPC fails on, RJD
fails on, manifold isolation valve failed, tank isolation valve
failed, main bus off, causing inadvertent or uncontrollable
thruster firing). IOA-RCS claims this relay inadvertently
operating alone has no effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
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2) FAILURE: FAILS TO TRANSFER
05-6KF-2130-I 3/IR PPP
FRCS-972,974,976 2/IR PPP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this failed open relay causes loss of
driver power, thus jets, on associated manifold. Redundancy
provided by jets on another manifold. Loss of all redundancy
causes loss of jets required to expel propellants in efforts to
meet C.G. limits. (see 4.1.I.B.4)
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4.1.2.3.B.6
1 ) FAILURE :
NO FMEA
FRCS-I035
Resistors (i issue)
FAILS SHORT
3/3
The RLR42 resistors have been changed to the RWR80
resistors which can short. IOA-RCS recommends this failure be
included into the FMEAs. (the open failure mode for this
resistor is on 05-6KF-2111-I).
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4.1.2.3.B.7 Toggle Switche s (5 issues)
i) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KF-2036-2
FRCS-II121,II122,11123,11131
ii132,11133,11141,Ii142,
Ii143,11151,II152,11153
3/IR PPP
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (RJD fails on,
manifold isolation valve failed, tank isolation valve failed,
main bus off, causing inadvertent or uncgntrol!abl_ thruster
firing). IOA-RCS claims this switch inadvertently operating
alone has no effec t . (see 4.1.I.B.2) ....
2) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KF-2041-2
FRCS-II156,11157,11158
3/2R PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (spurious RJD ....
command, manifold isolation valve failed, tank isolation valve
failed, main bus fails off, causing inadvertent or uncontrollable
thruster firing). IOA-RCS claims this switch inadvertently
operating alone has no effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
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3) FAILURE: FAILS TO CONDUCT ONE OR MORE CONTACT SET
05-6KF-2035-I
FRCS-lll15,11119,11125,
11129,11135,11139
11145,11149
3/1R PPP
2/IR PPP, CIL
3/IR PPP (manifold 4)
ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this failed open toggle switch causes loss
of logic power, thus jets, on associated manifold. Redundancy
provided by jets on another manifold. Loss of all redundancy
causes loss of jets required to expel propellants in efforts to
meet C.G. limits. Manifold 4 has electrical redundancy for logic
power after ascent (11145,11149). (see 4.1.I.B.4)
4) FAILURE: FAILS TO CONDUCT ONE OR MORE CONTACT SET
05-6KF-2036-I
FRCS-II120,II124,11130,11134
11140,11144,11150,11154
3/IR PPP
2/IR PPP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this failed open toggle switch causes
idss of driver power, thus jets, for associated manifold.
Redundancy provided by jets on another manifold. Loss of all
redundancy causes loss of jets required to expel propellants in
efforts to meet C.G. limits. (see 4.1.I.B.4)
5) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KF-2035-2 3/IR PPP
FRCS-II126,11127,11128,11116 3/3
11117,11118,11136,11137,
11138,11146,11147,11148
ISSUE: NASA FMEA considers multiple failures (RJD fails on,
manifold isolation valve failed, tank isolation valve failed,
main bus off, causing inadvertent or uncontrollable thruster
firing). IOA-RCS claims this switch inadvertently operating
alone has no effect. (see 4.1.I.B.2)
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4.1.2.3.B.8 Signal Conditioners (1 issue)
I) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OR LOSS OF OUTPUT
NO FMEA
FRCS-11196 3/2R PFP, cIL
ISSUE: The OF3 signal conditioner routes data for the helium
oxidizer tank pressure data. This may causes loss of mission due
to uncertainty about quantity of propellant.
III
4.1.2.3.B.9 Pressure Sensors (2 issues)
I) FAILURE: INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN NORMAL
NO FMEA
FRCS-II44 3/2R PFP, CIL
_SSUE: The vernier thrusters' chamber pressure sensors
indicating a lower than actual pressure may deselect the vernier ......
jets. Reselection capability available. This may cause loss of
some mission operations (primary pressure sensors failures on 03-
2F-121314-2). (see 4.1.I.B.5)
2) FAILURE: INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN NORMAL
NO FMEA
FRCS-II45 3/2R PFP, CIL
ISSUE: The vernier thrusters' chamber pressure sensors
indicating a higher than actual pressure may be deselect a jet.
Reselection of jet available. This may cause loss of some
mission operations (primary pressure sensors failures On 0_2F -
121314-1). (see 4.1.I.B.5)
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4.1.2.3.B.I0 Temperature Sensors (2 issues)
I) FAILURE: INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN NORMAL
NO FMEA
FRCS-II54 3/2R PFP, CIL
ISSUE: The vernier thrusters' injector temperature sensors
indicating a lower than actual temperature may deselect a jet.
Rese!ection of jet available. This may cause loss of some
mission operations (primary injector temperature sensors failures
on 03-2F-1213i5-2). (see 4.1.I.B.5)
2) FAILURE : INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN NORMAL
NO FMEA
FRCS-II55 3/2R PFP, CIL
ISSUE: The vernier thrusters'injector temperature sensors
indicating a higher than actual temperature may deselect a jet.
Reselection of jet available. This may cause loss of some
mission operations (primary injector temperature sensors failures
on 03-2F-121315-I). (see 4.1.I.B.5)
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4.1.2.4 Thermal Control Subsystem (3 issues)
4.1.2.4.A Hardware
IOA analyzed and assessed thermal control subsystem items as
EPD&C items. See 4.1.2.4.B for assessment results.
4.1.2.4.B EPD&C (3 issues)
W
J
4.1.2.4.B.I Thermal Switches (2 issues)_
i) FAILURE: FAILS CLOSED (HEATERS REMAIN ON)
NO FMEA
FRCS-1300 2/2, CIL
ISSUE: Vernier thruster switch not specifically caiied out on
this FMEA. (see 4.1.I.B.5)
2) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
NO FMEA
FRCS-1301 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: Vernier thruster switch not specifically called out on
this FMEA. (see 4.1.I.B.5)
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4.1.2.4.B.2 Hybrid Drivers (I issue)
I) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KF-2215-2 3/3
FRCS-I157,1159,1161,I163,1165,1167, 3/2R PPP
1169,1171,1173,1175,1177,1179
_SSUE: This driver bailed short causes inab_ii_ty_ot_urnoff
heater with thermostat. Heater can be turned off with switch.
Loss of all redundancy may cause loss of some mission operations
due to orbiter pointing deep space for cooling.
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4.2 Aft RCS Assessment Results
The unresolved aft RCS hardware and EPD&C issues are presented in
the following sections. Several general issues are first
presented (section 4.2.1), followed by the specific unresolved
issues (section 4.2.2).
4.2.1 General Aft RCS Issues
Many of the unresolved issues which exist on individual FMEAs and
CILs are linked to several "general" issues identified by IOA
during the RCS FMEA/CIL assessment. These general issues concern
either the groundrules used by NASA/RI to perform the FMEA/CIL
analysis, or the NASA/RI analysis of the RCS subsystem. Each of
the general IOA issues results in numerous FMEA and CIL issues.
The general issues identified by IOA in the ARCS hardware and
EPD&C assessments are discussed in the following sections.
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4.2.1.A Hardware
Four general areas of difference between the IOA and NASA/RI aft
RCS subsystem analyses are responsible for many of the unresolved
ARCS hardware issues.
U
D
4.2.1.A.1 _ Inability to Complete Abort Propellant Dumps
During RTLS ann TAL aborts, OMS propellant is dumped through the
twenty-four ARCS primary thrusters, and RCS propellant is dumped
through the four +X primary thrusters. Inability to complete full
propellant dumps could result in violations of entry mass
properties constraints and/or violations of the OMS or RCS
propellant tank landing weight constraints due to the additional
amount of undumped propellants remaining in the tanks.
Therefore, IOA has classified each single failure which results in
the loss of one or more primary thrusters as a crit 1 during
aborts. The current NASA criticalities on these types of failures
do not include any abort crit 1 assignments.
For a flight on which an OMS abort dump to the propellant tank
landing weight constraint (22%) is planned, loss of one ARCS
thruster would reduce the amount of OMS propellant dumped and thus
result in some OMS propellant remaining in the tank in excess of
the tank landing weight limit. For a flight which has an abort
entry X cg approaching the aft limit (1109.0 inches), any
additional amount of undumped OMS propellant would move the X cg
further aft, possibly resulting in violation of the aft limit.
Similarly, loss of one ÷X thruster reduces the RCS propellant dump
rate by half for one pod and could result in an incomplete RCS
dump. The additional amount of undumped propellant in the RCS
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tanks could result in violation of the RCS tank landing weight
limit (70%) and/or violations of entry mass properties
constraints.
Violation of a propellant tank landing weight limit could result
in vehicle structural damage and or tank structural failure during
entry or landing.
Six (6) of the ARCS issues are related to this general issue.
w
_mw
--=
4.2.1.A.2 Propellant Leakage
IOA considers any leakage of RCS propellant (MMH or NTO) to be
potentially life and vehicle threatening, regardless of where the
leakage occurs. NSTS 22206 states that "A single failure
resulting in leakage of LO2, LH2, N2H4, or MMH shall be classified
as a Criticality 1" (p. 2-11, item h). Therefore, IOA classifies
any single failure which results in prop leakage as a 1/1. If
redundant items must fail before leakage occurs, IOA classifies
the failure as a functional criticality 1R. Propellant leakage
can result in contamination and corrosion of other components,
fire, explosion, or exposure of EVA and ground crews to propellant
or propellant vapors.
Twelve (12) of the ARCS hardware issues are related to this
general issue.
4.2. I.A. 3 Isolation Valve Internal Relief Device Failure
The propellant tank isolation valves, crossfeed valves, primary
manifold isolation valves, and vernier manifold isolation valves
each have an internal pressure relief device which would relieve a
downstream overpressurization condition if the valve was closed.
With the exception of the aft RCS vernier manifold isolation valve
(03-2A-202140-3, i/I), NASA/RI assigns 3/3 criticalities to the
FMEAs which address the failure of this device to relieve
downstrea m pressure. IOA contends that it is possible that a
failed closed relief device could allow a downstream pressure
build-up sufficient to'cause a_prbp line leak, ....This _s supported
by the fact that the prop line structural failure FMEA (03-2A-
202108-i) lists this failure as a cause. Since this failure could
result in line failure and prop ieakage, ioA recommends that the
current 3/3 FMEAs for the relief device failures be upgraded
accordingly.
Three (3) of the ARCS hardware issues are related_to this general
issue.
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4.2.1.A.4 Additional Items and Failure Modes
A number of RCS subsystem items and failure modes identified by
IOA during the analysis phase are not covered in the current NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA recommends that these items and failure modes be
incorporated into the FMEA/CIL. These issues are identified in
Appendix F by issue codes HDW 4 and HDW 5.
Thirty-four (34) of the ARCS hardware issues are related to this
general issue.
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4.2.1.B EPD&C
IOA has several general EPD&C issues that tend to inflate the
number of issues shown in the assessment tables. The following
generaiissues remaln unresoiVed.
4.2.1.B.I Loss of Talkback Data
IOA considers that the loss of data to determine the actual
position of a valve to be a 3/2R PPP. Valve position data is
provided by the GPC/MDM discretes and the event indicators, which
provide redundancy for each other. Loss of all redundancy may
lead to falsely failing the valve closed which could effect
mission operations. NASA _EAS have a 3/3 criticality for these
failures.
This type af failure mode accounts for 25 open issues shown in the
assessment tables for the aft EPD&C (6 issues in the helium
pressurization subsystem and 19 in the propellant storage and
distribution subsystem). They are identified by issue code EPD&C
I in Appendix F.
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4.2.1.B.2 FMEA Downgrades to 3/3 or 3/2R PPP - NST8 22206
Interpretations
Numerous issues remain open due to different interpretations of
NSTS 2220-6. ....AIi these issues concern the definition of the
redundancy string. IOA did not consider multiple or unrelated
failures in determining the criticality. IOA claims these FMEAs
warrant a 3/2R PPP or 3/3 for the failure mode.
This type of failure mode accounts for 54 open issues shown in the
assessment tables for the aft RCS EPD&C (I issue in the helium
pressurization subsystem, 46 issues in the propellant storage and
distribution subsystem, and 7 issues in the thruster subsystem).
They are identified by issue code EPD&C 2 in Appendix F.
M
I
a
m
m
I
116
m
I
w
rW
w
J
m
w
4.2.1.B.3 FMEA Failure Scenario Upgrades - NSTS 22206
Interpretations
These issues also remain open due to the different interpretations
of NSTS 22206. All these issues concern the definition of the
redundancy string. IOA did not consider mu!tiple or unrelated
failures in determining criticality, however IOA did consider the
functional redundancy for the item in question. Based on this,
IOA failure scenarios create a 1R or CIL item condition, without
using multiple or unrelated failures. IOA recommends these
failure scenarios and criticality upgrades be included in the
NASA FMEA/CIL.
These failure modes account for 9 open issues in the propellant
storage and distribution subsystem as shown in the aft RCS EPD&C
assessment tables. They are identified by issue code EPD&C 3 in
Appendix F.
4.2.1.B.4 EPD&C Issues Tied to Open IOA Hardware Issues
These issues are directly related to the open IOA hardware
issues. These failure modes account for 8 open issues in the
propellant storage and distribution subsystem. They are
identified by issue code EPD&C 4 in Appendix F.
4.2.1.B.5 Additional EPD&C Failure Modes Reaommended by IOA
These failure modes are not "currently addressed by the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA recommends these failure modes be incorporated
into the FMEA/CIL.
These failures account for 32 open issues shown in the assessment
tables for the aft RCS EPD&C (3 issues in the helium
pressurization subsystem, 16 issues in the propellant storage and
distribution subsystem, 5 issues in the thruster subsystem, and 8
issue in the thermal control subsystem). They are identified by
issue code EPD&C 5 in Appendix F.
w
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4.2.2 Specific Aft RCS Issues
The specific aft RCS hardware and EPD&C unresolved issues are
presented in the following sections and paragraphs which were
referenced in tables I and If. The organization of the sections
and paragraphs follow the RCS hierarchy shown in Figures 4-7, and
used in tables I and II.
Unresolved issues which are related to general issues discussed in
section 4.2.1 contain a reference to the applicable general issue.
Each issue is presented in a standard format which gives the
failure mode, applicable FMEA number and IOA assessment ID, the
NASA and IOA criticality and screen assignments, and the rationale
behind the IOA issue. Refer to assessment sheets in Appendix C
for further information on each issue.
4.2.2.1 Heli%um Pressurisation Subsystem (24 issues)
4.2.2.1.A Hardware (14 issues)
4.2.2.1.A.I Helium Tank Isolation Valves (4 issues)
i) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
03-2A-201020-2 3/1R PPP
RCS-20_ 3/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that this failure mode be upgraded to a
3/1R PFP. A failure of the redundant secondary regulator would
not be detectable in flight (fail B screen). No way to tell that
one level of redundancy has been lost.
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2) FAILURE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-202A 3/IR PFP, CIL
This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers internal leakage to be a credible
failure mode and recommends that it be addressed on the FMEA/CIL.
Effects same as "fails open". See issue on 03-2A-201020-2, above.
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m3) FAILURE : RESTRICTED FLOW
NO FMEA
RCS-IO020X 2/IR PFF, CIL
_SSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers restricted flow to be a credible failure
mode and recommends that a 2/IR PFF FMEA and CIL be added.
Effects same as "failed closed". Failure not detectable during
dual leg operation (fail B screen). Contamination can affect
both valves simultaneously (fail C screen).
4) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-10021X i/I ---, CIL
ISSUE." This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers external leakage of the He isol valve
due to a housing failure to be a credible failure (ref. NSTS
22206, p. 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and recommends that it be
addressed on the FMEA/CIL. Failure results in loss of helium
pressurant.
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4.2.2.1.A.2 Regulator Assemblies (3 issues)
I) FAILURE: FAILS CLOSED, RESTRICTED FLOW
03-2A-20103_-2 2/1R PPF, CIL
RCS-211 2/1R PFF, CIL (Fails closed)
RCS-212 2/IR PFF, CIL (Restricted flow)
ISSUE: IOA recommends that the B screen be failed for these
failure modes. A failed closed regulator would not be detectable
during dual leg operation. IOA accepts NASA/RI failure of C
screen, however has not identified a single event which can result
in the loss of both parallel regs. Contamination from downstream
source (prop vapors) requires multiple failures (quad check valve
poppets). The NASA/RI C screen classification is inconsistent
between the forward and aft RCS regulator analyses.
2) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-213 I/i ---, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers external leakage of the He regulator due
to a housing failure to be a credible failure (ref. NSTS 22206,
p. 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and recommends that it be addressed on
the FMEA/CIL. Failure results in loss of helium pressurant.
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3) FAILURE: SENSING PORT LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-214 3/2R PFP, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
RCS FMEA/CIL, but is addressed on the NASA OMS FMEA/CIL (03-3-
1004-3, sensing port leakage, 3/2R PFP). IOA recommends that
this failure mode also be addressed for the RCS regulators, with
the same rationale used in the OMS subsystem.
4.2.2.1.A.3 Quad Check Valve Assemblies (2 issues)
I) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-2A-201095-I
RCS-218
3/3 ---
2/1R PFP, CIL
ISSUE." IOA recommends that this failure mode be upgraded to a
2/IR PFP. IOA contends that, with series check valve poppets
failed open or leaking, the contamination of upstream components
by prop or prop vapors during armission could result in loss of
prop tank repressurization capability and subsequent inability to
utilize ARCS prop. Contamination by prop could cause parallel
regulators to fail closed.
2) FAILURE : STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-10024X I/i ---, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers external leakage of the quad check valve
assembly due to a housing failure to be a credible failure (ref.
NSTS 22206, p. 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and recommends that it be
addressed on the FMEA/CIL. Failure results in loss of helium
pressurant, and leakage of prop and/or prop vapors. See
4.2.1.A.2.
4.2.2.1.A.4 Qulak Disconnect Couplings
I, 2 ) FAILURE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(5 issues)
03-2A-201070-I
RCS-200
2/IR FFP, CIL
2/1R FFP, CIL
03-2A-201091-1
RCS-208, 216, 220, 243
3/IR FFP, CIL
3/IR FFP, CIL
ISSUE: I0A recommends that "poppet fails open" be added as a
failure mode on the FMEAs listed. This is a credible fai_iure
mode and is addressed on other QD coupling FMEAs.
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3-5) FAILURE: FAILS TO COUPLE
03-2A-201070-2, 201091-2, 202150-2 3/3 ---
RCS-201, 209, 217, 221, 226, 232, 238, 244 3/3 ---
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "restricted flow" be added as a
failure mode on the FMEAs listed. This is a credible failure and
is addressed on other QD coupling FMEAs.
4.2.2.1.B EPD&C (I0 issues)
4.2.2.1.B.I Diodes (4 issues)
I) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2267-I 3/3
ARCS-1326,1336 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: This issue concerns falsely failing the valve closed.
(see 4.2.1.B.1)
2) FAILURE: FAILED SHORT
05-6KA-2252-2 3/1R PFP, CIL
ARCS-1323,1325,1333,1335 3/3
ISSUE." NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (same diode short to
ground). IOA-RCS claims this diode failed short alone has no
effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
3) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
NO FMEA
ARCS-12329 2/IR PPP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this diode failed open causes inability
to open the valve. Redundancy provided by other valve. Loss of
this causes inability to expel propellants to meet landing weight
constraints.
4) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
NO FMEA
ARCS-12330 3/3
ISSUE: IOA-RCS claims this diode failing short has no effect.
No FMEA exists for this failure.
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4.2.2.1.B.2 Hybrid Drivers (2 issues)
1) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KA-2201-1 3/3
ARCS-1346,1358 3/2R PPP
u
mm
2 ) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KA-2201A-I 3/3
ARCS-1348,1360 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: Both of these issues concern falsely failing the valve
closed. (see 4.2.1.B.1)
4.2.2.1.B.3 Resistors (2 issues}
1) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2077-I 3/3
ARCS-1372,1374,1378,1380 3/2R PPP
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2) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2078-I 3/3
ARCS-I176,1377,1392,1393 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: Both of these issues
closed. (see 4.2.1.B.1)
concern falsely failing the valve
4.2.2.B.I.4 Microswltches (I issue)
1) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
NO FMEA
ARCS-12331 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: IOA'RCS claims this failed open resistor causes loss of
acccurate indication of the valve status from the event indicator
or the GPC/MDM microswitch discretes. This may lead to falsely
failing the valve closed.
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w4.2.2.1.B.5
I) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2151-I
ARCS-1413
Event Indicators (I issue)
3/3
3/2R PPP
ISSUE." This issue concerns falsely failing the valve closed.
(see 4.2.1.B.1)
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4.2.2.2 Propellant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
(135 issues)
4.2.2.2.A Hardware (23 issues)
4.2.2.2.A.I Propellant Tank Acquisition Assembly (I issue)
I) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, HELIUM PASSAGE, SCREEN DRY-OUT
03-2F-211110-2 1/1 ---, CIL
RCS-227 1/1 ---, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that the propellant tank acquisition
device components be itemized in the item list or functional
description sections to show specifically what is covered by this
FMEA (e.g.: upper compartment channels/screens, lower compartment
channels/screens, feedout tubes, plenum, bulkhead, etc.).
4.2.2.2.A.2 Pressure Relief Assemblies (3 issues)
I) FAILURE: BURST DISK LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-241 2/1R PFP, CIL
ISSUE:- Internal leakage of the burst disk is a credible failure
mode and is_not currently addressed on the NASA FMEA/CIL. IOA
recommends that this failure mode be added to 03-2A-201060-5
(pressure relief valve assy, burst disk ruptures prematurely, 2/1R
PFP). The failure history of the burst disk includes internal
leakage.
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2) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW
NO FMEA
RCS-10026X 3/1R FNP, CIL
ISSUE." This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers restricted flow to be a credible failure
mode for components with integral filters and/or orifices, and
recommends that it be addressed for the pressure relief valve.
Failure mode can be added to 03-2A-201060-3 (pressure relief
valve assy, burst disk fails to rupture, 3/IR FNP).
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3 ) FAILURE : STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-10027X i/I ---, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. FMEA 03-2A-201060-I addresses only a bellows failure.
IOA considers external leakage of the relief valve assembly due
to a housing failure to be a credible failure (ref. NSTS 22206,
p. 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and recommends that it be addressed on
the FMEA/CIL. Failure results in loss of helium pressurant, and
leakage of prop or prop vapors. See 4.2.1.A.2.
4.2.2.2.A.3
i) FAILURE :
Ground Manual Isolation Valve (I issue)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-247 I/i ---, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers external leakage of the ground manual
isolation valve due to a housing failure to be a credible failure
(ref. NSTS 22206, p. 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and recommends that it
be addressed on the FMEA/CIL. Failure results in loss of helium
pressuran£, and leakage of prop and/or prop vapors. See
4.2.1.A.2.
a&.
4.2.2.2.A'4 Propellant Tank Isolation Valves (5 issues)
I) FAILURE: FAILS CLOSED (1/2 VALVE)
03-2A-202110-I
RCS-251
3/IR PPP
3/IR PPP, i/I ABORT, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that this failure mode be upgraded to a
3/IR PPP, i/1 abort for the 1/2 valve. This failure results in
the loss of one +X thruster for the RTLS and TAL abort ARCS
propellant dump, and could result in inability to complete the
dump. See 4.2.1.A.I.
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2) FAILURE: RELIEF DEVICE FAILS CLOSED
03-2A-202110-2
RCS-10029X
RCS-10030X
3/3 ---
2/IR PNP, CIL (1/2 VALVE)
3/IR PNP (3/4/5 VALVES)
ISSUE: These valves are nominally open during all phases, and
will be closed only during some crossfeed/interconnect operations
or to isolate a downstream failure. During crossfeed/interconnect
operations, the downstream pro_liant line is h-o% subjec£ to
overpressurization because it is open to a tank. Therefore, this
failure mode is applicable only during straight-feed operations
when a failure has occurred which requires closing of the tank
isol valves. IOA recommends that this failure mode be upgraded to
a 2/IR PNP for the 1/2 valve and 3/IR PNP for the 3/4/5 valves
(not a i/l's, since a previous failure is required for the valves
to be closed). See 4.2.1.A.3.
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3) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW (1/2 VALVE)
NO FMEA
RCS-249 3/IR PPP, I/I ABORT, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers restricted flow to be a credible failure
mode for components with integral filters, and recommends that it
be addressed for the propellant tank isolation 1/2 valves.
Effect_ same as "failed closed" for the 1/2 valve. See issue on
03-2A-20211_0-I, above, and 4.2.1.A.I.
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4) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW (3/4/5 VALVES)
NO FMEA
RCS-10028X 3/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers restricted flow to be a credible failure
mode for components with integral filters, and recommends that a
new 3/iR PFPFMEA be added f0r restricted fl0w of the propeliant
tank isolation 3/4/5 valves. Restricted flow through one 3/4/5
valve would not be detectable during dual leg operation (fail B
screen).
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5) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-248 i/i ---, CIL
ISSUE." This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. FMEA 03-2A-202111-I addressed only a bellows failure.
IOA considers external leakage of a prop tank isolation valve due
to a housing failure to be a credible failure (ref. NSTS 22206,
p. 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and recommends that it be addressed on
the FMEA/CIL. Failure results leakage of propellant. See
4.2.1.A.2.
Crossfeed Valves (3 issues)
RELIEF DEVICE FAILS CLOSED
03-2A-202111-3
RCS-10033X
3/3 ---
311R PNP
ISSUE: These valves are nominally closed during a flight and are
open only during crossfeed/interconnect operations. IOA recom-
mends that the FMEA for this failure mode be upgraded to a 3/IR
PNP. Failure of the relief devices in all RCS and OMS crossfeed
valves is required for overpressurization and leakage of the
crossfeed lines to Occur. See 4.2.1.A.3.
q
2) FAILURE :_ RESTRICTED FLOW
NO FMEA
RCS-258 2/2 ---, I/i ABORT, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers restricted flow to be a credible failure
mode for components with integral filters, and recommends that it
be addressed for the RCS crossfeed valves. This failure can be
added to 03-2A-202111-2 (RCS crossfeed valve, fails closed, 2/2,
I/i abort).
w
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3) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-259A 1/1 ---, CIL
ISSUE.- This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. FMEA 03-2A-202111-1 addressed only a bellows failure.
IOA considers external leakage of a crossfeed valve due to a
housing failure to be a credible failure (ref. NSTS 22206, p. 2-
14, item 2.3.7.a), and recommends that it be addressed on the
FMEA/CIL. Failure results leakage of propellant. See 4.2.1.A.2,
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w4.2.2.2.A.6 Primary Manifold Isolation Valves (4 issues)
I) FAILURE: RELIEF DEVICE FAILS CLOSED
03-2A-202120-2
RCS-10035X
3/3 ---
2/1R PNP, CIL
These valves are nominally open during all phases, and
will not be closed unless a downstream failure occurs which
requires isolation. Therefore, this failure mode is not
applicable until another failure occurs. IOA recommends that the
FMEA for this failure mode be upgraded to a 2/1R PNP (not a 1/1,
since a previous failure is required _for the valve to be closed).
See 4.2.1.A.3.
I
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2) FAILURE: FAILS CLOSED, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
03-2A-202120-3
RCS-267, 271, 275, 279
3/1R PPP
3/IR PPP, 1/1 ABORT, CIL
ISSUE." IOA recommends that this failure mode be upgraded to a
3/1R PPP, 1/1 abort. This failure results in the loss of three
primary thrusters and could result in the inability £o Complete
RTLS and TAL abort RCS and OMS propellant dumps. See 4.2.1.A.I.
IOA also recommends that the "E" effects be revised. Loss of
three manifolds results in probable inability to maintain entry
control.
3 ) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW
NO FMEA
RCS-287 3/1R PPP, I/I ABORT, CIL .......
ISSUE; This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers restricted flo w to be a credible failure
mode for components with integral filters, and recommends that it
be addressed for the primary manifold isolation valves. Effects
same as "fails closed". See issue on 03-2A-202120-3, above, and
4o2.1.A.I.
4) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-286 1/1 ---, CIL
This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. FMEA 03-2A-202111-1 addressed only a bellows failure.
IOA considers external leakage of a primary manifold isolation
valve due to a housing faiiure to be a credihie faiiur-e (ref. _I_
NSTS 22206, p. 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and recommends that it be
addressed on the FMEA/CIL. Failure results leakage of
propellant. See 4.2.i.A.2.
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4.2.2.2.A.7 Vernier Manifold Isolation Valves (2 issues)
i) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-286A i/I ---, CIL
This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. FMEA 03-2A-202140-3 addressed a bellows failure. IOA
considers external leakage of a vernier manifold isolation valve
due to a housing failure to be a credible failure (ref. NSTS
22206, p. 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and recommends that it be
addressed on the FMEA/CIL. Failure r_sults leakage of
propellant. See 4.2.1.A.2.
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2) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW
NO FMEA
RCS-287 2/2 ---, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers restricted flow to be a credible failure
mode for components with integral filters, and recommends that it
be addressed for the vernier manifold isolation valves. Effects
same as "fails closed". This failure mode can be added to 03-2A-
202140-1 (vernier manifold isolation valve, fails closed, 2/2).
4.2.2.2.A.8._ Quick Disconnect Couplings (4 issues) •
1,2) FAILURE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-2A-201080-I
RCS-254, 256, 268, 272, 276, 280, 284
2/1R FFP, CIL
2/1R FFP, CIL
03-2A-201090-I 3/1R FFP, CIL
RCS-229, 233, 235 3/IR FFP, CIL
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "poppet fails open" be added as a
failure mode on the FMEAs listed. This is a credible failure
mode and is addressed on other QD coupling FMEAs.
3,4) FAILURE: FAILS TO COUPLE
03-2A-201080-3, 201090-2 3/3 ---
RCS-230, 234, 236, 255, 257, 269, 273, 277, 281, 285 3/3 ---
ISSUE: IOA recommends that "restricted flow" be added as a
failure mode on the FMEAs listed. This is a credible failure and
is addressed on other QD coupling FMEAs.
n
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4.2.2.2.B EPD&C (112 issues)
4.2.2.2.B.I Remote Power Controllers (3 issues)
1) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2177-2 3/IR PFP, CIL
ARCS-12019 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (open driver failed
on, ground driver failed on, causing continuous power to the
solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this RPC i_advertently operating alone
has no effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
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2) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2178-2
ARCS-12019
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (open driver failed
on, ground driver failed on, causing continuous power to the
solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this RPC inadvertently operating alone
has no effect.
3) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KA-2178ml 3/2R PPP
ARCS-12020 2/2, CIL
ISSUE: Lose capability to open manifold isolation valve.
Inability to open valve causes loss of verniers thus mission
operations.
4.2.2.2.B.2 Diodes (35 issues)
i) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
..... T
05-6KA-2268-I 3/3
ARCS-12123 3/2R PPP
2) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2269-I
ARCS-1448,1452,1456,1460
313
3/2R PPP
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3) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2279-I 3/3
ARCS-12054,12056 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The first three issues concern falsely failing the valve
closed. (see 4.2.1.B.I)
n
4) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2253-I
ARCS-12086,12088
2/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this diode
failed open alone (causing continuous power to the motor) has no
effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
5) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2253E-1 3/1R
ARCS-12098 3/3
PFP, CIL
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this diode
failed open alone (causing continuous power to the motor) has no
effect_ (see 4.2.1.B.2)
6) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2253F-I
ARCS-12100
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (shorted diode,
continuous power to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS
claims this diode failed open alone has no effect. (see
4.2.1.B.2)
m
7) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6KA-2253F-2 3/IR PFP, CIL
ARCS-12101 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (close relay failed
on, continuous power to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS
claims this diode failed short alone causes no effect. (see
4.2.1.B.2)
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8) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2254-I
ARCS- 12107,12109
2/1R PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this diode
failed open alone (causing continuous power to the motor) has no
effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
9) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2254E-1 3/1R
ARCS-12119 3/3
PFP, CIL
/_ NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (diode short,
continuous power to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS
claims this diode failed open alone has no effect. (see
4.2.1.B.2)
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1o) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2254F-I 3/IR PFP, CIL
ARCS-12121 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (diode open,
Continuous power to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS
claims this_diode failed open alone has no effect. (see
4.2.1.B.2)
ms
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Ii) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2261-I 2/IR PFP, CIL
ARCS-12130,12132,12151,12153 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this diode
failed open alone (causing continuous power to the motor) has no
effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
12) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
OS-6 -2261E- 
ARCS-12142,12163
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (diode short, close
relay fails on/ continuous power to the motor and a bellows
leak). IOA-RCS claims this diode failed open alone has no
effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
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13) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2261F-I 3/IR PFP, CIL
ARCS-12144,12165 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (diode short,
continuous power to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS
claims this diode failed open alone has no effect. (see
4.2.1.B.2)
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14) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6KA-2261F-2 3/IR PFP, CIL
ARCS-12145,12166 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (diode opens, close
relay fails on, continuous power to the motor and a bellows
leak). IOA-RCS claims this diode failed short alone has no
effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
15) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2255-I
ARCS-12192,12194,12208,12210
12224,12226,12240,12242
2/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE.'- NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this diode
failed open alone (causing continuous motor power) has no effect.
(see 4.2.1.B.2)
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
16) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2255E-I
ARCS-12204,12220,12236,12252
/_ NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (system leak, diode
short, continuous power to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-
RCS claims this diode failed open alone has no effect. (see
4.2.1.B.2)
17) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2255F-I 3/IR PFP, CIL
ARCS-12206,12222,12238,12254 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (diode short,
continuous power to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS
claims this diode failed open alone has no effect. (see
4.2.1.B.2)
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18) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2257-I
ARCS-12036
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE." NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (switch short, open
driver failed on, causing continuous power to the solenoid).
IOA-RCS claims this diode failed open alone has no effect. (see
4.2.1.B.2)
19) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2257A-1 3/1R
ARCS-12038 3/3
PFP, CIL
ISSUE." NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (switch short,
close driver failed on, causing continuous power to the
solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this diode failed open alone has no
effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
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20) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6KA-2257F-2 3/2R PPP
ARCS-12063 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (switch short,
circuit breaker failed closed, causing continuous power to the
solenoid). --IOA-RCS claims this diode failed short alone has no
effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
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21) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6KA-2253E-2
ARCS-12099
2/IR PFP (I/I ABORT), CIL
2/2 (I/i ABORT), CIL
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failure
causes inability to close the valve (open relay has constant
inhibit). This prevents crossfeed capability thus loss of
mission operations (2/2). Inability to crossfeed may cause
incomplete OMS abort dump (i/I abort). (see 4.2.1.B.3)
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22) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6KA-2254E-2 3/IR PFP
ARCS-12120 2/2
(1/1 ABORT), CIL
(1/1 ABORT), CIL
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (diode opens,
continuous power to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS
claims this failure causes inability to close the valve (open
relay has constant inhibit). This prevents crossfeed capability
thus loss of mission operations (2/2). Inability to crossfeed
may cause incomplete OMS abort dump (1/1 abort). (see 4.2.1.B.3)
23) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
-D
05-6KA-2254F-2
ARCS-12122
3/1R PFP, CIL
3/1R PFP, CIL
_$SUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (diode opens,
continuous power to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS
claims this failure causes the valve to close on ascent (GPC
mode). Redundancy provided by second leg and from crossfeed
operation. Loss of all redundancy causes inability to expel
propellants to meet landing weight constraints. (see 4.2.1.B.3)
24) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6KA_2261E-2
ARCS-12143,12164
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/IR P?P, CIL
ISSUE_ NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (open diode,
continuous power to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS
claims this failure causes the inability to close the valve.
This, coupled with the loss of all hardware redundancy prevents
isolation of a thruster leak. (see 4.2.1.B.3)
25) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6KA-2255E-2 3/1R PFP, CIL
ARCS-12205,12221, 12237,12253 3/IR PFP, CIL
*_ NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (diode opens,
continuous power to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS
claims this failure causes inability to close the valve (open
relay has constant inhibit). This, coupled with the loss of all
hardware redundancy prevents isolation of a thruster leak. (see
4.2.1.s.3)
w
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26) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6KA-2255F-2
ARCS-12207,12223,12239,12255
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (system leak, diode
opens, continuous power to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-
RCS claims this failure has no effect if command was from switch
(normal mission configuration). However,-ifthe comma_d-was_rom
the GPC, this failure causes the inability to open the valve
(close relay has constant inhibit). Switch redundancy provided.
Loss of this, coupled with the loss of all hardware redundancy
causes inability to expel propellants'to meet landing weight
constraints. (see 4.2.1.B.3)
27) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
05-6KA-2257"2 3/3
ARCS-12037 3/2R PFP, CIL
IOA-RCS claims thiS-failUr e causes ina_iiity to open the
isolation valve man uaily. Redundancy to open the valve provided
with the GPC/MDM commands. Loss of all redundancy prevents
vernier operation thus loss of mission.
28) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KA-2255_2 3/3
ARCS-12193,12195,12209,12211 3/2R PPP
12225,12227,12241,12243
ISSUE: This issue concerns falsely failing the valve closed.
(see 4.2.1.B.1)
29) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2257G-1 3/3
ARCS-12064 3/IR P NA P
ISSUE." Lose GPC close command to the ground driver. Redundancy
provided with manual command. Loss of all redundancy prevents
isolation of thruster leak.
30) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2258-I 3/2R PPP
ARCS-12052 2/2, CIL
ISSUE: Lose GPC and manual command to open the isolation Valve.
No redundancy provided. This prevents vernier operation thus
loss of mission.
136
J
mm
m
l
m
u
mm
I
g
D
m
I
J
-- =
w_=
w
w
w
3 i) FAILURE : SHORTS TO GROUND
05-6KA-2258-3
ARCS-12344
3/2R PPP
2/2, CIL
ISSUE: Lose GPC and manual command to open the isolation valve.
No redundancy provided. This prevents vernier operation thus
loss of mission.
32-33) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
NO FMEA
ARCS-12068,12070 3/IR P HA P
ISSUE: The manifold isolation valve has two diodes in parallel
that completes the circuit to ground. One diode failing open has
no effect. Second diode failing open (the redundancy) causes
inability to close the valve to isolate a thruster leak.
34-35) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
NO FMEA
ARCS-12069,12071 3/3
ISSUE: The manifold isolation valve has two diodes in parallel
that completes the circuit to ground. Either or both diode
failing short has no effect.
4.2.2.2.B.3 Hybrid Drivers (21 issues)
i) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KA-2206-I 3/3
ARCS-1472,1474 3/2R PPP
i
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2) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KA-2206-2 3/3
_CS-1473,_475 3/2R PPP
3) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KA-2207A-I
ARCS-1476,1477,1482,1483
3/3
3/2R PPP
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4) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KA-2217-1 3/3
ARCS-1488,1490,1492,1494 3/2R
5) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
PPP
05-6KA-2217-2
ARCS-1489,1491,1493,1495
3/3
3/2R PPP
ISSUE." The first five issues concern falsely failing the valve
closed. (see 4.2.1.B.1)
6) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KA-2207-I
ARCS-1478,1484
2/IR PFP, CIL
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failure
may cause inability to accurately determine position of the
valve. Loss of all redundancy may lead to falsely failing the
valve closed. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
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7) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KA-2207-2 3/IR PPP
ARCS-1479,1485 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (driver failed on,
manifold isolation valve failed open, thruster leak). IOA-RCS
claims this driver inadvertently operating alone has no effect.
(see 4.2.1.B.2)
I
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8) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KA-2219-I
ARCS-1480,1486
2/IR PFP, CIL
3/2R PPP ...............
ISSUE." NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failure
may cause inability to accurately determine position of the
valve. Loss of all redundancy may lead to falsely failing the
valve closed. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
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9) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KA-2219-2
ARCS-1481,1487
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE." NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (driver failed on,
manifold isolation valve failed open, thruster leak). IOA-RCS
claims this driver inadvertently operating alone has no effect.
i0) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KA-2208-I
ARCS-1496,1498,1500,1502
1504,1506,1508,1510
2/IR _FP, CIL
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failure
may cause inability to accurately determine position of the
valve. Loss of all redundancy may lead to falsely failing the
valve closed. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
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Ii) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2113A-2
ARCS-12033
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE:_ NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (open driver failed
on, ground _river failed on, causing continuous power to the
solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this driver inadvertently operating
alone has no effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
12) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KA-2210-I 3/IR PFP, CIL
ARCS-12024 3/2R PPP
ISSUE." NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (switch short,
ground driver failed on, causing continuous power to the
solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this failure may cause inability to
accurately determine position of the valve. Loss of all
redundancy may lead to falsely failing the valve closed. (see
4.2.1.B.2)
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13) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KA-2210A-I
ARCS-12022
3/1R PFP, CIL
3/2R PPP
ISSUE." NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (switch short,
ground driver failed on, causing continuous power to the
solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this failure may cause inability to
accurately determine position of the valve. Loss of all
redundancy may lead to falsely failing the valve closed. (see
4.2.1.B.2)
14)
.,B
FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2211-2 3/IR PFP, CIL
ARCS-12031 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (open driver failed
on, ground driver failed on, causing continuous power to the
solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this driver inadvertently operating
alone has no effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
15) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2212-2 3/1R PFP, CIL
ARCS-12029 3/3
. i
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (open driver failed
on, ground driver failed on, causing continuous power to the
solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this driver inadvertently operating
alone has no effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
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16) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2213-2 3/IR PFP, CIL
ARCS-12027 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (close driver
failed on, ground driver failed on, causing continuous power to
the solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this driver inadvertently .....
operating alone has no effect. (see 4.2.1\B.2) _
ms 0
W
17) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2224-2
ARCS-12035
3/1R PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (type I driver
failed on, type III driver failed on, causing continuous power to
the solenoid). IOA-RCS clalms this driver inadvertently
operating alone has no effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
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18) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KA-2113A-I 3/2R PPP
ARCS-12032 2/2, CIL
ISSUE: Lose capability to open the isolation valve.
prevents vernier operation thus loss of mission.
This
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19) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2210-2 3/2R PPP
ARCS-12025 2/2, CIL "
ISSUE." Failure provides inhibit to the "open" driver so that it
cannot be turned on. This causes inability to open the isolation
valve which causes loss Of verniers thus mission operations.
20) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2211-I 3/2R PPP
ARCS-12031 2/2, CIL
ISSUE." Lose capability to open the isolation valve.
to open the valve causes loss of verniers thus mission
operations.
Inability
21) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KA-2224-I 3/1R PPP
ARCS-12034 2/2, CIL
ISSUE." Lose capability to open the isolation valve. This
prevents vernier operation thus loss of mission. NASA FMEA
failure also credible. Lose capability to close valve to isolate
a thruster leak. IOA-RCS recommends both failures be covered on
this FMEA.
4.2.2.2.B.4 Relays (II issues)
I) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2126-2
ARCS-1546,1548
3/1R PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (second series
relay failed closed, continuous power to the motor and a bellows
leak). IOA-RCS claims this relay inadvertently operating alone
causes no effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
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2) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2132-2 3/IR PFP, CIL
ARCS-1562,1564,1570,1572 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (close relay fails
on, continuous power to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS
claims the latching relay inadvertently operating alone has no
effect. (see 4.2ol.B.2)
J
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3) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KA-2133-I
ARCS-1557,1559,1565,1567
3/IR PPP
3/2R PPP
NASA FMEAcontafns multiple failures (open relay fails
off, tank isolation valve failed closed, thruster failed off).
IOA-RCS claims this failure causes inability to open the
crossfeed valve. Electrical redundancy provided. Loss of this,
coupled with the loss of all hardware redundancy may causes loss
of mission. Note : FMEA incorrectly identifies relay
45V76AII6K44. It should be 56V76AII6K46. Refer to VS70-943099
and ARCS ID 1557. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
im
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4) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KAn2136-2
ARCS-1542,1_44
(i/I ABORT) , CIL
(i/I ABORT), CIL
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failure
causes inability to close I/2 valve. This prevents crossfeed
capability thus loss of mission operations (2/2). Inability to
crossfeed may cause incomplete OMS abort dump (I/I abort). (see
4.2.1.B.3) +_
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5) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2127-2
ARCS-1552,1556
2/IR PFP, CIL
3/IR PFP, CIL
ISSUE." NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failure
will close the valve and cause inability to re-op@n i_ ........
Redundancy provided by second 3/4/5 leg and from crossfeed
operation. Loss of all redundancy causes loss of jets required
to expel propellants to meet landing weight constraints. (see
4.2.1.B.3)
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6) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2137-2
ARCS-1550,1554
2/IR PFP
2/2
(1/1 ABORT) , CIL
(i/i ABORT), CIL
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failure
causes inability to close 3/4/5 valve. This prevents crossfeed
capability thus loss of mission operations (2/2). Inability to
crossfeed may cause incomplete OMS abort dump (1/1 abort). (see
4.2.1.B.3)
7) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2133-2 2/IR
ARCS-1558,1560,1566,1568 3/IR
PFP, CIL
PFP, CIL
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failure
causes inability to close crossfeed valve. This, coupled with
the loss of all hardware redundancy prevents isolation of a
thruster leak. (see 4.2.1.B.3)
8) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2128-2 2/IR PPP, CIL
ARCS-1576,1580,1584,1586 3/IR PPP (i/i ABORT), CIL
ISSUE." NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failure
will close the valve and cause the inability to re-open it. This
causes loss of jets on associated manifold. Redundancy provided
by jets on other manifolds. Loss of all redundancy causes
inability to expel propellants to meet landing weight
constraints. Loss of manifold thrusters during RTLS/TAL abort
could result in inability to complete a propellant dump. (see
4.2.1.B.3)
9) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2128A-2 2/IR PPP, CIL
ARCS-1574,1578,1582,1588 3/IR PNP
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failure
causes inability to close manifold isolation valve. This,
coupled with the loss of all hardware redundancy causes inability
to isolate a thruster leak. (see 4.2.1.B.3)
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i0) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KA-2126-I 3/IR PPP (I/I ABORT), CIL
ARCS-1545,1547 2/2 (i/i ABORT), CIL
ISSUE: Lose capability to close the valve. This prevents
crossfeed capability thus loss of mission (2/2). Inability to
crossfeed may cause incomplete OMS abort dump (i/i abort)
ii) FAILURE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-6KA-2127-1 2/2, CIL
ARCS-1551,1555 2/1R PPP, CIL
ISSUE: Lose capability to close the valve. This prevents
crossfeed capability and inability to isolate a leak.
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4.2.2.2.B.5 Resistozs (Z9 issues)
I) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-208!-I 3/3
ARCS-1589,1591,1603,1605 3/2R
(I/i ABORT), CIL
PPP
2) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2082=I 3/3
ARCS-1597,1601 3/2R
3) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2085-I
ARCS-1613,1615,1617,1629
PPP
3/3
3/2R PPP
T
mm
4) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2086-I
ARCS-1607,1611,1619,1623,
1627,1631,1633,1635
3/3
3/2R
(1/1 ABORT) , CIL
PPP
5) FAILURE: FA_LS OPEN
05-6KA-2102-I
ARCS-1641,1647,1651,1655,
i65§_i665,i669,1673
3/3
3/2R PPP
E
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6) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2088-I
ARCS-1679,1681,1685,1687,1693,1695,1699,1701,
1707,1709,1713,1715,1721,1723,1727,1729
3/3
3/2R PPP
7) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2091-I 3/3
ARCS-12012,12013,12014,12015 3/2R PPP
ISSUE:
closed.
The first seven issues concer_ falsely failing the valve
(see 4.2.1.B.1)
8) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2083-I
ARCS-1593,1595,1599
2/IR PFP
3/2R PPP
(1/1 ABORT), CIL
ISSUE.- NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failure
may cause inability to accurately determine position of the
valve. Loss of all redundancy may lead to falsely failing the
valve closed. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
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9) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2084-I
ARCS-1609,1621,1625,1637
2/IR PFP (i/i ABORT)
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failure
may cause inability to accurately determine position of the
valve. Loss of all redundancy may lead to falsely failing the
valve closed. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
io) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2i03-I 2/iR
ARCS-1643,1645,1649, 3/2R PPP
1661,1663,1669
_ : _SA FMEA _o_tains_mu_tipie _aiiures _(contindous p0wer
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failure
may cause inability to accurately determine position of the
valve. Loss of all redundancy may lead to falsely failing the
valve closed. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
L
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ii) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2089-I
ARCS-i683,1697,1711,1725
2/IR PPP
3/2R PPP
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failure
may cause inability to accurately determine position of the
valve. Loss of all redundancy may lead to falsely failing the
valve closed. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
12) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2090-I 3/IR PFP
ARCS-12008 3/2R PPP
NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (switch short,
ground driver failed on, causing continuous powertothe
solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this failure may cause inability to
accurately determine position of the valve. Loss of all
redundancy may lead to falsely failing the valve closed. (see
4.2.1.B.2)
13-19) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT
NO FMEA
ARCS-1644,1646,1650
1662,1_64,1668
3/3
ISSUE." A short across these resistors is a credible failure.
IOA-RCS recommends they be incorporated into a FMEA.
4.2.2.2.B.6 Toggle 8wltches (4 issues)
i) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2039-2
ARCS-12126,12127,12147,12148
3/IR PPP
2/2 (I/I ABORT), CIL
ISSUE." NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (close relay failed
on, continuous power to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS
claims the switch failed short across close contacts will close
the valve and cause inability to re-open it. This prevents
crossfeed capability thus loss of mission (2/2). Inability to
crossfeed may cause incomplete OMS abort dump (I/i abort). (see
4.2.1.B.4)
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2) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2032-2
ARCS-12204,12205,12206
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/IR PPP
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (diode failed open,
open driver failed on causing continuous power to the solenoid).
IOA-RCS claims this failure causes the inability to close the
valve. This, coupled with the loss of all hardware redundancy
prevents isolation of a thruster leak. (see 4.2.1.B.3)
3 ) FAILURE : INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2028-2
ARCS-12082,12083,12084
3/IR PPP
2/2
(i/i ABORT), CIL
(I/I ABORT), CIL
ISSUE: Switch failed short across open contacts causes inability
to close the valve. This prevents crossfeed capability thus loss
of mission operation (2/2). Inability to crossfeed may cause
incomplete OMS abort dump (1/1 abort). (see 4.2.1.B.4)
4 ) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2029-2
ARCS-12103,12104,12105
3/1R PPP
2/2
(I/I ABORT), CIL
(i/i ABORT), CIL
ISSUE:- Switch failed short across open contacts causes
inability to close the valve. This prevents crossfeed capability
thus loss of mission operation (2/2). Inability to crossfeed may
cause incomplete OMS abort dump (1/1 abort). (see 4.2.1.B.4)
4.2.2.2.B.7 Microswitches (9 issues}
i) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
NO FMEA
ARCS-12332 2/2 (I/I ABORT), CIL
ISSUE.- The tank isolation valve 1/2 solenoid talkback switch
provides power to the talkback circuitry and the relay inhibit.
A microswitch failure across the close contacts will not allow
the valve to be closed This prevents crossfeed capability thus
loss of mission operations (2/2). Inability to crossfeed may
cause incomplete OMS abort dump (1/1 abort). (see 4.2.1.B.5)
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2) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
NO FMEA
ARCS-12333 3/IR PPP
ISSUE.- The tank isolation valve 3/4/5 solenoid ta!kback switch
provides power to the talkback circuitry and the relay inhibit.
A microswitch failure across the open contacts prevents valve
from being opened. Hardware redundancy provided by second leg of
3/4/5, the 1/2 valve, and crossfeed operation. Loss of all
redundancy causes loss of jets required to expel propellants to
meet landing weight constraints. (see 4.2.1.B.5)
3) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
NO FMEA
ARCS-12334 3/IR PFP
The crossfeed isolation valve 1/2 solenoid talkback
switch provides power to the talkback circuitry and the relay
inhibit. A microswitch failure across the close contacts
prevents valve from being closed. This prevents isolation of a
thruster leak. (see 4.2.1.B.5)
4-7) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
NO FMEA
ARCS-12336,12337,12338,12339 3/2R PPP
ISSUE.- IOA-RCS claims this failed open resistor causes loss of
acccurate indication of the valve status from the event indicator
or the GPC/MDM microswitch discretes. This may lead to falsely
failing the valve closed. (see 4.2.1.B.5)
8-9) FAILURE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
NO FMEA
ARCS-12074,12075 3/2R PPP
/_ IOA-RCS claims this failed open resistor causes loss of
acccurate indication of the valve status from the event indicator
or the GPC/MDM microswitch discretes. This may lead to falsely
failing the valve closed. (see 4.2.1.B.5) .....
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4.2.2.2.B.8 Circuit Breaker (2 issues)
i) FAILURE: SHORT, FAILED CLOSED
05-6KA-2280-2
ARCS-12073
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE.- NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (switch jam, open
driver failed on, causing continuous power to the solenoid. IOA-
RCS claims this circuit breaker failed closed alone has no
effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
2) FAILURE: FAILED OPEN
05-6KA-2280-I
ARCS-12072
3/IR PPP
2/2, CIL
ISSUE: Lose capability to open the isolation valve. This
prevents vernier operation thus loss of mission. NASA FMEA
failure also credible. Lose capability to close valve to isolate
a thruster leak. IOA-RCS recommends both failures be covered on
this FMEA. (see 4.2.1.B.3)
u
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4.2.2.2.B.9 Bvent Indicators
i) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2153--I 3/3
ARCS-1857 3/2R
2) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2154-2 3/3
ARCS-1858A 3/2R
(8 issues}
PPP
PPP
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3) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2159-I 3/3
ARCS-1856 3/2R
4) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2155-2
ARCS-1859A
3/3
3/2R
PPP
PPP
m
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5) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
05-6KA-2156-2 3/3
ARCS-12017 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: The first five issues concern falsely failing the valve closed.
(see 4.2.1.B.I)
6) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
05-6KA-2154-I
ARCS-1858
2/IR PFP, CIL
3/2R PPP -
NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak). IOA-RCS claims this failure
may cause inability to accurately determine position of the
valve. Loss of all redundancy may lead to falsely failing the
valve closed. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
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7) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
05-6KA-2155-I 2/IR PFP, CIL
ARCS-1859 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (continuous power
to the motor and a bellows leak - NOTE: FMEA scenario for failure
not valid). IOA-RCS claims this failure may cause inability to
accurately _etermine position of the valve. Loss of all
redundancy may lead to falsely failing the valve closed. (see
4.2.1.B.2)
8) FAILURE: FAILS SHORT TO GROUND
05-6KA-2156-I
ARCS-12016
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/2R PPP
NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (switch short,
ground driver fails on, causing continuous power to the
solenoid). IOA-RCS claims this failure may cause inability to
accurately determine position of the valve. Loss of all
redundancy may lead to falsely failing the valve closed. (see
4.2.1.B.2)
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4.2.2.3 Thruster Subsystem (23 issues)
4.2.2.3.A Hardware (I0 issues)
w
4.2.2.3.A.1 Primary Thruster Bipropellant Solenoid Valves
(6 issues)
I) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
03-2A-221310-I
RCS-290
RCS-294, 296, 298
3/1R FPP, CIL
1/1 ---, CIL (F_ils open)
1/1 ---, CIL (Internal leakage)
ISSUE: A thruster biprop valve failed open or leaking due to
piece-part structural failure or seal failure results in leakage
of propellant. See 4.2.1.A.2. Such a failure could also result
in jet zots upon subsequent use of the thruster.
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2) FAILURE: PREMATURE OPERATION
(DURING GROUND C/O TRICKLE CURRENT TEST)
03-2A-221310-3 3/3 ---
RCS-10138X I/i ---, CIL
ISSUE: IOA considers a premature (unexpected) firing of an RCS
thruster during ground operations and testing to be a 1/1
failure. S_ch a failure could result in loss of life due to
exposure to prop vapors and thruster plume. This failure is the
result of a reaction jet driver (RJD) failure. A "failed-on"
thruster caused by an RJD failure is covered in the GNC
subsystem.
3) FAILURE: FAILS CLOSED (ONE OR BOTH VALVES)
03-2A-221310-4
RCS-293, 295, 297
3/1R FPP, CIL
3/1R FPP, 1/1 ABORT, CIL
ISSUE.- IOA recommends that this failure mode be upgraded to a
3/1R FPP, 1/1 abort. This failure results in the loss of one
primary thruster and could result in the inability to complete
RTLS and TAL abort RCS and OMS propellant dumps. See 4.2.1.A.I.
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4 ) FAILURE : STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-291 1/l ---, CIL
ISSUE." This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers external leakage of the primary thruster
biprop solenoid valves assembly due to a housing failure to be a
credible failure (ref. NSTS 22206, p. 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and
recommends that it be addressed on the FMEA/CIL. Failure results
in leakage of propellant. See 4.2.1.A.2.
5) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW
NO FMEA
RCS-292 3/IR FPP, i/I ABORT, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers restricted flow to be a credible failure
mode for components with integral filters, and recommends that it
be addressed for the primary thruster biprop valves. Effects
same as "fails closed". See issue on 03-2A-221310-4, above, and
4.2.1.A.I.
6) FAILURE: DELAYED OPERATION, ONE VALVE OPENS SLOWLY OR LATE
NO FMEA ......
RCS-10043X _ I/I .... , CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers the delayed opening of one biprop valve
relative to the other to be a credible failure which should be
addressed. Such a failure of the oxidizer valve could result in
fuel migration into the oxidizer injector tube and detonation
within the tube upon oxidizer flow (zots). Rupture of the valve
assembly due to jet zots would result in leakage of propellant.
See 4.2.1.A.2. IOA recommends that a I/1 FMEA be generated for
this failure mode.
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4.2.2.3.A.2 Primary Thruster Injector Head Assembly (2 issues)
i) FAILURE: RESTRICTED FLOW
NO FMEA
RCS-10040X 1/1 ---, CIL
ISSUE: This item is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers the injector assembly to be at the same
level of detail as other primary thruster components on the
FMEA/CIL, and recommends that a separate 1/1 FMEA be regenerated
for this item and failure mode. This will ensure that this
critical failure gets the proper amount of attention. Restricted
flow leading to an improper mixture ratio or inadequate cooling
would probably result in loss of the thruster, and could result
in combustion chamber or nozzle extension burn-through.
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2) FAILURE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BURN-THROUGH
NO FMEA
RCS-10041X I/i ---
ISSUE: This item is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers the injector assembly to be at the same
level of detail as other primary thruster components on the
FMEA/CIL, and recommends that a separate 1/1 FMEA be regenerated
for this item and failure mode. This will ensure that this
critical failure gets the proper amount of attention. Such a
failure of _he injector head assembly could result in a
fire/explosion potential leading to possible damage to the
vehicle.
Vernier Thruster Assembly (2 issues)
FAILS OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE _
03-2A-231310-3
RCS-301
RCS-304
3/1R FPP, CIL
1/1 ---, CIL (Fails open)
1/1 ---, CIL (Internal leakage)
ISSUE: A thruster biprop valve failed open or leaking due to
piece-part structural failure or seal failure results in leakage
of propellant. See 4.2.1.A.2. The NASA criticalities assigned
to these vernier thruster failures are inconsistent between the
forward and aft RCS subsystems.
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2 ) FAILURE : STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FMEA
RCS-303 i/I ---, CIL
ISSUE: This failure mode is not currently addressed on the NASA
FMEA/CIL. IOA considers external leakage of the vernier thruster
biprop valve assembly due to a housing failure to be a credible
failure (ref. NSTS 22206, po 2-14, item 2.3.7.a), and recommends
that it be addressed on the FMEA/CIL. Failure results in leakage
of propellant. See 4.2.1.A.2.
d
4.2.2.3.B EPD&C (13 issues)
4.2.2.3.B.1 Remote Power Controllers (2 issues) _
I) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2179-2 3/IR
ARCS-1872,1874,1880,1884, 3/3
1889,1891,1896,1900
PFP, CIL
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (RJD command, relay
failed closed, manifold isolation valve failed, tank isolation
valve failed, main bus failed, causing inadvertent or
uncontrollable thruster firing). IOA-RCS claims this RPC
inadvemtently operating alone has no effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
2) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KA-2184-2 3/IR PFP, CIL
ARCS-1904,1906 3/3 ..............
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (RPC failed on, RJD
command, manifold isolation valve failed, tank isolation valve
failed, main bus failed off, causing inadvertent or
uncontrollable thruster firing). IOA-RCS claims this RPC
inadvertently operating:alone has no effect.
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4.2.2.3.B.2 Hybrid Drivers (3 issues)
i) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2214-2
ARCS-1980,1982,1984,1986
1988,1990,1992,1994
3/IR PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE.- NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (RJD command, relay
failed, manifold isolation valve failed, tank isolation valve
failed, main bus failed, causing inadvertent or uncontrollable
thruster firing). IOA-RCS claims this driver inadvertently
operating alone has no effect. (see4.2.1.B.2)
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2) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KA-2185-2
ARCS-2000,2002
3/1R PFP, CIL
3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (driver failed on,
RJD command_ manifold isolation valve failed, tank isolation
valve_failed, main bus failed Off, causing inadvertent or
uncontrollable thruster firing). IOA-RCS claims this driver
inadvertently operating alone has no effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
3) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
05-6KA-222022 3/IR PFP, CIL
ARCS-1996,1998 3/3
ISSUE: NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (driver failed on,
RJD command, manifold isolation valve failed, tank isolation
valve failed, main bus failed off, causing inadvertent or
uncontrollable thruster firing). IOA-RCS claims this driver
inadvertently operating alone has no effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
W
W
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4.2.2.3.B.3 Relays (I issue)
i) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05,6 -2130- ......... .....3/IR PPP
ARCS-2024,2026,2028 3/3
ISSUE." NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (RJDcommand, relay
failed closed, manifold isolation valve failed, tank isolation
valve failed, main bus failed, causing inadvertent or
uncontrollablethruster firing). IOA-RCS claims the latching
relay failing closed alone has no effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
=
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w4.2.2.3.B.4 Toggle switches (2 issues)
i) FAILURE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-6KA-2036-2 3/IR
ARCS-12262,12272,12282,12292 3/3
12263,12273,12283,12293
PPP
/_ NASA FMEA contains multiple failures (RJD command,
manifold isolation valve failure, tank isolation valve failure,
main bus failure, causing inadvertent or uncontrollable thruster
firing). IOA-RCS claims the switch inadvertently operating alone
has no effect. (see 4.2.1.B.2)
I
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2) FAILURE: FAILS TO CONDUCT ONE OR MORE CONTACT SET
05-6KA-2035-1
ARCS-12256,12260
12276,12280
3/IR
3/1R
PFP, CIL
PFP (or 2/2), CIL
_." IOA-RCS agrees withNAS A FMEA criticalities and screens
for manifolds 1-4 (3/IR PFP). However, IoA_Rcsrecommends _the
manifold 5 failure also be included in the effects as a 2/2
condition.
4.2.2.3.B.5 Pressure Sensors (3 issues)
1-3) FAILURE: INDICATES HIGHER OR LOWER PRESSUPd_ THAN ACTUAL
NO FMEA
ARCS-2286,2287,2288 3/2R PPP
ISSUE: Redundancy management may fail jets. Vernier jet ....
activity may be limited. IOA,_RCS recommends th_se failures be
incorporated into a FMEA. Note : Existing FMEA on pressure
sensors contain only the primary jets.
4.2.2.3.B.6 Temperature Sensors (2 issues)
1-2) FAILURE: INDICATES HIGHER OR LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
NO FMEA
ARCS-2296,2297 3/_R PP2 _, _ ,,_ _
ISSUE: Redundancy management may fail jets. Vernier jet
activity may be limited. IOA-RCS recommends these failures be
incorporated into a FMEA. Note : Existing FMEA on temperature
sensors contain only the primary jets.
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w4.2.2.4 Thermal Control Subsystem (8 issues)
4.2.2.4.A Hardware
IOA analyzed and assessed thermal control subsystem items as
EPD&C items. See 4.2.2.4.B for assessment results.
4.2.2.4.B EPD&C {S issues)
w
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4.2.2.4.B.1 Thermal switches (8 issues)
1-3) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
NO FMEA
ARCS-2334,2336,2338 312R PPP
Propellant in jet may freeze. _ Redundancy provided With
jets on other manifolds. If jet is required, orbiter may orient
itself toward solar heating. This may effect mission operations.
4-6) FAILURE: FAILS HIGH
NO FMEA
ARCS-2335,2337,2339 3/3
ISSUE:- Thermostat failing high provides continuous power to jet
heaters. Heaters can be switched off. No effect.
z
;L.
7) FAILURE: FAILS OPEN
NO FMEA
ARCS-2340 2/2
Propellant in jet may freeze.
This may effect mission operations.
No redundancy provided.
8) FAILURE: FAILS HIGH
NO FMEA
ARCS-2341 3/3
ISSUE: Thermostat failing high provides continuous power to jet
heaters. Heaters can be switched off. No effect.
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4.3 Additional Comments and Concerns
During the assessment of the NASA RCS FMEA/CIL, IOA identified
several areas of concern which are not evinced by the individual
failure mode issues presented in this report. These concerns are
discussed in the following hardware and EPD&C sections. Several
general comments about the IOA assessment and resolution process
are also given.
4.3.A Hardware Comments and Concerns
The IOA RCS hardware FMEA and CiL assess_entswere performed on
the NASA/RI FMEA/CIL reevaluation information received by IOA as
of 1/01/88. Any updates or changes in this information made by
NASA/RI after this date are not reflected in this report. The IOA
assessment of the RCS hardware CILs was performed against the
post-CCB CIL package dated 12/05/87. This information was
presented at RCS PRCB on 23 December 1987. The IOA assessment of
the RCS hardware FMEAs (non-CILs) was performed against a
criticality and screen summary package dated 9/03/87. For the
FMEA (non-CIL) assessment, IOA had only criticality and screen
information. The "effects" and other areas lis£ed on a FMEA sheet
could not be assessed. Updated FMEA sheets were not generated by
NASA/RI.
RCS thermal control and instrumentation items are covered on the
NASA RCS hardware FMEA/CIL, however IOA analyzed and assessed
these items as EPD&C items, seethe EPD&C portions of this
report for the_assessment results on these items.
Each of the hardware issues in this report have been discussed
with the NASA RCS subsystem manager (SSM). The SSM has indicated
agreement with a number of the IOA issues, however all issues
remain classified by IOA as "open". IOA does not consider an
issue to be resolved until it is either incorporated into the
NASA FMEA/CIL, or withdrawn by IOA.
On the current NASA FMEA/CIL, one FMEA or CIL sheet may include
several components and/or failure modes. The criticality and
screens assigned on the FMEA or CIL reflect only the worst case
component failure mode. IOA accepted this practice since the
components and failure modes are addressed. However, IOA is
concerned that this lumping of components and failure modes on
individual FMEAs and CILs reduces insight into RCS subsystem
failures. Many of the components and failure modes lumped
together on one FMEA or CIL would_ have--dl-fferent crit_-c_ity and
screen assignments if they were separated onto individual FMEAs
and CILs, and better insight would be obtained. For example, the
vernier thruster assembly FMEAs (03-2F-131310 and 03-2A-231310)
include the inlet valves, injector, thrust chamber, nozzle
extension, heater, insulation, pressure transducer, and
temperature transducer. These vernier thruster components are at
the same level of detail as the same primary thruster components
which are separated onto individual FMEAs and CILs. A better
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understanding of the failures of each of the vernier thruster
components could be obtained if they were separated onto
individual FMEAs and CILs and assigned unique criticalities.
recommends a more consistent level of detail on the NASA RCS
hardware FMEA/CIL, and less lumping of components and failure
modes on FMEAs and CILs.
IOA
Related to this concern are the issues raised by IOA that leakage
of valve housings should be addressed on the FMEA/CIL. IOA
recommended that a new FMEA and CIL be generated for each valve
housing, however accepted the lumping of all valve housings on
the two existing helium and propellant line leakage FMEAs.
Some RCS subsystem failures do not exist as "failure modes" on
current FMEAs and CILs. Instead, they are listed only as causes
on FMEAs and CILs for other failure modes. IOA questions whether
a critical RCS failure mode listed only as a cause on a FMEA or
CIL receives adequate attention. All critical failures should be
listed as failure modes on FMEAs and CILs to ensure that they
receive the appropriate amount of attention.
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4.3.B EPD&C Comments and Concerns
IOA takes issue with the NASA interpretations of NSTS
22206, Section 2.l.s, page 2-4, the definition of redundancy. The
NASA-applied definition of the redundancy string allowed the
selection of specific failures which were required to cause known
problems, i.e., failures required to cause continuous power to the
AC motor valves, or failures required to apply continuous power to
the manifold 5 solenoid valve. IOA considers this definition of
redundancy to be related more to a Hazard Analysis rather than a
FMEA/CIL analysis and considers many NASA redundancy strings to
include multiple failures.
IOA analyzed the specific function of the item and determined the
impactof the failure. Per NSTS 22206 interpretation, the
redundancy string was defined as anyother i£em that is Capable of
performing the specific function of this item. Criticalities were
then assigned based on this redundancy.
This discrepancy was discussed at a meeting with the NASA
subsystem manager. In general, the NASA definition tended to be
more conservative (assigned a more severe criticality on the
FMEA). However, IOA was requested to follow NSTS 22206. The
difference in interpretations accounts for the high number of
issues cited.
Also at the meeting with the subsystem manager, IOA presented the
issue concerning closing a valve to isolate a leak with the GPC.
The subsystem manager stated that the GPC is not used to isolate a
leak since the_software has to be manually loaded. Due to time
limitations, IOA was not able to extract all these issues
concerning this out of this report.
An extensive amount of re-analysis was done for the assessment
report. Since the manifold 5 isolation valve wiring changed after
the IOA analysis was complete, IOA completely re-analyzed the new
design. Additionally, all diades and switches were re-analyzed in
efforts to match the NASA FMEA breakdown for these items.
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Proc. spec., RI.
14. MC282-0082, Rev D, 3-17-82, Pressurant Storage Tank, Proc.
spec., RI.
15. MC284-0421, Rev E, 5-3-82, Pressure Relief Valve, Proc.
spec., RI.
16. MC284-0430, Rev E, 6-22-81, AC Motor Valve, Proc. spec., RI.
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spec., RI.
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AC
ALC
ALCA
AMCA
AOA
APC
ARCS
ASSY
ATO
ATT
BCE
BFS
BTU
C&W
CIL
CL
CMD
CNTL
CNTLR
CRIT
CRT
D&C
DAP
dc
DOD
DPS
DTO
EPDC
ET
F
F
FA.
FCOS
FDA
FF
FLCA
FLT
FM
FMCA
FMEA
FRCS
FSW
ft
FU
FUNC
FWD
G
GFE
GNC
GPC
APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
- Alternating Current
- Aft Load Controller
- Aft Load Control Assembly
- Aft Motor Control Assembly
- Abort-Once-Around
- Aft Power Controller
- Aft Reaction Control System (Subsystem)
- Assembly
- Abort-To-Orbit
- Attitude
- Bus Control ELement
- Backup Flight System
- Bus Terminal Unit
- Caution and Warning
- Critical Items List
- _lose (Closed)
- Command, Commander
- Control
- Controller
- Criticality
- Cathode-Ray Tube
- Displays and Controls
- Digital Autopilot
- Direct Current
- Department of Defense
- Data Processing System (Subsystem)
- Detailed Test Objective
- Entry Interface
- Electrical Power Distribution and Control
- External Tank
- Fahrenheit
- Functional
- Flight Aft
- Flight Control Operating System
- Fault Detection and Annunciation
- Flight Forward
- Forward Load Control Assembly
- Flight
- Failure Mode
- Forward Motor Control Assembly
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Forward Reaction Control System (Subsystem)
- Flight Software ..........
- Feet
- Fuel
- Function
- Forward
- Gravity
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Guidance, Navigation, and Control
- General Purpose Computer
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GSE
He
HW
I/C
I/O
ID
IMU
IOA
ISOL
ISP
JSC
L
LCA
LRU
MAN
MCA
MCC
MDAC
MDM
MECO
MM
MMH
msec
N204
NA
NASA
NSTS
NTO
OA
OF
OI
OMRSD
OMS
OP
OPS
OX
OXID
P
PAD
PASS
PBI
Pc
PCA
PCI
PCM
PCMMU
PLS
PRCS
PRESS
PROC
psi
psia
psid
psig
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Ground Support Equipment
Helium
Hardware
Interconnect
Input/Output
Inside Diameter
Inertial Measurement Unit
Independent Orbiter Assessment
Isolation
Initial Specific Impulse
Johnson Space Center
Left
Load Controller Assembly -
Line Replaceable Unit
Manual
Motor Control Assembly
Mission Control Center (JSC)
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
Main Engine Cutoff
Major Mode
Monomethyl Hydrazine
Millisecond
Nitrogen Tetroxide
Not Applicable
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Space Transportation System
Nitrogen Tetroxide
Operational Aft
Operational Forward
Operational inst_mentation
Operational Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Open
Operations Sequence
Oxidizer
Oxidizer
Pitch
Propellant Acquisition Device
Primary Avionics Software System
Push-Button Indicator
Chamber Pressure
Power Control Assembly_
Potential Critical Item
Pulse Code Modulation
Pulse-Code ModUlation-Ma-s£er unit
Primary Landing Site
Primary Reaction Control System (jet)
Pressure
Processor
Pounds per Square Inch
Pounds per Square Inch Absolute_
Pounds per Square Inch Di-fferentiai
Pounds per Square Inch Gage
A-2
W
I
I
mI
I
z
J
i
I
I
I
I
m
m
l
im
w
wm
PTI
PWR
R
R
RCS
RHC
RI
RJD
RM
RPC
RTLS
scfm
SFOM
SOP
SPEC
SSM
SSSH
STS
SUM
SYS
TAL
THC
TK
TPS
VERN
VLV
VRCS
Y
- Programmed Test Input
- Power
- Right
- Roll
- Reaction Control System
- Rotation Hand Controller
- Rockwell International
- Reaction Jet Driver
- Redundancy Management
- Remote Power Controller
- Return-to-Launch Site
- Standard Cubic Feet per Minute
- Shuttle Flight Operations Manual
- Subsystem Operating Program
- Specification
- Subsystem Manager
- Space Shuttle Systems Handbook
- Space Transportation System
- Summary
- System
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Translation Hand Controller
- Tank
- Thermal Protection System
- Vernier
- Valve
-Vernier Reaction Control System (jet)
- Yaw
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DEFINITION8 o GROUND RULES r AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
RCS-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206. Instructions _ou _reDaration
of FMEA/CIL. 10 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to _PS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE}- an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
tQuchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing_operations
w
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APPENDIX B
DEFTNITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in _TS 22206• Instructions for
_reDaration of FMEA/CIL. 10 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions•
1
1
le
•
•
•
o
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being !lown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics•
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
RCS - Specific Groundrules and Assumptions
B.3.A Hardware
.
.
The function of an RCS thruster is to provide thrust in
a certain axis and direction. Therefore, from a top
down system analysis approach, thrusters which fire in
the same axis and direction may be considered redundant
to each other•
All aft RCS thrusters are required for the successful
completion of OMS/RCS propellant dumps during RTLS and
TAL aborts.
• It is assumed that after the failure of an RCS
thruster, the RCS redundancy management will
automatically deselect the opposite-firing thruster.
• Any leakage of RCS propellants is potentially life and
vehicle threatening regardless of where the leak occurs
(NSTS 22206, p. 2-I1, item h). IOA classifies any
single failure which results in propellant leakage as a
I/I. If redundant items must fail before leakage
occurs, IOA assign a functional criticality IR.
L
g
The IOA redundancy string applied to the "fails closed"
f_ilure mode for the helium tank isolation valves,
propellant tank isolation valves, manifold isolation
valves, and crossfeed valves does not include a failure
which requires that the valve be closed.
Inability to deplete propellants or complete planned
propellant dumps can lead to violations of orbiter
entry mass properties constraints and/or violations of
propellant tank landing weight constraints (ARCS only).
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B. 3. B EPD&C
I. IOA-RCS assumed the inability to re-open a valve on
ascent is not a credible event• These valves (helium
isolation valve A & B, tank isolation valves 1/2 &
3/4/5, and manifold isolation valves 1-5) are open
prelaunch and are used to supply propellants to jets for
control, ET separation, and RTLS/TAL aborts•
• IOA-RCS assumed if a valve was closed for some reason
(i.e. isolate a leak) after ascent, the inability to re-open
this valve Was a credible failure and the reason to close
was not in the redundancy string•
3. The above valves and the aft crossfeed valves can be
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configured manually or with the GPC. The primary and
secondary application of these commands depends on the
mission phase. For secondary application, IOA-RCS
issued a "NA" for the B screen since this would be a
stand-by function.
IOA-RCS issued a "NA" for B screens for all
electrical components failed open that are used to
isolate a leak. Isolation of a leak is a stand-by
function. If a failed short item causes inability to
isolate a leak (valve failed open), this item has the
applicable B screen assigned to it.
IOA-RCS assumed that loss of logic power for reaction
jet drivers on ascent was not a credible failure since
multiple failures (driver power circuit failed off)
must occur. However, after ascent, driver power is
turned off during sleep periods. Inability to turn on
logic power, thus driver power, is now credible. This
causes loss of jets on associated manifolds.
MDM discretes and the event indicators provide the
logic and visual status of the valve position.
Resistors, diodes, and hybrid drivers are used in the
circuitry that provide this data. IOA-RCS claims the
failure of these items may lead to a false indication
of the valve position. The worst effect of these
indicators would be to falsely fail the valve closed
which may effect on-orbit operations.
An issue has been made of all RLR type resistors
with a short failure mode with a 3/3 criticality. This
type resistor cannot fail short. Updated FMEAs have
not been received to delete this failure mode.
Electrical components within the valve (microswitches,
diodes, etc) have been analyzed for the assessment
report. This analysis is shown in Appendix E.
All switches have been re-analyzed for the assessment
report. They have been broken into five categorical
groups• This analysis is shown in Appendix E.
Diodes have been re-analyzed for the assessment report.
The diodes have been broken out into the seven groups
(depending on the function of the diode in the circuit)
as shown below :
- x
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
Limit switches or Talkback
GPC close
GPC open
Manual open
Manual close
Manual open/close inhibit
Manual close/open inhibit
B-7
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ASSESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality i_ compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
_ me
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
_ if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = R_dundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
= NASA FMEA/CIL
= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N = Non compare for that column (deviation)
rm
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-100
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01010-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
FRCS
i00
HELIUM STORAGE TANK
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
- [ / ] [ ] [ ] E ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF THE ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-101
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01070-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
I01
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[F] [F]
[P] [NA]
IN] [N]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
CONDITION OF
CAP SEALS UNDETECTABLE AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA RECOMMENDS
ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
r
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RCS-102
03-2F-I01070-2
FRCS
102
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
l
I
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD
INCLUDE "FAILS TO COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW".
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-103
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01020-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 103
ITEM: HE ISOL A & B VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
- (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA NOW RECOMMENDS T_HAT THE_B SCREEN BE FAILEDAND THATkTHIS ITEM
AND FAILURE MODE BE PLACED ON THE CIL. A FAILURE OF THE
REDUNDANT SECONDARY REG IS_ NOT DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT. IOA _
RECOMMENDS THE ADDITION OF A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
w
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-103A
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 103
ITEM: HE ISOL A & B VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
w
l
u
z
B
W
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
_ [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS. °
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (INTERNAL LEAKAGE). THE
SSM AGREED THAT THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE ADDED TO Q_r2F- _
101020-5 (FAILS OPEN), WHICH IS CLASSIFIED AS A 3/IR PPP. IOA
NOW RECOMMENDS A 3/IR PFP FOR 03-2F-I01020-3. SEE ASSESSMENT
SHEET RCS-103.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-104
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01020-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 104
ITEM: HE ISOL A & B VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUND CY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI PASSAGE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT
THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR AND PLACED ON
THE CIL. INABILITY TO REPRESS FRCS PROP TANK AND SUBSEQUENT
INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE PROP COULD RESULT IN VIOLATIONS OF
ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE
DURING ENTRY.
mE_
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-105
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01013-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
105
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
ClL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
l
ml
B
i
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m
m
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS. THIS FMEA SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE HELIUM COMPONENT
BODIES IN THE ITEM LIST AND CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE.
THE SSM AGREED THAT VALVE BODIES SHOULD BE ADDED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-106
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
106
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [. ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN i/I EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ....ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNST_AM FILTER OR COMPONENT. _COMMENDS THAT SUCH A
.................. IOA
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BuT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
Z
B
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-107
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01013-I
NASA DATA:
-BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
sUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS ......
107
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ORIGINAL£Y-CQNSf6_ED THE PARk-L_L:LINE SEGMENTS OF THE ISOL
VLV LEGS TO BE REDUNDANT. HOWEVER, IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI
CRIT i/i ASSIGNMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECTS REG_.DING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY_ ....
COMPONENT BODIES IN THE ITEM LIST AND CORRESPONDING RETENTION
RATIONALE. THE SSM AGREED THAT VALVE BODIES SHOULD BE ADDED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-108
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
108
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN 2/IR EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
m
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: i/0i/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RCS-109
03-2F-I01091-I
NASADA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
109
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SC_ENS. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT t'POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A_FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED
ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA/CIL SHOULD BE 12.
THE SSMAGREEDWiT_T--HEiDA IEEUE_ T_K-I_C_S ADDING A
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER
ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
J
m
W
W
n
n
I
m
i
U
I
U
w
W
g_
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-12
vAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
F
_ °
T ....
ASSESSMENT DATE: !/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-I10
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01091-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
ii0
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different =from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
..... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
I
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-III
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01030-I
SUBSYST_:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:_
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST:
FRCS
III
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
ASSESSMENT:
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[P] [NA] [P] [ ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
u
I
l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA
RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-II2
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
FRCS
112
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
2/IR PFP AND PLACED ON THE CIL. INABILITY TO REPRESS FRCS PROP
TANK AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE PROP COULD RESULT
IN VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS CONSTRAINTS AND LOSS OF LIFE
OR VEHICLE DURING ENTRY. THIS FAILURE IS UNDETECTABLE DURING
DUAL LEG OPERATION AND, THEREFORE, FAILS THE B SCREEN DURING THE
ASCENT FLIGHT PHASE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-II3
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
113
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). THE
SSM AGREED THAT THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE ADDED TO 03-2F-
101030-2 (FAILS CLOSED), WHICH IS CURRENTLY CLASSIFIED AS A 3/IR
PPP. IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/!R PFP FOR 03-2F-I01030-2.
SEE  SESSMENT ETRCS-112. .....
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-II4
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
114
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
COMPARE
[ / ] [ ]
[ 2/IR] [ P ]
[ N/N ] [ N ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]*
[NA] [P] [X]
[N] [N] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ I /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). THE
SSM AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE HELIUM
LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-I01013-I) WITH CORRESPONDING
RETENTION_TIQNALE. IOA ORIGINALLY CONSIDERED THE PARALLEL
HELIUM PATHS TO BE REDUNDANT FOR THIS FAILURE _ (2/ IR) ,- BUT NOW
CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A I/I.
v
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-II5
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
115
HE PRESS REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] CP] CP]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
]
]
[ ] ,
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_KS :
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH
SENSING PORT)- _ HOOVER, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY NASA/RI
IN THE _ OMS suBSYSTEM ON _A 03-_3"i064--3 (3/2_R_PFP) _' i0A
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE ALSO BE COVERED FOR THE RCS
REGULATOR WITH THE SAME RATIONALE USED IN OMS. IOA WITHDRAWS
2/IR PPP CRIT,
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-II6
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
116
HE PRESS REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE (BLOCKAGE OF SENSING PORT) IS ADEQUATELY
ADDRESSED ON FMEAs 03-2F-I01030-I AND 101030-2, WHICH LIST
CONTAMINATION OF PILOT SCREENS, RESTRICTOR ORIFICES, OR SENSE
LINES AS CAUSES FOR THE REGULATOR FAILURES COVERED. AN
ADDITIONAL _A IS UNNECESS_Y. IOARECOMMENDS A2/IR PFP FOR
03,2F--i0i030,2. SEE_ASSESSMENT SHEET_RCS-iI2 .....
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-II7
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
117
HE PRESS REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI 3/IR FFP ASSIGNMENT. IOA ORIGINALLY
IDENTIFIED THIS AS A TWO-SEAL COUPLING RATHER THAN A MULTIPLE
SEAL 0032 COUPLING. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE
ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE
FAILURE MODE AND iS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE QUANTITY ON
THIS FMEA sHOULD BE 12. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE. IOA
ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES
COq_STRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-II8
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01091-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
118
HE PRESS REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMIMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
E
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-II9
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01095-I
NASA DATA: .......
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
119
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT'.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
i0A RECOMMENDS THAT THiS _ ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
2/IR AND PLACED ON THE CIL. W_TH SERIES POPPE--TS FAI_D 0mEN, THE
CONTAMINATION OF UPSTREAM COMPONENTS BY PROP OR PROP VAPORS COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF PROP TANK REPRESS CAPABILITY AND _
INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE FRCS PROP, THIS COULD LEAD TO
VIOLATIONS oF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND LOSS OF LIFE
OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY. FAILURE OF ONE POPPET UNDETECTABLE
DURING FLIGHT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-120
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01095-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
120
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
2/IR. INABILITY TO REPRESS FRCS PROP TANK AND SUBSEQUENT
INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE PROP COULD RESULT IN VIOLATIONS OF
ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE
DURING ENTRY.
v
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wml
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-121
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
03-2F-I01091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
121
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ F ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
C.D. PRUST
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI 3/IR FFP ASSIGNMENT. IOAORIGINALLY
IDENTIFIED THIS AS A TWO-SEAL COUPLING RATHER _ A MULTIPLE
SEAL 0032 COUPLING. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE
ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE _
FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE QUANTITY ON
THIS FMEA SHOULD BE 12. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE. IOA
ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-122
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01091-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
122
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE.FAILSTO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-123
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-IIIII0-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 123
ITEM: PROPELLANT TANK
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ I/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_ (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE "D" EFFECTS BE REVISED.
FAILURE AFTER ET SEP COULD ALSO RESULT INLOSS OF LIFE OR_;: _ :
VEHICLE. IOAALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
ABOUT POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA CREW AND GROUND CREW TO PROP OR
PROP VAPORS. _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-124
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02108-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 124
ITEM: PROP LINES, ALL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: ......
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT _"FAILURE OF LINE BELLOWS TO DEFLECT" BE ADDED
AS A CAUSE ON THIS FMEA/CIL. IOA CONSIDERS THIS TO BE A CREDIBLE
FAILURE WHICH SHOULD BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL. THIS FMEA
SHOULD INCLUDE VALVE BODIES IN THE ITEM LIST AND
CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE
EFFECTS DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO
PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-125
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 125
ITEM: PROP LINES, ALL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ j [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN i/i EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH K
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-28
t_
-.5
m
w
F
m..
w
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-126
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02150-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
FRCS
126
PROP FILL VENT REGULATOR CHECK-OUT COUPLING
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[F] [F]
[P] [NA]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-127
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02150-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
127
PROP FILL VENT REGULATOR CHECK-OUT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] C
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 3 [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ...........
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-128
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-IIIII0-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
128
PROP CHANNEL SCREENS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE P.A.D. COMPONENTS BE ITEMIZED IN THE ITEM
LIST OR FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION SECTIONS TO SHOW SPECIFICALLY WHAT
IS COVERED BY THIS FMEA/CIL. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE "HIGH
G" DISCUSSION BE REMOVED FROM THE FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-129
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
129
PROP FEED-OUT TUBE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICA£ITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
NOW CONSIDERS _STRICTE _ FLOW IN THIS SECTION 0F TUBE TO BE
QUESTIONABLE. IOA DOES NOT REGARD THE ABSE_E_0F _ THIS FAILURE
MODE IN THE FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE, BUT DOES RECOMMEND THAT
THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-130
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COUPLING
FRCS
130
PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL CHECK-OUT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI 3/IR FFP ASSIGNMENT. IOA ORIGINALLY
IDENTIFIED THIS AS A TWO-SEAL COUPLING RATHER THAN A MULTIPLE-
SEAL 0032 COUPLING. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE
ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE
FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM AGREED
WITH THE IOA ISSUE. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE
EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE FIRE HAZARD, HAZARD TO GROUND CREW,
AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-131
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01090-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COUPLING
FRCS
131
PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL CHECK-OUT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
_FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA FAILURE_0DES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOUL D INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". i0A RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE ANDIS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-132
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02150-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
132
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY _ REDUNDANCYStREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:" (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
]
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B
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-133
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02150-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
133
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-134
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02150-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COUPLING
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
134
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT BULKHEAD BLEED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
wm_
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-135
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02150-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COUPLING
FRCS
135
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT BULKHEAD BLEED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MOD_-ON ANALYSIS _ SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-136
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02150-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
136
PROP TK VENT AND REGULATOR CHECK-OUT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ F ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
[ ]
C ]
L
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-137
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02150-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
_Ew [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
137 ............
PROP TK VENT AND REGULATOR CHECK-OUT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/a ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" _D_"REST_CTEDFLOW", !0A RECOMMENDS T_T "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-138
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02106-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 138
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
C
C
[
CIL
ITEM
B C
] C ] [ ] IX]*
] [ ] [ ] IX]
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILURE OF LINE BELLOWS TO DEFLECT" AND
"ISOLATION VALVE RELIEF DEVICE FAILURE TO RELIEVE" BE ADDED AS
CAUSES ON THIS FMEA. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS
DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE ExPgSURE_OFEVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR
PROP VAPORS. •.... '.............
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-139
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 139
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] *
] ix]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
mm
m
mm
I
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS".
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
NOW CONSIDERS THE CRED_B!D!TY_QF RESTBICTEP_F_LO__!NA BELLOWS/TO
BE QUESTIONABLE. IOA DOES NOT REGARD THE ABSENCE OF THIS FAILURE
MODE IN THE FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE,
BUT DOES RECOMMEND T_T THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-140
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
140
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (BURST DISK INTERNAL
LEAKAGE). IOA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE MODE TO BE CREDIBLE AND
RECOMMENDS IT BE ADDED TO 03-2F-I01060-5. THE FAILURE HISTORY OF
THE BURST DISK INCLUDES THIS FAILURE. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE
IOA ISSUE.
m
w
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: Rcs'I40A
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01060-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
140
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT'.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
mm
m
mm
ms
U
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THE
ADDITION OF_STATEMENTS TO THE E_E_T_-_LEG_DING POSSiB_
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS, AND
HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA CREWS FROM LEAKAGE OF PROP OR PROP
VAPORS.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-141
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01060-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
141
PRESSURERELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR FNP ASSIGNMENT. IOA
CONSIDERED RELIEF VALVE TO BE AN EMERGENCY SYSTEM IN THE ORIGINAL
ANALYSIS.
=
i
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-141A
NASA _A #: 03-2F-I01060-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
FRCS
141
P_SSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD _ALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY _D_D_CY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_C A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
m
m
m
I
m
RECO_ENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION _TIONA_: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
_KS:
IOA AGNES WITH NASA/RI _TIONALE FOR 3/IR PNP ASSIG_NT. IOA
CONSIDERED _LIEF VAL_ TO BE _ EMERGENCY SYSTEM IN THE ORIGINAL
_ALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-142
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
142
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ _ _ ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED
ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA/CIL SHOULD BE 12.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER
ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
i
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1
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-143
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01091-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
143
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
1
1
1
1
i.
1
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FA!LUREMODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSMAGREE_ WIT_"n'E IOA ISSUE, _:: ;_
1
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1
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U
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-144
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01050-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
144
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
I0A [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
J
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-145
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01050-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
145
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA i/I BASED ON "FAILURE TO REMAIN OPEN". IOA NOW CONSIDERS THE
CREDIBILITY OF THIS FAILURE MODE TO BE QUESTIONABLE. IOA DOES
NOT REGARD THE ABSENCE OF "FAILURE TO REMAIN OPEN" IN THE
FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE, BUT DOES RECOMMEND THAT THIS
FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-146
NASA FMEA # : NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
146
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NAS_ [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
] [ ] ,
] ix]
] [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ [ ] [ ]
C [ ] C ]
[ [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[i/i] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RU_RE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). THE SSM AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY
SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA/CIL (03-
2F-I01013-I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FMEA INCLUDE PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS
(CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-147
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
147
PROP TK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
PROP TANK ZS0_V-ALVES. I0_SNO ISSUE wiTH T HI_FA_LURE MODE,
HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE THE POSSIBLE
EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RU_,LQR_E_RNAL
LEAKAGE OF THE VAt-rE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE. THE SSM
AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE PROP LINE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-I02108-I) WITH CO_SPONDING
RETENTION RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-148
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02120-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
148
PROP TK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC • A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ F ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WITHDRAWS I/i CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED
FLOW TO A THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH. IOA ALSO
WITHDRAWS i/i ABORT ISSUE DUE TO LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP
CAPABILITY DURING RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT
(BASED ON A POSSIBLEINCOMPLETE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS
IN THE FUTURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A 2/IR PPF AND PLACED ON THE CIL. INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE
FRCS PROP COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO PERFORM ET SEP, OR
VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND LOSS OF LIFE
OR VEHICLE DURING ENTRY. ANY CONTAMINATION COULD AFFECT BOTH
VALVES SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-149
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02120-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
149
PROP TK ISOL VLV 1/2
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR PNP ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RCS-149A
NONE
FRCS
149
PROP TK ISOL VLV 1/2
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (INTERNAL LEAKAGE). IOA
NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A3/IR PNP. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT
THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDED TO 03-2F-I02120-2 (3/IR PNP). THIS IS
A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE WHICH SHOULD BE ADDRESSED.
..... _Li_ ......... _ i
E
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-150
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02120-I
NASAl:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
150
PROP TK ISOL VLV 1/2
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
g
m
m
j
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
fOA WITHDRAWS f/IXBORT ISSUE DUETO-LACK OF C_I_RCS DUMP
CAPABILITY DURING RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT
(BASED ON POSSIBLE INADEQUATE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS
IN THE FUTURE. -..........
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED CLOSED AND FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO 2/IR PPP AND PLACED ON THE CIL.
INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE FRCS PROP COULD RESULT IN INABILITY
TO PERFORM ET SEP, OR VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTY
CONSTRAINTS AND LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE DURING ENTRY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-151
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02120-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
151
PROP TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR PNP ASSIGNMENT.
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-151A
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
151
PROP TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
n
m
mm
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D
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (INTERNAL LEAKAGE). IOA
NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A 3/IR PNP. IOA RECO_NDS THAT
THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDED TO 03-2F-I02120-2 (3/IR PNP). THIS IS
A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE WHICH SHOULD BE ADDRESSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RCS-152
03-2F-I02120-I
FRCS
152
PROP TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOa [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ABORT ISSUE DUE TO LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP
CAPABILITY DURING RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A I/1 ABORT CRIT
(BASED ON POSSIBLE INADEQUATE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS
IN THE FUTURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED CLOSED AND FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO 2/IR PPP AND PLACED ON THE CIL.
INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE FRCS PROP COULD RESULT IN INABILITY
TO PERFORM ET SEP, OR VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTY
CONSTRAINTS AND LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE DURING ENTRY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-153
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02150-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
153
MANIFOLD 1/2 FILL & DRAIN/PURGE COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X ] *
CX].
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ _ _ _
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
m
g
m
J
m
m
I
M
g
u
g
mm
I
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-60 U
r_
U
L
w
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
m
|__
E_
E_
=
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-154
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02150-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
FRCS
154
MANIFOLD 1/2 FILL & DRAIN/PURGE COUPLING
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
iADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-155
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02150-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
FRCS
155
MANIFOLD 3/4/5 FILL & DRAIN/PURGE COUPLING
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ F ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-156
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02150-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
156
MANIFOLD 3/4/5 FILL & DRAIN/PURGE COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] E ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW _. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
L.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-157
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-102110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
157
MANIFOLD I, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m
g
U
mm
g
mm
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS;
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR PNP ASSIGNMENT. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS ON THIS FMEA INCLUDE PROP LEAKAGE
EFFECTS (CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND
CREWS).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-158
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
158
MANIFOLD i, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA WITHDRAWS I/i ABORT ISSUE BASED ON LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP
CAPABILITY DURING RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER RECO_NDS A i/I ABORT CRIT
(BASED ON POSSIBLE INADEQUATE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS
IN THE FUTURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED CLOSED AND FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILURE MoDEs BE UPGRADED TO 2/iR PPP _D PLACED ON THE CIL.
CERTAIN COMBINATIONS OF TWO FAILURES (LOSS OF YAW JETS ON SAME
SIDE) COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS PROP AND POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS LEADING TO LOSS
OF LIFE OR VEHICLE DURING ENTRY.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-159
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
159
MANIFOLD i, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[F] [F]
[P] [NA]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _.
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAIL LrRE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS T_L_T "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE
MODE ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS
ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM AGREED WITS THE IOA
ISSUE. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
ABouT PRO@ _A_GE-EFFECT_S (CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE
OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-160
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
160
MANIFOLD I, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION _TIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
r
m
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-67
r
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-161
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS
161
MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
m
m
g
m
u
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR PNP ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-162
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
162
MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/ NC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WITHDRAWS I/I ABORT ISSUE BASED ON LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP
CAPABILITY DURING RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A I/i ABORT CRIT
(BASED ON POSSIBLE INADEQUATE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS
IN THE FUTURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED CLOSED AND FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILURE MODES BE UPGRADED TO 2/IR PPP AND PLACED ON THE CIL.
CERTAIN COMBINATIONS OF TWO FAILURES (LOSS OF YAW JETS ON SAME
SIDE) COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS PROP AND POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS LEADING TO LOSS
OF LIFE OR VEHICLE DURING ENTRY.
mw
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-163
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
163
MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/R! _TIO_A_ FOR FAILU_ OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE
MODE ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS
ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA
ISSUE. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
ABOUT PROP LEA_GE EFFECTS (CORROSION, FIRE_EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE
OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-164
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
164
MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-165
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
165
MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
....... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR PNP ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-166
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
166
MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ABORT ISSUE BASED ON LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP
CAPABILITY DURING RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT
(BASED ON POSSIBLE INADEQUATE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS
IN THE FUTURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED CLOSED AND FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILURE MODES BE UPGRADED TO 2/IR PPP AND PLACED ON THE CIL.
CERTAIN COMBINATIONS OF TWO FAILURES (LOSS OF YAW JETS ON SAME
SIDE) COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS PROP AND POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS LEADING TO LOSS
OF LIFE OR VEHICLE DURING ENTRY.
r
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-167
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
167
MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE
MODE ON THIS _EA/_L, THIS IS A C_RED_BLEFAILURE--MODE-AND rS
ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA
ISSUE. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
ABOUT PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS (CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE
OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
J
J
I
I
l
m
Im
I
ms
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-74
I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RCS-168
03-2F-I01080-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
168
MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
N
z
m
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-169
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
169
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
C p ] [ NA] [ P ] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] _ [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR PNP ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-170
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
170
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WITHDRAWS I/i ABORT ISSUE BASED ON LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP
CAPABILITY DURING RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A i/I ABORT CRIT
(BASED ON POSSIBLE INADEQUATE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS
IN THE FUTURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED CLOSED AND FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILURE MODES BE UPGRADED TO 2/IR PPP AND PLACED ON THE CIL.
CERTAIN COMBINATIONS OF TWO FAILURES (LOSS OF YAW JETS ON SAME
SIDE) COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS PROP AND POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS LEADING TO LOSS
OF LIFE OR VEHICLE DURING ENTRY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-171
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
171
MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
I
m
I
l
m
i
mm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECO_ND$ T!_AT_,POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE A_DED AS A FAILURE
MODE ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS
ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA
ISSUE.- IOA A_O=_RECO_ENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
ABOUT PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS (CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE
OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-172
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
172
MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
RCS-173
03-2F-I02170-2
FRCS
173
MANIFOLD 5, ISOL VLV
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
u
m
u
II
B
m
ms
RECOMMENDAT IONS ."
[ 3 /1R ]
(if different from NASA)
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES "FAILS OPEN", AND "INTERNAL LEAKAGE" AS A 3/IR
PNP.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND THESE FAILURE MODES BE UPGRADED
TO 3/IR PNP. INABILITY TO ISOLATE_APROP LEAK COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF PROP FROM TANK AND PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS (CORROSION, FIRE,
EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS). _
ANY LEAKAGE OF PROP IS A CRITICAL FAILURE PER NSTS-22206.
INABILITY TO CONTROL A LEAK SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE A IR.
IS
II
II
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n
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-174
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02170-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
174
MANIFOLD 5, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i
F_
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO HIGHER PROP CONSUMPTION USING PRIMARIES.
w
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-81
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:I/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-175
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
175
MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI,, RATIONA_ FOR FAILURE, OF A ANDFAILu_BSCREENS.IOA RECOMM_.NDs _THAT -_POPPET FA_ 0_N_E_DDED AS A
MODE ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS
ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA
ISSUE. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
ABOUT PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS (CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE
OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-176
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
176
MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
W
_z2
= :
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
L_
_.==
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mR
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-177A
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02170-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 177
ITEM: MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 1 /I ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[x]
[ ]
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA/CIL COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR
THE VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS
FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS DISCUSS THE
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP
VAPORS. NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
THE SSM AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE PROP
LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-I02108-I) WITH
CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-177
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 177
ITEM: MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA/CIL COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR
THE PRIMARY MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS
FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS DISCUSS THE
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP
VAPORS. NASA/RI DO NoT- C_VER STRUC_L _AILURE, _ RUPTURE, OR _
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE _ HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
THE SSM AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE PROP
LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-I02108-I) WITH
CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-178
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 178
ITEM: MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /" 2 ] [ ] [ ] [ :_ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS. •
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
WITHDRAWS i/i CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOw TO
A THRUSTER COULD CAUSE BURN-THROUGH. IOA ALSO WITHDRAWS i/i
ABORT ISSUE DUE TO LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP CAPABILITY DURING
RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT (BASED ON A
POSSIBLE INCOMPLETE D_P) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS IN THE
FUTURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED
ON THE FMEA/CIL. THE SSM AGREED THAT THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE
ADDED TO 03-2F-I02110-I (3/IR PPP) FOR PRIMARY MANIFOLDS AND TO
03-2F-I02170-I (2/2) FOR VERNIER MANIFOLDS°
HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR FOR 03-2F-I02110-I. SEE
ASSESSMENT SHEETS RCS-158, 162, 166, & 170.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-179
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121308-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM"
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
179
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
] IX]*
] IX]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) !
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE"D" EFFECTS BE REVISED. IOA CONSIDERS
LEAKAGE OF PROP TO BE CRITICAL AFTER ET SEP ALSO, AS WELL AS A
HAZARD TO EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT "ISOL VALVE RELIEF DEVICE FAILURE TO
RELIEVE" AND "FAILURE OF LINE BELLOWS TO DEFLECT" BE ADDED AS
CAUSES ON THIS FMEA.
z
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-180
NASA FMEA # : NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
180
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
NOW CONSIDERS THE CREDIBILITY OF RESTRICTED FLOW IN A BELLOWS TO
BE QUESTIONABLE. I0A DOES NOT REGARD THE ABSENCE OF THIS FAILURE
MODE IN THE FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE,
BUT DOES RECOMMEND THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-181
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
181
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILUREMODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE"FAiLS
ON". IOA RECOMMENDS T_T THE FAILED OPEN MoDE BE UPG_DED_O A
I/I BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206, ANY
SINGLE FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED
AS A i/1. PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE CREW, VEHICLE,
AND GROUND CREW. FROM A LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA
CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE TO BE A 2/IR FPP. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET
RCS-186.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-182
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
FRCS
182
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] ,
] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS. •
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RU_E, EXTE_RNAL LEAKAGE) FOR THE THRUSTER SOLENOID VALVE. THE
SSM AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE PROP LINE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-I02108-I) WITH CORRESPONDING
RETENTION RATIONA_.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-183
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
183
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
WITHDRAWS i/i CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW TO
A THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH. IOA ALSO WITHDRAWS I/I
ABORT ISSUE DUE TO LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP CAPABILITY
DURING RTLS & TAL, HOWEVE R RECO_NDS A 1/l ABORT CRIT (BASED ON
A POSSIBLE INCOMPLETE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS IN THE
FUTURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED
ON THE FMEA/CIL. THE SSM AGREED THAT THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE
ADDED TO 03-2F-121310-3 (3/IR FPP) . HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS A
2/IR FPP FOR 03-2F-121310-3. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-186
m
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-184
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
COMPARE [ /N ]
FRCS
184
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, -X AXIS
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
IN] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A SCREEN. IOA
CONSIDERS THRUStErS IN _ S_ME--AXi_ _:T0 _BE REDUND_ TO EACH
OTHER. IOA CONSIDERS THE LOSS OF ALL -X THRUSTERS TO BE ONLY A
3/2R FPP. THE -X THRUSTERS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR ET SEP OR
FRCS PROP DUMPING. 03-2F-121310-3 INCLUDES THRUSTERS IN ALL
AXES, AND THE CRITICALITY ASSIGNED IS FOR THE WORST-CASE AXIS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-185
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
LEAD ANALYST:
FRCS
185
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, -X AXIS
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IOA
COMPARE
[3/IR] [F]
[i/i] [ ]
[N/N ] [N]
[ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ ] [ ] [X]
[N] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A I/i BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEA_GE OF PROP. PER NSTS-22206,
ANY SINGLE FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED
AS A I/I. PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE CREW,
VEHICLE, AND GROUND CREW.
FROM A LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE TO
BE A 3/2R FPP. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-184.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-186
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
FRCS
186
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
LEAD ANALYST : C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
l
B
I
W
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A SCREEN. IOA
WITHDRAWS I/i ABORT CRIT DUE TO LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP
CAPABILITY DURING RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER IOA RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT
CRIT (BASED ON A POSSIBLE INADEQUATE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY
EXISTS IN THE FUTURE. IOA CONSIDERS THRUSTERS IN THE SAME AXIS
TO BE REDUNDANT TO EACH OTHER. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED
CLOSED FAILURE MODE FOR PRIMARY THRUSTERS IN THE Y AXIS BE
UPGRADED TO A 2/IR FPP. LOSS OF BOTH +Y OR BOTH -Y JETS COULD
RESULT IN INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS PROP, LEADING TO POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS ANDLOSS OF LIFE
OR VEHICLE DURING ENTRY. 03-2F-121310-3 INCLUDES THRUSTERS IN
ALL AXES, AND THE CRITICALITY ASSIGNED IS FOR THE WORST-CASE
AXIS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-187
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
187
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/i BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAGUE OF PROP. PER NSTS-22206,
ANY SINGLE FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED
AS A i/I. PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE CREW,
VEHICLE, AND GROUND CREW.
FROM A LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE TO
BE A 2/IR FPP. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-186.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-188
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
188
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ZAXIS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
I0A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_S:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR FPP ASSIGNMENT FOR
THRUSTERS IN THE Z AXIS. IOA CONSIDERS THRUSTERS IN THE SAME
AXIS TO BE REDUNDANT TO EACH OTHER. 03-2F-121310-3 INCLUDES
THRUSTERS IN ALL AXES, AND THE CRITICALITY ASSIGNED IS FOR THE
WORST-CASE AXIS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-189
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS
189
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] C ] C ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A I/I BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS-22206,
ANY SINGLE FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED
AS A i/I. PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE CREW,
VEHICLE, AND GROUND CREW.
FROM A LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE TO
BE A 3/IR FPP. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-188.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-190
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
190
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
CIL
ITEM
B C
] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [X]
] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: .... ._ ............. -
THERE ARE NO ALIGNMENT BELLOWS ON THE VERNIER THRUSTERPROP
LINES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-191
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
191
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE ARE NO ALIGNMENT BELLOWS ON THE VERNIER THRUSTER PROP
LINES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-192
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-131310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
192
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS
ON". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED OPEN MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
i/I BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206, ANY
SINGLE FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED
AS A 1/1. PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE CREW, VEHICLE,
AND GROUND CREW.
FROM A LOSS OF VERNIER THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA/RI 2/2 ASSIGNMENT. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY
ITEMS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-193
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-131310-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
193
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
• ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DiFFERENCES. 10A RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY ITEMS
INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE _ SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL F_AS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-194
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
194
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [_ / ] [ ] [ ] C
IOA C 1 /I ] C ] [ ] C
] [ ] *
] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[i/i] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......................
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). THE SSM AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY
SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-1) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-195
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-131310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
195
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
J
W
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/i BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206,
ANY SINGLE FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS A I/I. PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO CREW,
VEHICLE, AND GROUND CREW. FROM A LOSS OF VERNIER THRUSTER
STANDPOINT, IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI 2/2 ASSIGNMENT. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA
BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-196
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-131310-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
196
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WITHDRAWS I/i CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED
FLOW TO A THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BUN-THROUGH. FROM A LOSS OF
VERNIER THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI 2/2
ASSIGNMENT.
IOA RECO_NDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY ITEMS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA
BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-197
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121312-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 197
ITEM: THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION,
PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ i /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS
FMEA INCLUDE "STRUCTURAL FAILURE".
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ASSESSMENTDATE: i/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-197A
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121313-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 197
ITEM: THRUSTERCOMBUSTIONCHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION,
PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA REC_0_NDS THAT THE FAILUREMQ_ES QNI_TH_S
FMEA INCLUDE "STRUCTURAL FAILURE". IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE
SUBASSEMBLY ITEMS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO
INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-198
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-131310-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 198
ITEM: THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION,
VERNIER, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS
FMEA INCLUDE "STRUCTURAL FAILURE" AND "BURN-THROUGH". IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY ITEMS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE
SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-199
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201010-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
199
HELIUM STORAGE TANK
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA REC0_NDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-200
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201070-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
200
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-201
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201070-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
ARCS
201
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] ] [ ] *
[ ] ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[
[
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND ,RESTR!CTE A _W"_ IOA_ RECOMM_ NDS = T_T ',RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUEJ :
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-202
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 202
ITEM: HE ISOL A & B VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA NOW RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED AND THAT THIS ITEM
AND FAILURE MODE BE ADDED TO THE CIL. A FAILURE OF THE REDUNDANT
SECONDARY REG IS NOT DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-202A
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 202
ITEM: HE ISOL A & B VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
W
J
mm
i
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RECOMMBNDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (INTERNAL LEAKAGE). THE
SSM AGREED THAT THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE ADDED TO 03-2A_
201020-2, WHICH IS CLASSIFIED AS A 3/IR PPP. IOA NOW RECOMMENDS
A 3/IR PFP FOR 03-2A-201020-2. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-202.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-203
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201020-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 203
ITEM: HE ISOL A & B VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
I
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI PASSAGE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS
ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF
ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND/OR PROP TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-i13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
u
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RCS-204
03-2A-201013-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
204
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ I [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NODIFFERENCES. IQARE_CQMMENDS ADDING_ASTATEMENT_TOTHE EFFECTS
ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASSI_ROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. THIS
FMEA SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE HELIUM COMPONENT BODIES IN THE ITEM LIST
AND CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THE SSM AGREED THAT VALVE
BODIES SHOULD BE ADDED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-205
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
205
HE LINE, ALL EXCEPT ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ i /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN I/I EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED oN THE _A/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REG_D THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-206
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201013-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
ARCS
2O6
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST : C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
ix]
[ ]
I
I
l
r
I
ms
mm
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ORIGINALLY CONSIDERED THE PARALLEL LINE SEGMENTS OF THE ISOL
VLV LEGS TO BE REDUNDANT. HOWEVER, IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI
CRIT I/I ASSIGNMENT. IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT
TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY
MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK _DING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS. THIS ?_TEA-SHOUL_-_LSU-TN_LUDE HELIUM COMPONENT .....
BODIES IN THE ITEM LIST AND CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE.
THE SSM AGREED THAT VALVE BODIES SHOULD BE ADDED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
RCS-207 BASELINE [
NONE NEW [
ARCS
207
HE LINE, ISOL VLV TO PRESS REGULATOR
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
• (ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ _ ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW IN A SEGMENT OF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH AN OC_ENCE COULD
RESULT IN 2/IR EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-208
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201091-!
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
208
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
L
w
Im
Im
ImI
I
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS -.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE
MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS
ADDRESSED ON 03-2F-I01070-I. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
IOA ALSO RECO_NDS ADDING A STATE_NT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS
AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS
FMEA IS INCORRECT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-209
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201091-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
209
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW'¥_ IoARECOMMENDS THAT "_STRiCTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-210
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
210
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
I
g
mm
U
l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA
RECOMMENDS ADDI_GA STATE_N_TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-211
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
211
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUND_CY SCREENS CIL
ITEMFLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF C SCREEN. HOWEVER, IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED. A FAILED CLOSED REG
WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE DURING DUAL LEG OPERATION (ASCENT).
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS
AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-212
NASA FMEA #: 03--2A-201030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
212
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF C SCREEN. HOWEVER, IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED. A FAILED CLOSED REG
WOULD NOT BE DETECTA--B_ DURING DUAL LE_ oPERATION [ASCENT)'
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS
AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-213
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
213
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). THE
SSM AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE HELIUM
LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-201013-I) WITH CORRESPONDING
RETENTION RATIONALE.
IOA ORIGINALLY CONSIDERED THE PARALLEL HELIUM FLOW PATHS TO BE
REDUNDANT FOR THIS FAILURE (2/IR), BUT NOW CLASSIFIES THIS
FAILURE AS A I/I.
L
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-214
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
214
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/ NC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] C P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA/R_D0 NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (EXTERNAL LE_GETHROUGH
SENSING PORT). HOWEVER, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY NASA/RI
IN THE OMS SUBSYSTEM ON FMEA 03-3-I004-3 (3/2R PFP). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE ALSO BE COVERED FOR THE RCS
REGULATOR WITH THE SAME RATiONALE USED IN OMS. IOAW_ITHDRAWS
2/IR PPP CRIT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-215
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
215
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
........... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE (BLOCKAGE OF SENSING PORT) IS ADEQUATELY
ADDRESSED ON FMEAs 03-2A-201030"i AND 201030-2, WHICH LiST
CONTAMINATION OF PILOT FILTERS, RESTRICTOR ORIFICES, AND SENSE
PORTS AS CAUSES FOR THE REGULATOR FAILURES COVERED.
AN ADDITIONAL FMEA IS UNNECESSARY.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-216
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ].....
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM •
COUPLING
ARCS
216
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[F] [F]
[P] [NA]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: ............
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI 3/IR FFP ASSIGNMENT. YOAORI-GINA£LY _
IDENTIFIED THIS -0032 COUPLING AS A -0018 COUPLING. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
03-2F-I01070-I. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS oF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA IS
INCORRECT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-217
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201091-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
217
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_S:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-218
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201095-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
218
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[p] [F] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_s-.
IOA_COMMENDS THAT __!_i _TEM AND FAIL_I_ODE BE UPGRADED TO_
2/IR PFP AND PLACED ON THE CIL. WITH SERIES POPPETS FAILED OPEN,
THE CONTAMINATION OF UPSTREAM COMPONENTS BY PROP OR PROP VAPORS
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF PROP TANK REPRESS CAPABILITY AND
i NABI L_T_-_ -uS E oR DEPI_T_ _/_C_ _PRO _. _TH_ S--_0_ LT IN _SS
OF ET SEP C--ONTROL, LOSS OF ENTRY CONTROL, AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF ENTRY_SS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS. FAILURE OF ONE POPPET IS UNDETECTABLE
DURING FLIGHT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
RCS-219
03-2A-201095-2
ARCS
219
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[F] [X]*
[P] [x]
[N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF C SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS
ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-220
NASA _A _#f_ 03-2A-201091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
....
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
220 ......
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
LEAD ANALYST : C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
I
I
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND BSCREENS .. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILUREMT0bEAND IS ADDRESSED ON
03-2F-I01070-I. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA IS
INCORRECT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-221
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201091-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
221
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ] C
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) =
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: ('If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-222
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-211110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 222
ITEM: PROPELLANT TANK
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ I/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
................. ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS DISCUSS THE
EFFECTS OF PROP LEAKAGE (CORROSIVE, FIRE/EXPLOSIVE, EXPOSURE OF
EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-223
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202108-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 223
ITEM: PROP LINES, ALL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
C_L
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILURE OF LINE BELLOWS TO DEFLECT" BE ADDED
AS A CAUSE ON THIS FMEA/CIL. IOA CONSIDERS THIS TO BE A CREDIBLE
FAILURE WHICH SHOULD BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL. THIS FMEA
SHOULD _INCLUDE=yALVE BgDTES INo THE ITEM LIST AND .........................
CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE
EFFECTS DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO
PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
w
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-224
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 224
ITEM: PROP LINES, ALL
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT".
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
]
]
[ ] •
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED F_LOW IN A SEGMENT OF L_NE DUETO
1
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OBSTRUCTION ORDEFORMATION (CRIMPING) SUCH AN OCCURRENCE COULD
RESULT IN i/I EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN
m
1 Z
OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD FLOW TO
DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR C OMPQNENTo IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A
FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
RCS-225
03-2A-202150-1
ARCS
225
PROP FILL/VENT COUPLING
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ F ] [ F ]
[ P ] C NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS
AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-226
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202150-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARCS
226
PROP FILL/VENT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE"AND "RESTRICTED F I43W!'. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREEDWITH THE IOA ISSUE. =
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-227
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-211110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
227
PROP CHANNEL SCREENS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCYCRITICALITY .........SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE P.A.D. COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA
BE ITEMIZED IN THE ITEMLIST OR FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTIONS SECTIONS
TO SHOW SPECIFICALLY WHAT IS COVERED ON THIS FMEA. THE SSM
AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-228
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
228
PROP FEEDOUT TUBE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW) t....I0A
NOW CONSIDERS RESTRICTED FLOW IN THIS SECTION OF _TUBE TO BE
_QUESTIONABi.E_ _ _iOA DOES NOT REGARD THE ABSENCE OF THIS F_ILURE
MODE IN THE FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE, BUT DOES RECOMMEND THAT
THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED.
g
I
II
mm
J
mm
E
lid
m
g
m
g
m
mm
mm
m
D
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-138
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
L
J
_m
l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-229
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COUPLING
ARCS
229
PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL CHECK-OUT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ][3/1R] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE
MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO_TE_EFFECTS REGARDING
POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARDAND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS.
m
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-230
NASA FMEA #: 03"2A-201090-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COUPLING
ARCS
230
PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL CHECK-OUT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "_STRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "_STRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDEDrAS AFAILURE MODE O N THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-231
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202150-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
231
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
IN] IN] [ ]COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RII_TIO__ALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA_RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REG_DING
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS
AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-232
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202150-2
NA_ADATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS _:
232
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL BLEED COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" _D_ "RESTRICTED FI_SW _ • - IoA REcO_NDS -T--HAT _"RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-233
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
233
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHECK-OUT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE
MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RCS-234
03-2A-201090-2
NASA DATA: .....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
234
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHECK-OUT COUPLING
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD _CLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND _RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS _T "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS ....
THE SSMAGREED WiTH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-235
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
235
PROP TK PLENUM SCREEN CHECK-OUT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
IN] IN] [ ]COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE
MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-236
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201090-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
236
PROP TK PLENUM SCREEN CHECK-OUT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE'ADDED_AS A FAILU_MODE 0N 'THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-237
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202150-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
ARCS
237
PROP TK ENTRY SUMP BLEED COUPLING
LEAD _ALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESS_NT:
CRITICALITY REDUND_CY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
_COMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION _TIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI _TIONALE FOR FAILU_ OF A _D B SCREENS.
IOA RECO_NDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
POSSIBT._. VIO_TIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONST_INTS
_D PROP T_K _DING WEIGHT CONST_INTS.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-238
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202150-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
238
PROP TK ENTRY SUMP BLEED COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
w
m
l
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ONANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSEDON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE iOA iSSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-239
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-211120-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 239
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT'.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILURE OF BELLOWS TO DEFLECT" AND
"ISOLATION VALVE RELIEF DEVICE FAILURE TO RELIEVE" BE ADDED AS
CAUSES ON THIS FMEA. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS
INCLUDE POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP
VAPORS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-240
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 240
ITEM: GIMBAL BELLOWS
LEAD ANALYST : C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] C ] C ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
mm
m
m
I
l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
NOW CONSIDERS__DIBI_YO_RE_C_ FLOW IN A BELLOWSTO
BE QUESTIONABLE. IOA DOES NOT REGARD THE ABSENCE OF THIS FAILURE
MODE IN THE FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE,
BUT DOES RECOMMEND THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
RCS-241
NONE
ARCS
241
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (BURST DISK INTERNAL
LEAKAGE). IOA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE MODE TO BE CREDIBLE AND
RECOMMENDS IT BE ADDED TO 03-2A-201060-5. THE FAILURE HISTORY OF
THE BURST DISK INCLUDES THIS FAILURE.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-241A
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201060-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
241
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
u
mm
mm
D
m
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ms
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF PROP TANK _LANDINGWEIGHT _D
ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS, AND HAZARD TO GROUND
AND EVA CREWS FROM LEAKAGE OF PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-242
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201060-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
242
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST : C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /1 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR FNP ASSIGNMENT. IOA
ORIGINALLY CONSIDERED THE PRESS RELIEF ASSY TO BE AN EMERGENCY
SYSTEM.
m
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RCS-242A
03"2A-201060-4
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
242
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
D
mm
R
E
z
I
g
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR PNP ASSIGNMENT. IOA
ORIGINALLY CONSIDERED THE PRESS RELIEF ASSY TO BE AN EMERGENCY
SYSTEM. _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-243
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
243
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 3 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[F] [F] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
03-2F-I01070-I.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA IS INCORRECT.
w
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-244
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201091-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARCS
244
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I
I
D
I
m
I
mm
m
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
..... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
,, __ ,- _ ,, ,,cOUP_ _D RESTRICTED FLOW'. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
m
I
m
mm
R
m
M
umw
J
m _
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-156
m_
L=
w
m
m
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-245
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201050-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
,L
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST:
ARCS
245
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
C.D. PRUST
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-246
NASA _EA #: 03-2A-201050-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
_AD _ALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA: °
BASELI_ [ ]
NEW [ X ]
_CS _
246
GRO_D _AL ISO_TION VAL_
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUND_CY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL _TENTION _TIONAT_: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA i/I BASED ON "FAILU_ TO REMAIN OPEN". IOA NOW CONSIDERS THE
CREDIBILITY OF THIS FAILLE MODE TO BE QUESTIONAB_. IOA DOES
NOT REG_D THE ABSENCE OF "FAILLE TO REMAIN OPEN" IN THE
_EA/CIL TO BE _ OPEN ISSUE, BUT DOES RECOMMEND T_T THIS
FAIL--MODE BE ADDRESSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-247
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
247
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ I /I ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). THE
SSM AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE HELIUM
LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-201013-I) WITH CORRESPONDING
RETENTION RATIONALE.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS OF
THIS FAILURE BE INCLUDED IN THE EFFECTS (CORROSION, FIRE,
EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
z
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-248
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
248
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
_DUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA C 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[I/I] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
PROP TANK!SO, VALVES. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS FAILURE MODE,
HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE THE POSSIBLE
EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL
LEA_GE_TH_AL_OU_G_°_N=T_i__OR ELSE_. _ _SSM
AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE PROP LINE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-202108-I) WITH CORRESPONDING
RETENTION RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-249
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
249
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
IOA ITEM LIST SHOULD NOT INCLUDE THE 3/4/5 VALVES. NASA/RI DO
NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA WITHDRAWS i/i
ISSUE, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW OF PROP TO A
THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH.
THE SSM AGREED THAT THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL. IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/IR PPP, i/i ABORT FMEA AND CIL FOR
RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE PROP TANK ISOL 1/2 VALVES. LOSS OF PROP
FLOW THROUGH THE 1/2 VALVE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
ONE +X THRUSTER USED TO DUMP ARCS PROP DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS.
INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PLANNED ARCS DUMP COULD RESULT IN
VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
w
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-161
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-250
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202110-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
250
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
COMPARE
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
[ 2/2 ]
[ 3 /2R ]
[ N/N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
m
g
g
m
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I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 2/2, I/I ABORT ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-251
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
251
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ NI]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE FOR THE PROP TANK ISOL 1/2
VALVE BE UPGRADED TO A 3/IR PPP, i/I ABORT AND PLACED ON THE CIL.
LOSS OF FLOW THROUGH THE 1/2 VALVE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
ONE +X THRUSTER USED TO DUMP ARCS PROP DURING RTLS & TAL
ABORTS. INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PLANNED ARCS DUMP COULD RESULT
IN VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
r_
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-252
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202110-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
252
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 3/4/5/ A & B
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
D
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
U
i
m
In
n
m
E
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-164
j
g
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
u
w
m
W
W
W
_-_'c
m
m_m
w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-253
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
253
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 3/4/5/ A & B
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable )
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES FOR THE 3/4/5 VALVE , HOWEVER IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/IR
PPP, i/i ABORT FOR THE 1/2 VALVE WHICH IS ALSO COVERED ON THIS
FMEA. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-251.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-254
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST:
ARCS
254
MANIFOLD 1/2 GROUND PURGE COUPLING
ASSESSMENT:
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE
MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM AGREED-WITH THE IOA ISSUE,
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA CREWS.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-255
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ARCS
255
MANIFOLD 1/2 GROUND PURGE COUPLING
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEAAPPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
=
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-256
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS ......
256
MANIFOLD 3/4/5 GROUND PURGE COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .........
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE
MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOAIS_UE. _
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA CREWS.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-257
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ARCS
257
MANIFOLD 3/4/5 GROUND PURGE COUPLING
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 3 /3
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "R_ESTRICTED FLOW _ IOA RECO_NDS THAT "R-ESTRiCTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
THE QUANTITY 0NTHIS_A APPE_S _ TO BE INCO_CT. _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RCS-258
NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
258
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 OR 3/4/5
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[2/2
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). THE
SSM AGREED THAT RESTRICTED FLOW SHOULD BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON 03-2A-202111-2-(2/2, I/i ABORT). 10A AGREES WITH A 2/2, i/I
ABORT FOR RESTRICTED FLOW.
IOA WITHDRAWS i/I CRIT ISSUE, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT
RESTRICTED FLOW OF PROP TO A THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-
THROUGH.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-259
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
259
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 OR 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
CROSSFEED VALVES. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS FAILURE MODE,
HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE THE POSSIBLE
EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE. THE SSM
AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE PROP LINE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-202108-i) WITH CORRESPONDING
RETENTION RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-260
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202111-I
NASA DATA_
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
260
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR PPP CRIT ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-261
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202111-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
261
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-262
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202111-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
262
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
NASA DATA: .....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST : C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/!RPPP_ CRITASSIG_NT.
HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS CONCERN REGARDING DETECTABILITY OF
INTERNAL _A_GE DURING FLIGHT. IOA ACCEPTS SSM POSITION THAT A
LEAKAGE LARGE ENOUGH TO CAUSE ANY PROBLEMS WOULD BE DETECTABLE.
LEAKAGES TOO SMALL TO DETECT ARE OF NO CONSEQUENCE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
RCS-263
03-2A-202111-2
ARCS
263
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
IN] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
RCS-264 BASELINE [ ]
NONE NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 264
ITEM: CROSSFEED LINES
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
C.D. PRUST
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ I /I ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [
[ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
] [ ] .
] ix]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RIuDONOTCO_R _STRICTED FLOW IN A SEGME_QF LINE DUE TO
OBSTRUCTION OR DEFORMATION (CRIMPING). SUCH_OCCU_NCE COULD
RESULT IN 2/2, I/i ABORT EFFECTS, HOWEVER THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH
AN OCCURRENCE IS QUESTIONABLE. ANY CONTAMINATION WOULD
FLOW TO DOWNSTREAM FILTER OR COMPONENT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH
A FAILURE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL, BUT DOES NOT REGARD THIS
RECOMMENDATION AS AN OPEN ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1701/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ i /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
RCS-265
03-2A-202108-I
ARCS
265
CROSSFEED LINES
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILURE OF LINE BELLOWS TO DEFLECT" BE ADDED
AS A CAUSE ON THIS FMEA/CIL. IOA CONSIDERS THIS TO BE A CREDIBLE
FAILURE WHICH SHOULD BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL. THIS FMEA
SHOULD INCLUDE VALVE BODIES IN THE ITEM LIST AND
CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE
EFFECTS DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO
PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
w
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
RCS-266
03-2A-202120-I
ARCS
266
MANIFOLD I, ISOL VLV
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
C ] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
g
J
I
m
I
mm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR PNP ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-267
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
267
MANIFOLD I, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
....._= ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOa RECOMMENDS THAT=THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
3/i_ _P_, i/i ABORT_AND PLAL_EDDN _THE CIL. r_3ss OF ALL THRUSTERS
ON ONE MANIFOLD MAY RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO COMPLETE ADEQUATE
OMS OR ARCS DUMPS DURING RTLS OR TAL,
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS OR PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-268
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS ......
268
MANIFOLD I, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /iR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI_RATIQ_NALE FOR FAILURE _OF A AND B SCREENS.
!OAA RE CO_ND_S THAT "POPPET. FAI_ OPEN" BE ADDED AS .A FAILURE
MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA CREWS.
THE QUANTITY ON THiS _A APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-269
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
269
MANIFOLD i, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-181
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-270
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
270
MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
I
mm
ms
mm
i
R
m
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
...... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR PNP ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-271
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 271
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
3/IR PPP, I/I ABORT AND PLACED ON THE CIL. LOSS OF ALL THRUSTERS
ON ONE MANIFOLD MAY RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO COMPLETE ADEQUATE
OMS OR ARCS DUMPS DURING RTLS OR TAL,
_SULTING IN POSSIB_ VIOLATIONS _0F ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS OR PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
= :
n
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-272
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-I
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
272
MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
IF] IF] [P]
[P] [NA] [P]
[N] [N] [ ]
IX]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FQR FAILURE OF A AND B SC_ENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE
MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM A=G=REED WITH T_oIOA ISSUE ...._ i. i
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STA_TEM_S TO=THE_??ECTS REG_DT_G
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA CREWS.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-273
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
273
MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
W
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-274
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
274
MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] E ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[P]
E ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR PNP ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: i/0i/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-275
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
275
MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
_ NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
3/IR PPP, I/I ABORT AND PLACED ON THE CIL. LOSS OF ALL THRUSTERS
ON ONE MANIFOLD MAY RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO COMPLETE ADEQUATE
OMS OR ARCS DUMPS DURING RTLS OR TAL,
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS OR PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-276
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
03-2A-201080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
276
MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
m
m
mm
I
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE
MODE ON THIS FMEAo THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA CREWS.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-277
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
277
MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
"(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RCS-278
03-2A-202120-I
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ARCS
278
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
C.D. PRUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] .[ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR PNP ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-279
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
279
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
W
w
w_
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
3/IR PPP, i/i ABORT AND PLACED ON THE CIL. LOSS OF ALL THRUSTERS
ON ONE MANIFOLD MAY RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO COMPLETE ADEQUATE
OMS OR ARCS DUMPS DURING RTLS OR TAL,
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS OR PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-280
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
03-2A-201080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
ARCS
280
MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ F ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ NA]
[N] [N]
C
CP]
[P]
C ]
ClL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI_TIgNALE F0R FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
....!OA RECO__NDS _T ,,POPPET FAILS _OPEN" BE_ADDED AS A FAILURE
MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOa ISSUE.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
FIRE/E_PLOSfd@_Z_D _D HAZED TO_GR6UND AND EVA CREWS.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-281
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
281
MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
] C ] C ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS.
THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
RCS-282
03-2A-202140-2
ARCS
282
MANIFOLD 5, ISOL VLV
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[N] IN]
C
[P]
[ ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR 3/IR PNP ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-283
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202140-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
ARCS
283
MANIFOLD 5, ISOL VLV
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE "C" EFFECTS DISCUSS LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO HIGHER PROP CONSUMPTION WITH PRCS.
=
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-284
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
284 _-_
MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ............
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE
MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
OTHER QD FMEAS. THE SSM AGREED WITH THE IOA ISSUE.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA CREWS.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RCS-285
03-2A-201080-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
285
MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ] C ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD INCLUDE "FAILS TO
COUPLE" AND "RESTRICTED FLOW". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED
FLOW" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A
CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHE R QD _FMEAS"
THE SSMAG_ED wITHTHE I0A ISSUE. ....
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-286
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_W [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 286
ITEM: MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/l ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA/CIL COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MOPE FOR
THE PRIMARY MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVES. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH
THIS FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS
DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE..........EXp0_R._E OF_ EVA_ _G_O_9_W___O PROP__ OR
PROP VAPORS. NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE1
OR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR
ELSEWHERE. THE SSM AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY SHOULD BE ADDED
TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-202108-I) WITH
CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-286A
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202140-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 286
ITEM: MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
] [ ] [
] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [x]*
] IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA/CIL COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR
THE VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS
FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS DISCUSS THE
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP
VAPORS ,_ NASA/RI _ N0T C0_ER _"_TRUCTURA_ F_LURE, RUPTU_, OR
EXTERNAL _GE_OFT_/EVALVE]4OUSING_THiS FME_OR ELSEWHERE.
THE SSM AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE PROP
LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-202108-I) WITH
CORRESPONDING-_TE_IO%_TIONALE_ .....................
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-287
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA: ........
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
287
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
m
n
wgm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
WITHDRAWS I/I CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW OF
PROP TO A THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH. IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL. THE SSM AGREED THAT THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE ADDED
TO 03-2A-202120-3 (3/IR PPP) FOR PRIMARY MANIFOLD VALVES, AND TO
03-2A-202140-i (2/2) FOR VERNIER MANIFOLD VALVES. HOWEVER, IOA
RECOMMENDS A 3/IR PPP, I/I ABORT FOR 03-2A-202120-3.
SEE ASSESSMENT SHEETS RCS - 267, 271, 275, AND 279.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-288
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221308-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
288
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
L
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : •
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "FAILURE OF BELLOWS TO DEFLECT" AND "ISOL
VALVE RELIEF DEVIC_I FA_U_E TO RELIEVE" BE ADDED AS CAUSES ON
THIS FMEA WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF
EVA AND GROUND_REWS TO PROP oR PRoP VAPORS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-289
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
289 •
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
CIL
ITEM
B C
[ ] [
[ ] [
[ ] [
]
]
NASA [ / ] [ ] ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] ] [ N ] D
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
NOW CONSIDERS THE CREDIBILITY OF RESTRICTED FLOW IN A BELLOWS TO
BE QUESTIONABLE. IOA DOES NOT REGARD THE ABSENCE OF THIS FAILURE
MODE IN THE FMEA/CIL TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE,
BUT DOES RECOMMEND THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-290
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
290
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
-_ ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS
ON". iOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED OPEN MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
I/I BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206, ANY
SINGLE FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS A I/I. PROP LEAKAGE IS A HAZARD TO EVA CREW, THE
VEHICLE, AND GROUND CREW.
FROM A LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE TO
BE A 3/IR FPP, I/I ABORT. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEETS RCS - 293, 295,
AND 297.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-291
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS ........
291
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA C 1 /I ] C ] C ] C ]
[ ] *
CX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,_
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). THE SSM AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY
SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
202108-1) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-292
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
_w [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
292
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATfONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
WITHDRAWS i/I CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW OF
PROP COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE
RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL.
THE SSM AGREED T_T-THIS FAILURE MODES_H_OULD BE AD_E_T_O3-2A"
221310_4 (3/iR_FPP). _ HOWEVER,_ _A RECOMMENDS A 3/iR FPP, I/I
ABORT FOR 03-2A-221310-4. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEETS RCS - 293, 295,
AND 297.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-293
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
293
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A SCREEN. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 3/IR
FPP, i/i ABORT. THE LOSS OF ONE PRIMARY THRUSTER DURING AN RTLS
OR TAL ABORT WOULD RESULT IN REDUCED OMS AND RCS PROP
DUMPING CAPABILITY. INABILITY TO COMP_TE P_ED OMS AND RCS
DUMPS COULD RESULT IN VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-294
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
294
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A 1/1 BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN THE LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS
22206, A SINGLE FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS A i/I. PROP LEAKAGE IS A HAZARD TO EVA CREW,
THE VEHICLE, AND GROUND CREW.
FROM A LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE TO
BE A 3/1R FPP, i/I ABORT. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-293.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-295
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_ [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ARCS
295
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A SCREEN. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 3/IR
FPP, I/I ABORT. THE LOSS OF ONE PRIMARY THRUSTER DURING AN RTLS
OR TAL ABORT WOULD RESULT IN REDUCED OMS AND RCS PROP
DUMPING CAPABILITY. INABILITY TO COMPLETE PLANNED OMS AND RCS
DUMPS COULD RESULT IN VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-296
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
296
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] [N]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/i BECAUSE IT RESETS IN THE LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS
22206, A SINGLE FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS A i/I. PROP LEAKAGE IS A HAZARD TO EVA CREW,
THE VEHICLE, AND GROUND CREW.
FROM A LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE TO
BE A 3/IR FPP, i/I ABORT. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-295.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-209
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-297
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
297
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: CIf applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A SCREEN. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 3/IR
FPP, 1/1 ABORT. THE LOSS OF ONE PRIMARY THRUSTER DURING AN RTLS
OR TAL ABORT WOULD RESULT IN REDUCED OMS AND RCS PROP
DUMPING CAPABILITY. INABILITY TO COMPLETE PLANNED OMS AND RCS
D_PS cOU_ RESULT IN VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY _SS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-298
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
03-2A-221310-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
ARCS
298
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY- SCREENS " - CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
A B C
CF] CP] [P]
C ] C ] [ ]
[N] [N] IN]
[X]*
[X]
[ ]COMPARE [ N /N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
r
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/i BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN THE LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS
22206, A SINGLE FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS A I/I. PROP LEAKAGE IS A HAZARD TO EVA CREW,
THE VEHICLE, AND GROUND CREW.
FROM A LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE TO
BE A 3/IR FPP, I/i ABORT. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-297.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-299
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
299
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE ARE NO ALIGNMENT BELLOWS ON THE VERNIER THRUSTER PROP
LINES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-300
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
300
JET ALIGNMENT BELLOWS, VERNIER, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] [x]
] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE ARE NO ALIGNMENT BELLOWS ON THE VERNIER THRUSTER PROP
LINES.
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J
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS,30!
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-231310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
AXES
ARCS
301
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: .............. _ _ _ _
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS
ON". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED OPEN FAILURE MODE BE
UPGRADED TO A I/I BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER
NSTS 22206, ANY SINGLE FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN PROP LEAKAGE
SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS A 1/1. PROP _AKAGE IS A HAZARD TO EVA
CREW, VEHICLE, AND GROUND CREW.
FROM A LOSS OF VERNIER THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONSIDERS THIS
FAILURE TO BE A 2/2, SINCE LOSS OF VERNIERS RESULTS IN PROBABLE
LOSS OF MISSION. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY ITEMS
INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-302
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-231310-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
AXES
ARCS
302
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY ITEMS
INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-303
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
AXES
ARCS
303
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] ,
] ix]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THiS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). THE SSM AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY
SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
202108-1) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-304
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-231310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
AXES
ARCS
304
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/i BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206,
ANY SINGLE FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS A I/i. .......
PROP LEAKAGE IS A HAZARD TO EvA CREW, VEHIC_, ANb GROUND_tREW,
FROM A LOSS OF VERNIER THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONSIDERS THIS
FAILURE TO BE A 2/2, SINCE LOSS OF VERNIERS RESULTS IN PROBABLE
LOSS OF MISSION. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY ITEMS
INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-305
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-231310-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
AXES
ARCS
305
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WITHDRAWS i/i CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED
FLOW TO A THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH. FROM A LOSS OF
VERNIER THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI 2/2
ASSIGNMENT,
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY ITEMS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA
BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-306
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221312-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 306
ITEM: THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION,
PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1/l ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILURE MODES ON THIS
FMEA INCLUDE "STRUCTURAL FAILURE".
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-306A
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221313-1
NASA DATA: .....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 306
ITEM: THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION,
PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA
INCLUDE "STRUCTURAL FAILURE".
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-307
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-231310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 307
ITEM: THRUSTER COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION,
VERNIER, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
il
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT FAILURE MODES ON THIS FMEA
INCLUDE "STRUCTURAL FAILURE".
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY ITEMS INCLUDED ON THIS
FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-100OIX
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01060-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
I0001
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
m[]
ms
m
R
m
mm
m
ms
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
<I
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS THE ADDITION OF A STATEMENT TO
THE EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS, AND POSSIBLE LEAKAGE OF PROP OR PROP
VAPORS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10002X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 10002
ITEM: HE ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
w
E_
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL AS A 2/IR PFF. INABILITY TO REPRESS FRCS PROP TANK AND
SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE FRCS PROP COULD RESULT
IN VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. LOSS OF FLOW
THROUGH ONE VALVE NOT DETECTABLE DURING DUAL LEG OPERATION.
CONTAMINATION CAN EFFECT BOTH VALVES.
THE SSM AGREED THAT RESTRICTED FLOW SHOULD BE ADDED TO 03-2F-
101020-4 (3/IR PPP). HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS 2/IR PFF POSITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-IO003X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 10003
ITEM: HE ISOLVLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
R
z
ms
mm
D
mm
mm
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE) •
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). THE SSM AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY
SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
101013-1) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10004X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10004
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: ( !f applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-10005X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01095-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10005
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RAT_!ONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (BLOCKAGE OF
SINGLE INLET FILTER). HOWEVER, SSM ADDED A NEW FMEA/CIL (03-2F-
101095-3, 2/IR PPP) FOR THIS FAILURE MODE AS A RESULT OF AN IOA
ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE
UPGRADED TO A i/i. INABILITY TO REPRESS A FRCS PROP TANK AND
SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE FRCS PROP COULD RESULT IN
VIOLATIONS OR ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND LOSS OF LIFE
OR VEHICLE DURING ENTRY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
RCS-10006X
NONE
FRCS
10006
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
A B C
C ] [ ] C ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
Cl/l ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). THE SSM AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY
SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
101013-1) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE BE
INCLUDED ON THE FMEA (CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA
AND GROUND CREWS).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10007X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01060-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10007
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS. DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS PROP, AND THE EFFECTS
OF POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE (CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE
OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10008X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10008
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). THE
SSM AGREED THAT RESTRICTED FLOW SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE FAILURE
MODES ON 03-2F-I01060-3 (3/IR FNP, BURST DISK FAILS TO RUPTURE).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10009X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01060-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10009
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A S C _ _
NASA [ 1 /! ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS _A COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE. IOA HAS
NO ISSUE WITH THIS FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND ADDING
STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND THE HAZARDS OF PROP LEAKAGE TO
EVA CREW, VEHICLE, AND GROUND CREW.
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE. THE SSM
AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE PROP LINE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-I02108-I) WITH CORRESPONDING
RETENTION RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RCS-10010X
03-2F-102120-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
i0010
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from =NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
2/IR PNP AND PLACED ON THE CIL. THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM PROP LINES, AND IS
LISTED AS A CAUSE ON THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA
(03-2F-I02108-I) AND AS A FAILURE MODE ON 03-2A-202140-3.
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A 2/IR PNP SINCE A PREVIOUS
FAILURE IS REQUIRED BEFORE THE VALVE WILL BE CLOSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10011X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
I0011
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
[ N ]
]
]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (FAILS MID-
TRAVEL), HOWEVER THE WORST-CASE EFFECTS OF THIS FAILURE ARE
COVERED BY THE FAILED CLOSED ANDRESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODES.
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ASS ESSMENT _DATE : :i/0 I/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10012X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10012
MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOLATION VALVES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [
] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] C ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
........ ADEQUATE [ ]
..... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
i/i AND PLACED ON THE CIL. THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM PROP LINES, AND IS
LISTED AS A CAUSE ON THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA
(03-2F-I02108-I) AND AS A FAILURE MODE ON 03-2A-202140-3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10013X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10013
MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOLATION VALVES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (FAILS MID-
TRAVEL), HOWEVER THE WORST-CASE EFFECTS OF TH_S FAILURE ARE
COVERED BY THE FAILED CLOSED AND RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10014X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10014
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] *
[ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT C0VER _ THIS FAILURE MODE ....(RELIEF DEVICE FAILS TO
RELIEVE). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A 2/IR PNP CIL BE CREATED FOR THIS
ITEM AND FAILURE MODE. THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM PROP LINES, AND IS
LISTED AS A CAUSE ON THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL _AKAGE FMEA AND AS A
FAILURE MODE ON 03-2A-202140-3.
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A 2/IR PNP SINCE A PREVIOUS
FAILURE IS REQUIRED BEFORE THE VALVE WOULD BE CLOSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10015X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS _ ......
10015
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, +Z AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
•HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA CONSIDERS THRUSTERS IN THE SAME AXIS TO BE REDUNDANT TO EACH
OTHER. iOA-CONS_IDERS THE LOSS OF ALL +Z THRUSTERS TO BE ONLY A
3/2R FPP. THE +Z THRUSTERS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR ET SEP OR PROP
DUMPING ..............................
03-2F-1213i0-3-INCLUDES THRUSTER-S IN ALL AxEs, _%ND THE
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED IS FOR THE WORST-CASE AXIS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10016X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10016
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
L
CIL
ITEM
NASA C / . ] [ ] [ ] C ]
IOA C 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] C ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO HDW ISSUE. THIS FAILURE MODE (PREMATURE OPERATION, FAILS ON)
COULD ONLY BE CAUSED_BY_ EPDC (RJD)FAILURE. _ THE RJDS _E
ASSESSED BY IOA IN THE GNC SUBSYSTEM.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-IOOI7X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
AXES
FRCS ....
10017
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, VERNIER, ALL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NAsA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ i/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO HDW ISSUE. THIS FAILURE MODE (PREMATURE OPERATION, FAILS ON)
COULD ONLY BE CAUSED BY AN EPDC (RJD) FAILURE. THE RJDS ARE
ASSESSED BY IOA IN THE GNC SUBSYSTEM.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10018X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10018
THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSEMBLY, PRIMARY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [x]
]
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE(RESTRICTED
FLOW), HOWEVER, NOTE ON 03-2F-121312-I SAYS THAT THE INJECTOR
FMEA WAS DELETED AND ADDED AS A CAUSE ON 03-2F-121312-I.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED
INDEPENDENTLY ON THE CIL WITH AI/I CRITICALITY. THE INJECTOR IS
AT THE SAME LEVEL OF_DETAI£_WITH OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS __
COVERED ON INDIVIDUAL FMEAS, AND SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE i/I
ATTENTION.
RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE INJECTOR COULD RESULT IN THRUSTER BURN-
THROUGH.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10019X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10019
THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSEMBLY, PRIMARY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, BURN-THROUGH), HOWEVER, NOTE ON 03-2F-i2i312-I SAYS THAT
THE INJECTOR FMEA WAS DELETED AND ADDED AS A CAUSE ON 03-2F-
121312-1 .............................
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED _
INDEPE_TLY 0NT-HE=CIL-W_TH A I/I CRITICALfTY, THE INJECTOR IS
AT THE SAME LEVEL OF DETAIL WITH OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS
COVERED ON INDIVIDUAL FMEAS, AND SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE I/I
ATTENTION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10020X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 10020
ITEM: HE ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL AS A 2/IR PFF. INABILITY TO REPRESS ARCS PROP TANK AND
INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE ARCS PROP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
ENTRY CONTROL AND VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS
AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. LOSS OF FLOW THROUGH
ONE VALVE NOT DETECTABLE DURING DUAL LEG OPERATION, AND
CONTAMINATION CAN AFFECT BOTH VALVES SIMULTANEOUSLY.
THE SSM AGREED THAT RESTRICTED FLOW MODE SHOULD BE ADDED TO 03-
2A-201020-I (2/IR PPP), HOWEVER IOA MAINTAINS 2/IR PFF POSITION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10021X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 10021
ITEM: HE ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS"
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
I
I
i
D
m
J
l
D
u
mm
m
w
m
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). THE SSM AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY
SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
201013-1) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10022X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201030-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ARCS
10022
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. I0A RECO_ENDS ADDING A STATEMENT _TOTHEEFFECTS
ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTY CONSTRAINTS AND
PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10023X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201095-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS ....
10023
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RIQRIGINALLYDID NOT COVE R THIS FAILURE_ MODE(B_CKAGE OF
SINGLE INLET FILTER), HOWEVER ADDED 03-2A-201095-3 PER IOA ISSUE.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10024X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10024
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
[ ] [ ] ]
E ] [ ] ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[
[
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/Ri DONOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RU_RE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). THE SSMAGREED THAT THIS VALVEBODY
SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
201013-1) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE BE
INCLUDED ON THE FMEA (CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA
AND GROUND CREWS).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10025X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201060-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10025
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERE_CES, IQARECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND THE
EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE (CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION,
EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-IO026X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10026
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]: :
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). THE
SSM_GREED:THAT:RESTRICTED-F--LOW SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE FAILURE
MODES ON 03-2A-201060-3 (3/IR FNP, BURST DISK FAILS TO RUPTURE).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10027X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201060-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10027
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
CIL
ITEM
B C
] [ ] [ ] [x]*
] [ ] [ ] [x]
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
l
mm
mS
mm
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA_COVERS 0NL_ THEBELLOWS LEALKAGE FAILUR E_ MODE. IOA HAS
NO ISSUE WITH THIS FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND ADDING
STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND THE HAZARDS OF PROP LEAKAGE TO
EVA CREW, VEHICLE, AND GROUND CREW.
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE. THE SSM
AGREED THAT THIS VALVE BODY SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE PROP LINE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-202108-I) WITH CORRESPONDING
RETENTION RATIONALE
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10028X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10028
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES _C_SCREEN AS '¢PASS'!. NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS
FAILUREMODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). THE SSM AGREED THAT THIS FAILURE
MODE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL. IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/IR
PFP FOR RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE PROP TANK ISOL 3/4/5
VALVES. RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH ONE 3/4/5 VALVE WOULD NOT BE
DETECTABLE DURING DUAL LEG OPERATION. IOA WITHDRAWS 2/1R CRIT,
BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW OF PROP TO A THRUSTER
COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10029X
NASA FMEA #" 03-2A-202110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10029
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
m
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RE COMM_N_DS THAT THIS FAILU_ MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR PNP
FOR THE 1/2 VALVE AND PLACED ON THE CIL. THIS FAILURE COULD
RESULT IN OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF THE DOWNSTREAM PROP
LINES, AND IS LISTED AS A CAUSE ON THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-202108-I) AND AS A FAILURE MODE ON 03-2A-
202140-3.
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A 2/IR PNP SINCE A PREVIOUS
FAILURE IS REQUIRED BEFORE THE VALVE WILL BE CLOSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10030X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10030
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) {I
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 3/IR PNP
FOR THE 3/4/5 VALVE, THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF THE DOWNSTREAM PROP LINES, AND
IS LISTED AS A CAUSE ON THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA
(03-2A-202108-I) AND AS A FAILURE MODE ON 03-2A-202140-3.
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A 3/IR PNP SINCE A PREVIOUS
FAILURE IS REQUIRED BEFORE THE VALVE WILL BE CLOSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10031X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10031
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
I\
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applica>le)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NO ISSUE. NASA/RI DO NOT COVERTHIS FAILURE MODE (FAILS MID-
TRAVEL), HOWEVER THE WORST-CASE EFFECTS OF THIS FAILURE ARE
COVERED BY THE FAILED CLOSED AND RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10032X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ARCS
10032
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 3/4/5
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (FAILS MID-
TRAVEL), HOWEVER THE WORST-CASE EFFECTS OF THIS FAILURE ARE
COVERED BY THE FAILED CLOSED AND RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10033X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202111-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10033
RCS CROSSFEED VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (RELIEF DEVICE
FAILS CLOSED) BE UPGRADED TO A 3/IR PNP. THE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY (OMS & RCS CROSSFEED VALVE DEVICES) COULD RESULT IN
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF CROSSFEED LINES.
THIS FAILURE IS LISTED AS A CAUSE ON THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-202108-I) AND AS A FAILURE MODE ON 03-2A-
202140-3.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10034X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10034
RCS CROSSFEED VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETEN!iON RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (FAILS MID-
TRAVEL), HOWEVER THE WORST-CASE EFFECTS OF THIS FAILURE ARE
COVERED BY THE FAILED CLOSED AND RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODES.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10035X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10035
MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOL VALVES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
mm
mm
B
ms
mm
B
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
*iiL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
2/IR PNP AND PLACED ON THE CIL. THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM PROP LINES, AND IS
LISTED AS A CAUSE ON THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA
(03-2A-202108-I) AND AS A FAILURE MODE ON 03-2A-202140-3.
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A 2/IR PNP SINCE A PREVIOUS
FAILURE IS REQUIRED BEFORE THE VALVE WILL BE CLOSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10036X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202140-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10036
VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS DISCUSS THE
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10037X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10037
MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOL VALVES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (FAILS MID-
TRAVEL), HOWEVER THE WORST-CASE EFFECT_OF THIS FAILURE ARE
COVERED BY THE FAILED CLOSED AND RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10038X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
AXES
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS
10038
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO HDW ISSUE. THIS FAILURE MODE (PREMA_E OPERATION,-FAILS ON)
COULD ONLY BE CAUSED BY AN EPDC (RJD) FAILURE. THE RJDS ARE
ASSESSED BY IOA IN THE GNC SUBSYSTEM.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10039X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10039
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIER, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C !
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
U
I
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO HDW ISSUE. THIS FAILURE MODE (PREMATURE OPERATION, FAILS ON)
COULD ONLY BE CAUSED BY AN EPDC (RJD) FAILURE. THE RJDS ARE
ASSESSED BY IOA IN THE GNC SUBSYSTEM.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10040X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10040
THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSY, PRIMARY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] ,
] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS ITEMAND FAILURE (RESTRICTED FLOW).
IOA RE_OMMENDS_THAT_THIS IT_ AND FAILUREMODE BE ADDRESSED ON
THE FMEA/CIL WITH A I/I CRITICALITY. THE INJECTOR IS AT THE SAME
LEVEL OF DETAIL AS OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS WHICH ARE
COVERED ON INDIVIDUAL FMEA, AND SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE i/I
ATTENTION. RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE INJECTOR COULD RESULT IN
THRUSTER BURN-THROUGH.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10041X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10041
THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSY, PRIMARY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] *
] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
J
m
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m
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS ITEM AND FAILURE (RESTRICTED FLOW).
IOA RECO_NDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON
THE FMEA/CIL WITH A i/I CRITICALITY. THE INJECTOR IS AT THE SAME
LEVEL OF DETAIL AS OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS WHICH ARE
COVERED ON INDIVIDUAL FMEA, AND SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE i/I
ATTENTION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10042X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:-
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
AXES
FRCS
i0042
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL
LEAD ANALYST: ' C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE_MODE - (DELAYED OPERATION , ONE
VALVE OPENS SLOWLY OR LATE). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL WITH A i/I CRIT. SUCH
A FAILURE COULD RESULT IN ZOTS CAUSING THRUSTER RUPTURE AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10043X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
AXES
ARCS
10043
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
B C
] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [x]
] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[i/i] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _i_+ _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (DELAYED OPERATION, ONE
VALVE OPENS SLOWLY OR LATE). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL WITH A I/i CRIT. SUCH
A FAILURE COULD RESULT IN ZOTS CAUSING THRUSTER RUPTURE AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10116X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10116
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
u
u
w
U
w
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (PREMATURE
OPERATION DURING GROUND C/O TRICKLE CURRENT TEST) BE UPGRADED TO
A I/I AND PLACED ON THE CIL. FIRING OF A THRUSTER ON THE GROUND
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO EXPOSURE TO PROP,
PROP VAPO_ OR THRUSTER-PLUM-E. ....
THIS EPDC (RJD) FAILURE MAY BE COVERED IN THE GNC SUBSYSTEM.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10138X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
AXES
ARCS
10138
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 1/1 ] [ ] C ] C ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (PREMATURE
OPERATION DURING GROUND C/O TRICKLE CURRENT TEST) BE UPGRADED TO
A I/1 AND PLACED ON THE CIL. FIRING OF A THRUSTER ON THE GROUND
COULD RESULT_iN LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO EXPOSURE TO PROP,
PROP VAPORS, OR THRUSTER PLUME.
THIS EPDC (RJD) FAILURE MAY BE COVERED IN THE GNC SUBSYSTEM.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-308
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2176 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
FRCS
308
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-309
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2176 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
309
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
Nil
i
mm
i
g
i
L
l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-310
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2176A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
310
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
i
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-311
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2176A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
311
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ]
[2/1R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] "
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
l
mm
i
B
m
r
D
RECO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
g
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-312
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2176 -I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
312
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
= :
m
w
g
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
....... ADEQUATE [
.... INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
FRCS-313
05-6KF-2176 -2
FRCS
313
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
CIL
ITEM
[P] [ ]*
[P] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
I
n
m
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l
m
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-314
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2176A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
314
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
1
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-315
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2176A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
315
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (Ifdifferent from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
me
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-316
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2251 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 316
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[P] [NA] [P]
[F] [P] [F]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [N] [N] [N] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-317
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2251 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 317
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ p ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-318
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2251 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 318
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
" (ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
...... ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
z
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-277
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-319
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2251 -2
NASA DAT_: ....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 319
ITEM: DIODE
L
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[F] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ F ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
I
D
i
mm
m
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-320
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2252 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 320
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
i_:_ :_ ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-321
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2252 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 321
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
I
nl
u
n
D
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ . ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. DIODE FAILING SHORT ALONE
HAS NO EFFECT.
mm
ms
B
I
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-322
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2252 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 322
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
w
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w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-323
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2252 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 323
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A _ B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. DIODE FAILING SHORT ALONE
HAS NO EFFECT.
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AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
FRCS-324
05-6KF-2267 -i
FRCS
324
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESS_NT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 J
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
FRCS-325
05-6KF-2267 -2
FRCS
325
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
[ ]
B C
[ J [ J
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-326
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2267 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 326
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
' (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
; ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-327
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2267 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 327
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-328
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2202A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 328
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-329
05-6KF-2202A-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 329
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
COMPARE
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HD_FUNC A B C
[3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N/N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-330
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2202 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 330
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
l
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-331
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2202 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 331
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
i
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-332
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2202 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 332
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-333
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2202 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 333
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[p]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-334
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-220IA-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 334
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-335
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2201A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 335
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[P]
[ ]
B
[p]
[F]
[ N ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
m
i
l
mm
D
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-336
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2201 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 336
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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[]
I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-337
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2201 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 337
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[F] [F]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
m
!
m
mm
I
m
I
m
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
JADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-338
05-6KF-2202A-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 338
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [- ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
(If applicable) <ii
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESS MENT°ID: FRCS-339
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2202A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 339
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable) <I
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-340
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2001 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 340
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[P] [P] [P]
[F] [P] [F]
[ ] *
IX]
COMP_ [ / ] [N] [ ] [N] [N]
m
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
E
n
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-341
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2001 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 341
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P.]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADDyDELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-342
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2076 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
342
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATt_ONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-343
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2076 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
343
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I
B
mm
m
m
z
i
,ram
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETEfTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
m
m
b
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-344
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2076 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
344
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] C ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
m
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-345
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2076 -i
NASA DATA:
.... -B_ EI._ [.....]_
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
345
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
C ] [ ] C ] C ] *
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
C ] [ ] C ] C ]
I
I
I
i
I
B
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
.... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-346
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2076 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
346
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-347
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2076 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
347
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I
ms
D
I
mm
R
ms
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
..... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDTBLE FAILURE.
IOA _COMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-348
05-6KF-2077 -I
FRCS
348
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-349
05-6KF-2077 -i
FRCS
349
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
mm
ms
l
m
mm
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A _DIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88 (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-350
05-6KF-2077 -i
FRCS
350
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[312R] [P] [P] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-351
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2077 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
351
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88 (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-352
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2077 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
352
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [ 3
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-353
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2077 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] ....
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
353
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOARECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
mm
m
g
I
mm
i
mm
g
mm
mm
ISSUE RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88 (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FI%CS-354
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2077 -I
NASA DATA:
_ELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
354
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ 3 C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSSOFAC_TE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITIOn. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS O_ ALL-REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
_/2o/88.
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W
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-355
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2077 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
355
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS A NOT CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS ....
FMEA .....
ISSUE RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88 (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-356
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2078 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 356
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMP_ [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYMAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-357
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2078 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
357
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmc
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. _........_......
ISSUE RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88 (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-358
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
358
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
COMPARE
CIL
ITEMFLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ . ]
[N/N ] [N] [N] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II080X-II084X.
w
m
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-317
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-359
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
359
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] IN] [N]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
I
I
I
mm
g
II
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II080X-I1084X. _
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-360
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
360
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
CIL
ITEM
]
]
C
[ ] [ ] *
[P] [ ]
[ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDSFRCS II080X-II084X. ......
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-361
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_ [ ]
FRCS .....
361
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ 3
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II080X-I!084X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-362
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
362
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II080X-II084X.
i
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-363
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
363
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II080X-II084X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-364
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
364
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
_LIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL--ISOLATION VALVE A & B swITCH_RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II080X-II084X.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-365
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
5, 6
FRCS
365
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ S ] IN] IN] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A &B SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS l1080X-11084X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-366
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
366
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] CP] CP]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II080X-II084X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
7, 8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-367
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
367
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [F] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A &B SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II080X-II084X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-368
NASA DATA: .....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
L-
I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
7, 8
FRCS
368
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
- NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] C
[P] CP] [
t_
m
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
_ * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
" ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
_ REMARKS: _ _
..... -]_ELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A &BSWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II080X-II084X. -.....
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ASSESSMENT DATE :
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #"
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
9, i0
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-369
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
369
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _i÷_ ......_ .....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II080X-II084X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
9, i0
FRCS-370
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
370
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II080X-II084X.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
II, 12
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-371
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA
IOA
FRCS
371
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL IS0_TION VALVE A & B SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II080X-II084X.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-372
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
II, 12
FRCS
372
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS". (If different from NASA)
"[_ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II080X-II084X.
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M
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-373
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS _ _
373
HE TK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] IN] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ ] *
[ ]
C ]
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-374
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
374
HE TK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ _ ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ 3
[ ]
w
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-375
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS .....7-_
375
HE FU TK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CP] CP] CP]
C ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEAo
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-376
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
376
HE FU TK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTIONRATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-377
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
377
HE OX TK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmc
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
coMp_ [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-378
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
378
HE OX TK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] IN]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-379
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-103350 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
379
HE OX TK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-380
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03350 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM"
FRCS
380
HE OX TK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY S_ENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE ( /N ] ( N ] [ N ] ( N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
...... INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-381
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03360 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
381
HE OX TK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ 3
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ 3 [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ 3 C 3 [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-382
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03360 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
382
HE OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
m
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w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-383
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
383
HE OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmc
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMAR/_S •
REDUNDANT TO FRCS 381.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-384
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
FRCS
384
HE OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
REDUNDANT TO FRCS 382.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-385
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03360 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
385
HE FU TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-386
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03360 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
386
HE FU TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
L
l
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
h
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-387
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2151 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
387
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
g
Im
g
g
Q
g
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-388
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 388
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY ........REDUND_CYSCREENS CIL
ITEMFLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from-NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
r_
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-389
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 389
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
R_.D_DANCYSCREENS
A B
_7
C .........
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] .
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
I
Im
U
I
I
mi
I
l
z
m
im
mi
I
i
g
I
--- Z
m £
g
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-348
i £
ww
w
_ I
w
w
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-390
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 390
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[F]
[ N ]
B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
w
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-391
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253C-2
NASA _DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 391
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_C
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] .
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-392
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 392
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
IF]
[N]
B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-393
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253C-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 393
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COM?ARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-394
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 394
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
C ]
N
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-395
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 395
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[F] [F]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
z
D
u
mm
ms
I
U
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-396
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253D-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 396
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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BB
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-397
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253D-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 397
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[F] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-398
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 398
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO OPEN THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE 1/20/88 MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-399
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253B-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 399
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
l
m
m
mm
D
R
B
U
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-400
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 400
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO OPEN THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE 1/20/88 MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.
u
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-401
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253B-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 401
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDw/nmc
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ 3 [ 3
IF] [P]
IN] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ 3
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (I f different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-402
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253A-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 402
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
_ INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE WITH GPC. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO TAKE EFFECT CAN BE UP TO 24 HOURS.
SOFTWARE HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED. IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE
BASED ON THIS RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-403
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 403
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IF] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
I
=
m
I
mm
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
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I
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-404
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 404
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
........ INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE WITH GPC. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
m
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO TAKE EFFECT CAN BE UP TO 24 HOURS.
SOFTWARE HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED. IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE
BASED ON THIS RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-405
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
_'w [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 405
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES ............
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
J
I
m
m
i
b
i
l
mm
m
ms
I
g
m
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-364
ms
t
mm
m_
WU
m
ml
m
wmmmr
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-406
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 406
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ x] *
C ]
[ N ] .....
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
w
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-365
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-407
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 407
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ..............
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.-_
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-408
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253E-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 408
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
C ] C ] C ]
[ N ] [ N ] C N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C3/3 ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-409
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 409
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-410
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 410
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
...... (ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-411
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 411
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-412
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 412
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-413
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253F-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 413
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /iR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
IF] IF]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CILRETENTIONRATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-414
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253D-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 414
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] IN]
C
[P]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
z
E
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-415
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253D-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 415
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ........
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-416
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253D-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 416
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
m
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ASSESSME_ DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-417
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253D-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 417
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
= _HDW/FUNC
RED_CY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
NASA [ 3 /3 ], [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ]
B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-4i8
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253E-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 418
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
(3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
w
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-419
NASA FMEA # : 05-6KF-2253E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 419
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. --
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-420
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 420
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
n
mmm
W
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTIONRATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
.... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILUREALONEHAS NO
EFFECT.
L
%win
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-421
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 421
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
g
m
mm
w
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-422
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 422
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ I ] C
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
B C
] C ] [ ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE WITH GPC. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO TAKE EFFECT CAN BE UP TO 24 HOURS.
SOFTWARE HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED. IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE
BASED ON THIS RATIONALE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-381
=
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-423
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253A-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 423
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[F] [P]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[p]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
mm
N
u
mm
am
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
l
w
mm
l
z
mm
g
mm
I
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w
L_
w
m
m
wm_
w
w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-424
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 424
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
_ INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
U
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
K
r_
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-425
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 425
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] C ]
] [ ]
I
l
g
I
I
U
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
mm
m_
m
mm
u
mm
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-426
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 426
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
IF]
IN]
B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
m
m
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
i
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-427
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254C-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 427
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
Ix]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
l
m
mm
u
I
I
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
l
R
mm
l
R
m
u
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-428
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 428
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
i
w
r
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-429
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254C-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 429
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
C3/3 ] [ ]
[3/IR] [F]
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
m
b
mE
EE
am
i
i
am
m
mm
i
mE
mm
am
mm
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N
Z
[]
i
M
i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-430
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254F-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 430
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
_[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-431
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254F-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 431
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[F] [F]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[p]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
I
i
ms
m
Im
D
l
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
I
mm
mm
Z
ms
U
mm
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
FRCS-432
05-6KF-2254D-I
FRCS
432
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[ ] E ]
IN] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
E ]
[ )
m
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
m
i
m
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-433
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254D-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 433
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
IF] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
ms
mm
mm
i
i
i
J
l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
mR
[]
i
B
m
mm
mm
mm
mm
B
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U
I
W
m
w
u
w
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-434
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 434
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY _DUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO OPEN THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
r_
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-435
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254B-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 435
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
IF] [P]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
B
m
l
mm
I
l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
z
u
mm
l
mm
I
g
mm
g
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i
z
m
i
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-436
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 436
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
[P] [P] [P] [
[F] [P] [P] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) •
E311R] [P] [NA] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO OPEN THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-437
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254B-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 437
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ]
CO.ARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
mlm
m
mm
M'
w
ms
z
W
Qm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
m
g
m
I
m
I z
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m
i
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-438
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 438
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
B C
] C ] C ] C ] *
] C ] [ ] C ]
] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-439
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254A-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 439
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
m
i
i
l
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
I
nl
mR
m
m
g
u
U
m
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-440
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 440
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-441
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 441
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
i
m
i
m
I
I
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-442
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 442
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] IN] IN]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-443
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 443
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
mm
B
J
m
B
z
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r_
D
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mm
mm
m
mm
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-444
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254E-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 444
ITEM: DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
n
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-445
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254E-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 445
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
1
1
1
1
m
mm
11
1
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
k
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-446
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 446
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
w
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-447
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 447
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
C 3 C ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-448
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 448
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
i
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U
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-449
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 449
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IF] IF] [P]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] IN] IN] IN] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-450
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254D-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 450
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA
IOA
A
[3/IR] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ]
B C
[ P ] [ p ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
r ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-451
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254D-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 451
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] .
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-452
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254D-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 452
ITEM: DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-453
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254D-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 453
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
I
m
m
I
I
im
r
IE
ms
mm
U
Ilm
I
m
i
I '
qm °
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-412
I
II
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
D
w
= :
m
=
m
w
W
m
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-454
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
[ ]
[ ]
W
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-455
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 455
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
U
m
=
B
Ira,
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: - FRCS-456
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
05-6KF-2254 -i
FRCS
456
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DAT_:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
IN] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES.
EFFECT.
] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-457
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254A-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 457
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] C ] C ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ..........
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1229/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-458
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 458
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK BECAUSE TIME TO EFFECT IS UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT_ DATE: 1/--29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-459
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 459
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[F] [P] [P]
IN] [N] [N] c l*
[
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS" (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
..... INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-460
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2206 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 460
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ 3 [ 3 [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If di-fferent from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCYPROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL RED_DANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
t_
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT _D: FRCS-461
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2206 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 461
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. Loss OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
!SSU_ENOTRESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-462
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2206 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [.... ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 462
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE _SS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-463
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2206 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 463
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
]
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-464
NASA _ #: 05-6KF-2207 -i
SUBSYST_: FRCS
MDAC ID: 464
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
T._.AD ANALYST: D. __
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION _TIONAT._.: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICAT!_ON_OF THE VALVE
__s±_o_. ....._D_ _. _ o_ A_ __c_ _Y_AD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYST__AGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
FRCS-465
05-6KF-2207 -2
FRCS
465
DRIVER, HYBRID
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I
m
m
g
D
mm
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-466
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2207 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 466
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-467
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2207 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 467
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ].......
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
C ] [ ] C ] *
[ ] [ ] C ]
C ] [ ] C ]
mm
ms
mm
B
me
[]
me
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
........ INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDE-D. LOSS OF A_D_ANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-468
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2003 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 468
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
COMPARE [ /N ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[N] IN] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] C ] C ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
w
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-469
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2003 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 469
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
m
l
m
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_-
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
I
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-470
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2004 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 470
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA
IOA
C 3 /IR ] C P ] C P ]
C3/3 ] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[p]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
C ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-471
05-6KF-2004 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 471
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[p]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
R
I
mm
B
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-472
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126 -l
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 472
ITEM: RELAY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY ......._DUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH THE LOSS OF THIS RELAY, VALVE CANNOT BE OPENED. INABILITY
TO OPEN VALVE PREVENTS OPERATION OF JETS REQUIRED FOR TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE TANK ISOLATION
VALVE 1/2 FAILED CLOSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-473
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 473
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_JNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
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AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESS_T ID:_ FRCS-474
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126A-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 474
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SC_ENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELIN_ [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREE_ WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
w
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n
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-475
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 475
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
mm
D
mm
g
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
m
i
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AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-476
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 476
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/IR] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
CP] [P]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
=
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=
_mm
M
w
m
m
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g
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-477
05-6KF-2126A-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 477
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-478
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 478
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-
WITH T_IHE Loss _OF _IS_RELAY_ VALVE _C_0T BE OPENED. • INABiLiTY....
TO OPEN VALVE PREVENTS OPERATION OF JETS REQ_RED FOR TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE TANK ISOLATION
VALVE 1/2 FAILED CLOSED.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-479
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
= NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 479
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
l
B
m
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFE_NT INTERP_TATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-480
05-6KF-2126A-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 480
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
D. HARTMAN
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ p ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
[ ]
C ]
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-481
05-6KF-2126A-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 481
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FI_CS-482
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 482
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-483
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 483
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. RED_DANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DIS_SSED. IT WAS AG_ED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-484
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127A-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 484
ITEM: RELAY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
• _'_ _ ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH THE LOSS OF THIS _LAY, VALVE CANNOT BE OPENED. INABILITY
TO OPEN VALVE PREVENTS OPERATION O? JETS _QUTRED TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING CG LIMITS. ALSO THEIR IS NO
REDUNDANCY FOR MANIFOLD 5 :(VERNIERS , 2/2)_:............
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5. THE VERNI_S_ _(_/2)"
REMAINS OPEN AS WELL.
z REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-443
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-485
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127A-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 485
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] IN]
C
[p]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS _LTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER _.
AT MEETING w_TH SUBsYST-_AN__0N I/20/88,--N_TS-22206 wAS .....
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-486
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 486
ITEM: RELAY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
C ] [ ]
[N] IN]
C
[P]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
...... ADEQUATE
• INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-487
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 487
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA-
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
...... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
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AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-488
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 488
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDA/_CYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
w
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w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-489
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 489
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
..... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES .....
INABILITY TO OPEN-THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PR0_DED. ......_SS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPEL_S TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-490
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 490
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH THE LOSS OF THIS RELAY, VALVE CANNOT BE OPENED. INABILITY
TO OPEN VALVE PREVENTS OPERATION OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING CG LIMITS. ALSO THEIR IS NO
REDUNDANCY FOR MANIFOLD 5 (VERNIERS - 2/2).
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5. THE VERNIER ISSUE (2/2)
REMAINS OPEN AS WELL. -..............................
U
m
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-449
n
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
1
1
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-491
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 491
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
C ] C ] C ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX] *
[ ]
[ N ]
1
1
1
1
1
1
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE _INS OPEN. _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-492
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 492
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
U
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-493
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 493
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
mm
ms
ms
mm
L
ms
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
B
I
mm
mm
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DIs_SSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: i/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-494
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 494
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
_b_Y SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (I_ _different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
n
u
=
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-495
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 495
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO OPEN _THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-496
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2083 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 496
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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R
ms
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-497
NASA _ #: 05-6KF-2083 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYST_: FRCS
MDAC ID: 497
ITS: _SISTOR, 1.2K 2W
T._AD _ALYST: D. __
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMP_ [ / ]
_D_D_CY SC_ENS
A
C ]
[ ]
[ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
IT_
[ ]
_CO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL _TENTION _TIONAT._:
REM_:
NO DIFFE_NCES .
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-498
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2083 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 498
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
w
r
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-499
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2083 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 499
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DI_FERENCES, ...... _
[ ]
[ ]
l
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-500
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2083 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 500
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-501
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2083 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 501
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-502
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2081 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
502
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACUTE INDICATION 0?THE-vALvE
POSITION_ _ _DA_CY P_OVIDED. L_SE OF ALL REDUNDANCY_YLEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
_z
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-503
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2081 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
503
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
C ] C ] C ] C ] *
C ] C ] C ] [ ]
C ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT"--_?AILURE_ MODE FROM: THIS _
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED) .
g
mm
mm
B
l
D
l
i
mm
g
mm
m
J
z
I
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-462
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
w
m
w
I
==
i
m
=__
I
i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-504
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2082 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
504
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (Ifdifferent:fr0m NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
...... (ADD/DE_TE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
PO_O_'__DANCY _0__ ....L0_SOF _RED__YL,_AD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-505
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2082 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
S0S
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS_MOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM _IS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-506
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2081 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
506
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
................................. I.............
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-507
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2082 -I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
507
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-508
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2082 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
508
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ) [ P ] [ P ) [ P )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
......................................... , =. ................. ......... ........
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-509
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2082 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
509
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
i _i _ ...........
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-510
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2081 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
510
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY : REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID"
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-511
05-6KF-2081 -1
FRCS
511
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
I
I
i
D
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOARECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
mm
g
i
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH suBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-512
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2081 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
512
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] C ] *
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
C 3 /2R ]
(If different from NASA)
[P] CP] CP] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
: ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYMAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-513
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2081 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
513
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] _ _-_
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING wITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-514
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2084 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]_
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 514
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDA/_CY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
_. (ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
........... TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-515
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2084 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 515
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ 3
m
[]
E
1
1
1
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ 3 C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES ....
1
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-516
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2084 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 516
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-517
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2084 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 517
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_mC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C
[ ] C
C ] C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] C ]
] [ ]
m
me
me
u
l
I
z
I
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS-
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-518
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2084 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 518
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ]
--REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[ F ]
[ ]
[N]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-519
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2084 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 519
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-520
05-6KF-2086 -I
FRCS
520
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A CB
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION O? THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED, LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-521
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2086 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
521
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] :
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
U
mm
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ms
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
......... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
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ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-522
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2085 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
522
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-523
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2085 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
523
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .........
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS _ii
FME.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE_I/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-524
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2086 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
FRCS
524
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ ADEQUATE [ ]
_ INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS'FAILtrRE _Y=:CAUSE _SS O_ _C_TE _iNDICATION _OF=THE VALVE
POSITI_ON. _.... _D_DJIN_Y PROVIDEDL ....LOSS" OF ALL-REDUNDANCY-MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WI_SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-525
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2086 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
525
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]. [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
..... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOARECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEAo
ISSUE RESOLVED AT_ETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-526
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2085 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
526
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
........... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : _
THIS_AILUP_E MAY qAUSE_S S OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS_OP ALL_REDUNDANC_MA¥ LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYST_ _AGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-527
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2085 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
527
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS _OVAL oF_THEwSHORT _ ?AILURE MODE FROM THIS
ISSUE RESOLVED AT _ETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-528
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2086 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
528
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY .... REDUNDANCY SCREENS ....... CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL_DUNDANCYMAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-529
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2086 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
529
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECO_NDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-530
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2086 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
530
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
...... [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POS_. _ R_D_DANCY_PR0_IDED. _LoSS OF ALL_UNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS •
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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l
ms
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-531
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2086 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
531
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLEFAILURE.
IOARECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
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l
ISSUE RESOLVED=AT METING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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_ ASSESSMENT DATE:
_ ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
m
u
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
_ ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-532
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
532
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
m
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
-- RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
m
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_ * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
w ............... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCH RE'ANALYZED BY
= IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II085X-II089X. .......
u
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
FRCS-533
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
533
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
]
m
m
i
me
I
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS l1085X-l1089X. ........
me
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-534
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
534
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
E ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II085X-II089X.
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B
I
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-535
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
co_ [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
535
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 1,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [F] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II085X-lI089X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE_ _
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-536
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS
536
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [
] C ] *
] C ]
COMPARE C N /N ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II085X-II089X.
i
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-537
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS _ _ _
537
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II085X-II089X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-538
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
538
OX & FUTK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II085X-II089X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-539
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
6
FRCS
539
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5,
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II085X-II089X.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-540
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
540
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ Y ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II085X-II089X.
w
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I
I
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-541
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
541
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II085X-II089X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-542
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
542
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA° SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II085X-II089X.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
I0
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-543
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
543
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ I ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II085X-II089X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
10
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-544
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
544
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY
IOAo SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II085X-II089X.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
Ii, 12
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS'545
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS ....
545
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ...........
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II085X-II089X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ii, 12
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-546
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
546
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] C F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY
IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II085X-II089X.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_O_C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-547
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
547
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
C ] C ] C ] C ]
C ] C ] C ] C ]
mR
I
mm
I
l
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TAN_K ISOI2%TION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II090X-II094X. I
g
mm
z
D
Im
mm
l
M
J
m
u
m
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-506
I
N
D
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
m
u
M
qhe
w
w
L--
n
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
FRCS-548
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
548
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II090X-II094X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
FRCS-549
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
FRCS
549
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
CN] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]
mm
D
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II090X-II094X.
R
m
[]
mm
U
R
am
D
m
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-508
i
L_
B
=
w
] ]
w
m
APPENDIX C
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT IDi FRCS-550
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
i, 2
FRCS
550
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] *
IF] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II090X-II094X.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
I
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
FRCS-551
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
551
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II090X-11094X.
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mmm
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-552
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
552
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II090X-II094X.
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D
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-553
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
553
OX & FU TK ISOLVLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_: _ _r_
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS 11090X-11094X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-554
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
5, 6
FRCS
554
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC B C
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ] *
C 3/3 ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL =T_ ISOLATIONVALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOAo SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II090X-II094X.
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m
mm
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-555
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
555
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _i_ % _ _ ?
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
oxIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II090X-II094X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
7, 8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-556
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
556
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II090X-II094X.
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m
m
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
7, 8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-557
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS i_.....
557
OX & FU TK ISOLVLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ,_...._ADEQUATEC 1
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II090X-II094X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-558
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
I0
FRCS
558
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9,
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ 3
..... _ (ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
:_ _ INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II090X-II094X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
I0
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
FRCS-559
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
559
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9,
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II090X-II094X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID- FRCS-560
NASA FMEA # :
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ii, 12
FRCS
560
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II090X-II094X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ii, 12
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-561
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
561
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[p]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II090X-II094X.
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wASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-562
FRCS
562
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE TO CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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g
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-563
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
563
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT-.
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
g
a
m
i
I
z
mm
J
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQU_ATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
C_GE TO CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESS_NT IDs FRCS IIO01X-II079X.
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Jme
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-564
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
564
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
:_:_ (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE TO CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT iDs FRCS II001X-11079X.
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I
m
ms
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
_AD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-565
FRCS
565
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
IIII
mm
mm
I
mm
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE TO CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDsFRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-566
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS
566
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FORWARD..........MANIFOLD IS0LATIO _ VAL_ #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE TO CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESS_-_ ....FRCS-S6_
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
FRCS
567
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
=
b
n
ms
nm
U
I
gm
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ............
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE TO CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X'II079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-568
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 568
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
• (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-569
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 569
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
CN]
mm
I
i
m
g
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON_SOCIATED M_IFO_- _REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-570
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 570
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ I ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-571
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255C-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 571
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
IF] [P]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
Ix]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-572
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 572
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THISFAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-573
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 573
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
B C
] C ] [ ] C ] *
] C ] C ] C ]
] [ ] [ ] C ]
I
i
U
n
I
I
m
z
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
m
mm
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-574
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 574
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS DIODE FAILED OPEN CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE WITH
THE GPC. MANUAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
112o/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-575
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 575
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA. _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-576
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 576
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-577
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 577
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
C ] C ] C ]
CN] CN] CN]
[X] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA _A CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES_EX-CESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (_OI_TiNUOUS POWER _T_ 0_S_THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. _DUND_CYPROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL_PRQPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-578
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 578
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] [N] [N]
[X]*
[ ]
IN]
m
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
b
I
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-579
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 579
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
,,m
m,,
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAy CAUSE _ OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION, _DUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-580
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 580
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) _
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-581
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 581
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C _
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-582
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 582
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WiTH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-583
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 583
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
IN]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-584
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255A-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 584
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE 1 OF 2 GPC COMMANDS TO CLOSE THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY SECOND GPC COMMAND AND MANUAL CLOSE COMMAND. LOSS OF THIS,
COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT
ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
LEAK BECAUSE THE TIME TO EFFECT CAN BE UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-585
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 585
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
IF] [P]
[N] IN]
C
[ ]
[p]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[X]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REI_:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
mm
mm
m
l
mm
m
m
z
mm
i
z
I
g
mm
i
m
ms
I
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-544
mm
wm
L_
n
D
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESS_NT ID: FRCS-586
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 586
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
! ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE 1 OF 2 GPC COMMANDS TO CLOSE THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY SECOND GPC COMMAND AND MANUAL CLOSE COMMAND. LOSS OF THIS,
COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT
ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
LEAK BECAUSE THE TIME TO EFFECT CAN BE UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-587
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255A-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 587
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA
IOA
[ 3/3 ] C ] [ ]
C 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] C N ] C N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
C ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
CX]
[N]
!
l
i
mm
i
I
ms
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WiTH NASA _.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-588
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255D-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 588
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-589
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255D-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 589
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_W [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
IF] [P]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-590
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 590
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-591
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 591
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
IN] IN]
C
[p]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
[N]
[A]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEACONS!DE_ MULTIP!_=FAILU_S_ ....THISoFAI!_DSHORTDIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS QF JETS ON AS SOCIATED_IFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
m
g
mm
J
mm
l
i
mm
l
mm
lm
m
i
mm
BB
I
z
m
m
l
I
m
mm
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-550 A_ m
mm
u
L_
r _
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-592
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 592
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_"w,
• w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-593
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255C-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 593
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY RED_DANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
u
I
g
mm
i
mm
g
mm
i
g '
g
g
u
-- =
m
__-- ff
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-552 _-;_-
_--=F
::i= =
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
w
=
m
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-594
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 594
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
i
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA _FMEA_ CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
I
i
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-595
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 595
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
CIL
ITEM
B C
] [ ] C ] [ ] *
] C ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
U
I
i
l
z
g
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
ADEQUATE [ ]
_ INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
_SSI=TION. " _D_DANCY PRovIDED. _k)SS_OF _ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-596
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 596
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE C /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
U
m
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) _ __
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS DIODE FAILED OPEN CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE WITH
THE GPC. MANUAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
l/2O/8S.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-597
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 597
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
IF] [P]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
I
i
m
l
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS-
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
I
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-598
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 598
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-599
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 599
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
m
m
m
m
m
z
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
m
m
m
B
m
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-600
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 600
ITEM: DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS _..... CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If differen£_from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
°NASA FMEA CONTAINSMULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT*
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-601
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 601
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
m
B
mm
m
j
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACUTE INDICATION O FTHE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT iD: FRCS-602
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 602
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
b
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-603
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 603
ITEM: DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CP] CP] CP]
C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-604
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 604
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [P] [P] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-605
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 605
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CP] CP]
C ] [ ]
CP]
C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N.] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA°
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-606
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 606
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE 1 OF 2 GPC COMMANDS TO CLOSE THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY SECOND GPC COMMAND AND MANUAL CLOSE COMMAND. LOSS OF THIS,
COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT
ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
LEAK BECAUSE THE TIME TO EFFECT CAN BE UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.
h..
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-56S
APPENDIX C
_SESS_NT WO_HEET
mm
ASSESS_NT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-607
NASA _A #: 05-6KF-2255A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELI_ [ ]
N_ [ X ]
SU_YSTEM: _CS
MDAC ID: 607
ITS: DIODE
LEAD _ALYST: D. __
ASSESS_:
CRITICALITY _D_D_CY S_EENS CIL
FLIG_ ITEM
HDW/_C A _ B C ....
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
_CO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL _TE_ION _TIONA7,_.: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
...... INADEQUATE [ ]
REM_:
IOA AGNES WITH N_A _.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-608
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 608
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] C
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE 1 OF 2 GPC COMMANDS TO CLOSE THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY SECOND GPC COMMAND AND MANUAL CLOSE COMMAND. LOSS OF THIS,
COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT
ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
LEAK BECAUSE THE TIME TO EFFECT CAN BE UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-609
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 609
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
IF] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-610
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255D-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 610
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D, HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[P]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-611
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255D-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 611
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
cRITIcALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ]
[3/IR] [F]
C ] C ]
[P] [ P]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-612
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 612
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES°, = THiS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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II
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT iD: FRCS-613
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 613
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /iR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASAFMEA CONSIDE_ _LTIpLE FAILURES__IS FAI_D=SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED _IFOLD _.... _D_DANCY PROVIDED .BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-614
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 614
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[p]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
C_ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-615
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255C-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 615
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEAo
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-616
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 616
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
=
w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
w
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-617
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 617
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
mm
i
i
i
mm
I
U
z
g
g
I
m
D
I
B
g
i
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-576
mm
uAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
m
w
w
r_
w
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-618
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEw [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 618
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS - CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
= •
m
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/IR] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS DIODE FAILED OPEN CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE WITH
THE GPC. MANUAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-619
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 619
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[p]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-620
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 620
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] IF]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
CIL
ITEM
C
[P]
[ ]
[ N ]
IX]*
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA _MEA C0NSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES, THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
w
_:AT MEETING WI_'S_SYSTEM 'MANGER ON i/20/88_ NSTS 22206 WAS
DIS_SSED. i_9_-WA_ A_REED UP_N-THAT THE-ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
L_
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-621
NASA _ #: 0S-6KF-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 621
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
m
m
g
m
g
m
mm
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
................ INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER_iFOLD. LOSS OF _DUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-622
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 622
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [F] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS_FAILUREALONEHAS NO
EFFE_. ........ _............
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-623
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 623
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] C P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. _b_CY PROVIDED. _ _SS OF ALL _ANCY MAY I_AD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-624
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 624
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
L ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88"
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-625
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 625
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
IN] IN]
C
[P]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS"
!QA=AGREES WITH NASA FMEAo _ _z
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: -FRCS-626
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 626
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) _
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-627
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 627
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] CP]
C ] C ]
[P]
[ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS-.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
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[ ]
m
R
m
D
m
B
I
m
I
u
I
U
m
U_
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-586
I
wi
=
i
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-628
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255A-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 628
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
=
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE 1 OF 2 GPC COMMANDS TO CLOSE THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY SECOND GPC COMMAND AND MANUAL CLOSE COMMAND. LOSS OF THIS,
COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT
ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
LEAK BECAUSE THE TIME TO EFFECT CAN BE UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-629
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255A-2
suBsYsTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 629
ITEM: DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA. _
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-630
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255A-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 630
ITEM: DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
CIL
ITEM
B C _-
] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE 1 OF 2 GPC COMMANDS TO CLOSE THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY SECOND GPC COMMAND AND MANUAL CLOSE COMMAND. LOSS OF THIS,
COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT
ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
LEAK BECAUSE THE TIME TO EFFECT CAN BE UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-631
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 631
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IF] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
i
M
m
me
i
I
RECO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA __ _- _ ,_ ...._ .....
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
FRCS-632
05-6KF-2255D-I
FRCS
632
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
r-
w
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
L
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-633
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255D-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 633
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA
IOA
A
[3/3 ] [ ]
[3/1R] IF]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REI_:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-634
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 634
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
_If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ]_ [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIP_ FAI_S, THIS FAILURE_ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING W_H sUBS$STEM _AG__ i/20/88; NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-635
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 635
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEMFLIGHT
HDW/FUNC + A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF)•
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSQCIATED _IFOLD_ _DUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-636
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 636
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-637
05-6KF-2255C-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 637
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
D. HARTMAN
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[F] [P]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT iD: FRCS-638
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 638
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
N
W
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AG_ED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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b
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-639
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 639
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
.... _ ..... _ _:= ..... c _:..:_:_ :x_ _ ......
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-640
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 640
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS DIODE FAILED OpEN CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE WITH
THE GPC. MANUAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-641
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 641
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
I0A [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[F] [P]
[N] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEAo
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-642
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-I
.... NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 642
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P J [ F ] [ P ] [ X J *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
{AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
_SA FMEA CONSIDERs _MULTIPLE FAI_S. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
-_CAUSES-EXCE-SsI-V-EMOTOR bPERATTON--(_DI_FINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT_INTERPRETATIONS OF_NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
J
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-643
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 643
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] ........
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-644
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 644
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ P ]
[ ]
IN]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES.
EFFECT.
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-645
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 645
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY cAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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L
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
FRCS-646
05-6KF-2268 -I
FRCS
646
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION oF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
FRCS-647
05-6KF-2268 -2
FRCS
647
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
C P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
B
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
l
I
i
i
m
I
i
u-
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-648
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 648
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ]
] [ ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
[
[
[COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 3 /2R ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-649
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 649
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
•IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P]
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[P] [P]
C ] [ ]
IN] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESS_NT ID: FRCS-650
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 650
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
u
m
_L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE 1 OF 2 GPC COMMANDS TO CLOSE THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY SECOND GPC COMMAND AND MANUAL CLOSE COMMAND. LOSS OF THIS,
COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT
ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
LEAK BECAUSE THE TIME TO EFFECT CAN BE UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
FRCS-651
05-6KF-2255A-2
FRCS
651
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
CF] [P]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
C ]
CP]
CN]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
CX]
[ N ]
m
l
i
m
E
i
m
B
m
g
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
[ ]
[ ]
W
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
FRCS-652
05-6KF-2255A-I
FRCS
652
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
C ] C ] C ] C ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE 1 OF 2 GPC COMMANDS TO CLOSE THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY SECOND GPC COMMAND AND MANUAL CLOSE COMMAND. LOSS OF THIS,
COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT
ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE GPC IS NOT USED TO ISOLATE A
LEAK BECAUSE THE TIME TO EFFECT CAN BE UP TO 24 HOURS (SOFTWARE
HAS TO BE MANUALLY LOADED). IOA WITHDRAWS THEIR ISSUE BASED ON
THIS RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-653
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255A-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 653
ITEM: DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-654
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255D-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 654
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 13 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-613
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
FRCS-655
05-6KF-2255D-2
FRCS
655
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[F] [P]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
mm
R
m
m
m
m
m
M
D
U
l
w
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-614
im
u
w
i
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-656
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 656
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II00ix-IIO79X.
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ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-657
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 657
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable ) .............
_DEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD Iso_TION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY, SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS llO01X'llO79X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-658
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 658
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [
[ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] ] [ ] *
[ ] ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
FRCS-659 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 659
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-660
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS
660
DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY _DUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[N] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-661
FRCS
661
DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IF] [P] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[&a4680H]
g
I
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II00ix-II079X.
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w
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT-.
FRCS-662
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS
662
DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
]
]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] E ] [ ] E ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicabie)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
w
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ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-663
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 663
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEUATE [ ]
REMARKS: :_
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE AssESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-664
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 664
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARDMANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
FRCS-665
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 665
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
[ ] ] [ ] *
[ ] ] [ ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [
[ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
I
i
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
FRCS-666 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 666
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] [ ] *
C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS l1001X-l1079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-667
FRCS
DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-668
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 668
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN _
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
w
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-669
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 669
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOLATION VALVE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-670
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 670
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-671
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 671
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-672
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 672
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-673
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 673
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
_SE CAPABi£ITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THiS COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD !-4 ISOLATION VALVE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-674
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 674
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IX] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-675
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 675
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-676
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 676
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-677
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 677
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO oPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO
EXPEL PROPEL_TS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOLATION VALVE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-678
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 678
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-679
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 679
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /1R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-680
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 680
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
•IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION _TIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA _ coNsIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NsTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN,
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-681
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 681
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] • [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
i
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mm
D
mm
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)_ _ ........_i_
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOLATION VALVE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-682
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 682
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
CP] [F] CP]
C ] C ] C ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-683
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 683
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C P ] [ P ]
C ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE :
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-684
FRCS
684
DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
]
]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-685
FRCS
685
DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
FRCS-686
FRCS
686
DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-687
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 687
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] [ ] *
C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQ_YATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-688
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS
688
DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-689
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS
689
DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
C ] [ ] C ]
C ] C ] C ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ...._ _
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-690
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 690
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] C ] *
C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS".
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-691
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 691
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C ] ] [ ] *
[ ] ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [
[ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .... _ _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-IIO79X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
FRCS-692 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 692
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY I0A DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-693
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 693
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] _[ ] [ ] [ ]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS l1001X-l1079X.
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ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-694
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 694
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS lI001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-695
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 695
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] C ] *
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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w
w
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-696
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2005 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 696
ITEM: FUSE,IA
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS".
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
__I
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-697
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2005 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 697
ITEM: FUSE,IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-698
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2005 -i
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 698
ITEM: FUSE,IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-699
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2005 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 699
ITEM: FUSE,IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-700
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 700
ITEM: FUSE,IA
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] C ] *
C ] C ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-701
FRCS
701
FUSE,IA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: ..........._ _....
FORWARD MANIFOLD ISO_TION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO
CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs FRCS II001X-II079X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
FRCS-702
05-6KF-2128A-I
FRCS
702
RELAY
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
C P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
C ] [ ]
c
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOLATION VALVE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-703
05-6KF-2128A-2
FRCS
703
RELAY
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] IN]
C
[P]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : _ _........
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, RELAY FAILING
HIGH CREATES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
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AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88,_NSTS 222Q6 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-704
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 704
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA
IOA
A
[3/IR] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ]
B
[ NA]
[ ]
[N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: .... FRCS-705
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128 -2
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 705
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
NASA _A CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN
THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
b
g
u
W
D
U
mm
mm
mm
i
I
mm
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DSCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-706
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 706
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOLATION VALVE.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-707
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 707
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
CF] CP]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[X] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ "P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE MA/%KS :
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, RELAY FAILING
HIGH CREATES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH suBsYsTEM _AGER_ON 1/20/88, NsTs 222_06 WAS
DISCUSSED.IT WASAGREEDUPON THE ISSU RAISEDABOVEWAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-708
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 708
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/ZR3 [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
u
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-709
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 709
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /!R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN
THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
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AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
FRCS-710
05-6KF-2128A-I
FRCS
710
RELAY
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[P] [P]
[P] C P ]
[ ] C ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOLATION VALVE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-711
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 711
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSHENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CP] CF] [P]
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
......ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, RELAY FAILING
HIGH CREATES INABILITY TO cLOSE THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
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AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NST_ 2_206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
FRCS-712
05-6KF-2128 -I
FRCS
712
RELAY
D. HARTMAN
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[P] [NA] [P]
[ ] C ] [ ]
IN] [N] [N]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
L •
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-713
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 713
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT _ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ........._
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS •
..... u
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN
THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
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AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-714
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 714
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
x
..... [ ±
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOLATION VALVE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-715
05-6KF-2128A-2
FRCS
715
RELAY
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 3 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
['P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEACONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, RELAY FAILING
HIGH CREATES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
I
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-716
05-6KF-2128 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 716
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-717
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 717
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN
THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
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AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-718
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 718
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-719
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
719
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-720
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
720
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-721
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
721
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-722
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
722
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ .] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
l
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-723
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
723
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-724
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
FRCS
724
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-725
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
725
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS_ _-_<
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-726
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
726
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS-FAILURE MAY CAUSE _SSOF_ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
[] ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING Wi#H SUBSYSTEM _XGE_6N_I/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-727
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
727
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / 1 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A sHoRT AcROss A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-728
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
728
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-729
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
729
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
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ISSUE NoT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH=SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-730
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
730
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAusE LOSS OF AcuTE INDICATION 0FTHE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM   GER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-731
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
731
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASa [ _ /3 J [ ] [ _ [ _ [ I *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-732
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 732
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-733
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -2
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 733
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-734
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
734
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]*
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-735
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS
735
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-736
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
736
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-737
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2087 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
737
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HAR_
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-738
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
738
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
=
w
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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m
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-739
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM'.
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
739
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS ."
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-740
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
740
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-741
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2088 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
741
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
_EMARKS : ..............
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED) .
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